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ABSTRACT

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT:
A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF FORENSIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TRUTH IN CHILD NARRATIVES

By
Elizabeth Samson
August 2019

Dissertation supervised by Lori E. Koelsch, Ph.D.
This dissertation draws on a hermeneutically-informed modification of Potter and
Wetherell’s (1987) discourse analysis methodology to explore how child memory and
experience are conceptualized in two widely-used forensic psychology training manuals.
Current research about child testimony tends to focus on how well children can factually
recount their experiences, or on optimizing interviewer performance so as to obtain
accurate accounts and minimize the risk of distorting children’s memories. Results of this
discourse analysis include: 1) frequent advisement of evaluator caution, objectivity, and
thoroughness, since evaluators are understood as responsible for preserving the accuracy
of children’s memories during the evaluation process; and 2) use of the suggestibility
model of memory, which assumes memory is a predominantly cognitive process in which
people—especially children—are vulnerable to external influences that will distort their
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accounts and thereby render them invalid. These findings were then put into dialogue
with a phenomenological conceptualization of child memory and experience. Though
both approaches present child memory/experience as fluid and easily influenced by other
people, phenomenology does not view these qualities as inherently problematic. Rather,
this orientation assumes that all experience is interrelated as a given, and that factual truth
is similarly important to experiential truth. Socio-historical context is also discussed,
namely how American and European legal practices have shifted over time to reflect
broader societal views of children as either vulnerable or autonomous. Finally, practical
implications of the handbook discourse are elaborated, including ways a
phenomenological perspective could improve how children are supported in forensic
settings. Integrating non-verbal communication, exploring experiential truth as well as
fact truth, and drawing on research that does not assume a suggestibility model of
memory are three principal suggestions for evaluators.
Keywords: discourse analysis, child memory, child experience, child testimony,
eyewitness testimony, suggestibility, phenomenology, forensic evaluation, forensic
interview
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Introduction
On August 12, 1983, Judy Johnson sought medical attention for her 3-year-old
son, reporting her suspicions that he had been sodomized by one of his caregivers at
McMartin Preschool in Manhattan Beach, California. Her son had complained of rectal
discomfort several times since his enrollment at McMartin that June, and though Johnson
had noted significant anal redness, it wasn’t until August that the possibility of abuse was
raised. This concern seems to have stemmed from a conversation she had with her child
upon again discovering blood on his anus, during which the boy mentioned an interaction
with “Mr. Ray” (Cheit, 2014; cf. Nathan & Snedecker, 1995). The proceeding doctors’
examinations confirmed the boy had experienced recent anal penetration. Johnson’s
report and the corroborating medical evidence spurred what would become the McMartin
Preschool trial, “often described as the longest and most expensive criminal trial in
American history” (Cheit, 2014, p. 17). Though exact figures vary, the trial proved an
ordeal spanning seven years and involving interviews with more than 400 suspected
victims of child abuse, over 100 different abuse charges against two defendants, and an
estimated $13 million in court costs (Cheit, 2014; deYoung, 1997). Neither of the
defendants was ultimately convicted on any of the charges (though eight against
Raymond Buckey were dismissed after two hung juries). While reactions to the justice of
the verdict are mixed, there is resounding concurrence across the scholarship that the
McMartin case was a disaster, one that is seldom cited without reference to the
astonishing media coverage and the language of “moral panic” and “witch hunts” (e.g.
Ceci & Bruck, 1995; deYoung, 1997; Eberle & Eberle, 1993; Nathan & Snedecker,
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1995). How did the investigation of one young boy’s distress develop into such a
notoriously unwieldy debacle?
Many factors arguably contributed to the virulent evolution of the McMartin
phenomenon. DeYoung (1997) points to an increase in societal attention to and
ambivalence about day care centers in the 1980s, given their correlation with women (i.e.
mothers) entering the workforce. Cheit (2014) suggests Manhattan Beach’s district
attorney may have hurried the investigation and encouraged sensationalist media
coverage to better serve his political interests. Indeed, the media’s role in proliferating
trial events in exhaustive detail is well documented as having influenced public
perception as well as the legal proceedings themselves (e.g. Eberle & Eberle, 1993;
Beckett, 1996). The circumstances surrounding Judy Johnson’s initial report foreshadow
one of the most contentious aspects of the trials, however, one whose implications remain
plangent even today: the veracity of child accounts. Though Johnson took stock of her
son’s physiological symptoms and complaints, it was not until he—the child—mentioned
his teacher in association with them that Johnson introduced the question of abuse.
From its outset, the McMartin case hinged largely on the disclosures and
testimonies of preschoolers; their significance remained constant throughout its sprawling
twists and turns. But these accounts were being presented in the midst of pioneering
research by cognitive psychologist Elizabeth Loftus and others that challenged
conventional assumptions about the general reliability of memory, particularly in the
instance of eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1975; 1979; Wells & Loftus, 1984).
Introducing this research starkly polarized those following the case into two camps: those
who believed the children’s accounts of abuse, and those who did not. Proponents of the
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latter invested in the concept of suggestibility, the theory that memories can be altered by
environmental factors easily, unintentionally, and unbeknownst to the individual offering
the account (Loftus, 1975; Ceci & Bruck, 1995). Suggestibility figured prominently in
the McMartin trial as a crucial (and largely successful) feature of the defense’s argument,
which claimed that leading interview strategies rendered child accounts tainted and
inaccurate. The McMartin case catapulted these questions from psychology labs and
courtrooms into the general public, casting a long, persistent shadow on the discourse of
child testimony (e.g. Garven, Wood, Malpass, & Shaw III, 1998; Schreiber, Bellah,
Martinez, McLaurin, Strok, Garven, & Wood, 2006; Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014).
The present study strove to better understand this shadow, its practical
implications, and the ways it simultaneously reflects and perpetuates broader cultural
suppositions about children’s experience and memory. To do so, I performed a
hermeneutically-informed discourse analysis of the guidelines for forensic evaluation of
children that widely-used forensic psychology training handbooks set forth. Specifically,
this inquiry focused on addressing the following questions: What version of child
memory/experience is constructed in forensic psychology manuals, and what are the
practical implications of these implicit and explicit assumptions? How does this
conceptualization compare with phenomenological understandings of child
memory/experience, and what are potential practical implications of accounting for the
lived experience of remembering in this context? In engaging with this project, I have
offered a critique of how child experience is and is not supported in the United States
legal system, and proposed further considerations for future adjustments and best
practices.
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Literature Review
Suggestibility Research in the Wake of McMartin
At the heart of McMartin lie questions about whether children’s narratives can be
considered valid in a court of law, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt. To what extent can
a child be trusted to accurately remember his or her experience? To what extent is it
possible for a child to accurately describe or express these memories? The apparent
simplicity of these queries belies the tremendous complexity and controversy that
surrounds how we understand memory in both psychological and forensic settings. As
described in Goodman, Bottoms, Schwartz-Kenny, and Rudy (1991):
How children and adults negotiate the reconstruction of a child’s past is a
question of critical importance to developmental psychology. In recent years, it
has also become a critical question for the legal system. There are few times when
the child-adult negotiation of the past is more consequential—or more
controversial—than when children are interviewed in a forensic context or when
they testify in courts of law. (p. 69)
McMartin helped launch these questions into the national spotlight. Though McMartin
was the highest profile and most widely publicized trial, the issues it raised continued to
flourish and transfigure throughout the decade thanks in part to cases like State v.
Michaels (Wee Care) in New Jersey, State v. Fuster (Country Walk) in Florida, and State
v. Kelly (Little Rascals) in North Carolina. These large-scale trials, in which daycare
providers faced multiple charges of child abuse, became important forums where
questions about the reliability of memory and child testimony were refined and debated
nationwide (Cheit, 2014; Lyon, 1999).
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In order to make sense of this situation percolating in the 1980s, it is important to
recognize that psychologists have long attempted to understand human memory and the
various processes and limitations we associate with it. In clinical settings, this is perhaps
most commonly demonstrated in the Freudian notion of repression, in short, that
distressing knowledge or experiences are not forgotten but rather pushed from our
awareness in unconscious efforts to minimize the anxiety they cause (Faller, 1996; Loftus
& Loftus, 1976; Pope & Brown, 1996). In the same vein, more recent psychological
conceptualizations of this phenomenon have been described in terms of “motivated
forgetting” (Pope & Brown, 1996, p. 46) or dissociation (e.g. Faller, 1996). Regardless of
semantics, the structure of psychotherapy can generally allow for the possibility of
understanding experience and memory as fluid or inexact, because this ambiguity may be
integrated into the therapy itself. For example, an adult individual might seek therapy
with a sense that he or she may have been abused as a child, though with no specific
memories of the abuse in question. This therapy could progress in any number of ways,
but treatment does not hinge upon an abuse history that is definitively proven or
disproven. In fact, a goal of therapy could easily become facilitating one’s processing or
tolerance of never knowing with certainty what happened. However practical it may be
for therapy, this goal is simply not feasible or appropriate within the current structure of
the United States legal system.
From repression to suggestibility. Though different psychological orientations
may assume a variety of perspectives on the functions or processes associated with
memory, both clinical and research settings generally allow for a greater degree of
acceptable ambiguity than historically has been supported in a legal context (Pope &
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Brown, 1996). This discrepancy was brought into sharp focus through Elizabeth Loftus’s
pioneering work on memory, in particular, on eyewitness accounts (e.g. Loftus, 1975;
1979; Loftus & Loftus, 1976). In a number of experiments, Loftus and her colleagues
looked not only at what participants exposed to stimuli (e.g. a video of a car accident)
recounted when asked later to describe what they had seen, but also at how interactions
with the post-stimulus interviewer influenced these descriptions, that is to say, their
memories:
We suggest that information acquired during a complex experience is apparently
integrated into some overall memory representation. Subsequent information
about that event—for example, that introduced inadvertently via questions
containing true or false presuppositions—is also integrated, and can alter the
initial representation. When the person is later queried about the original
experience, he forms a regenerated image based on the altered memorial
representation, and bases his response on that image. (Loftus, 1975, p. 571)
Findings like these helped to introduce and popularize the concept of suggestibility, the
theory that human memory is susceptible to the influence of others, and so potentially
malleable as to cast serious doubts onto the degree with which one might trust the
accuracy of any recollection.
Again, these influences and limitations to memory might be considered
intellectually interesting in a psychology laboratory, but the practical implications of
Loftus’ research also were felt acutely in the courtroom. In 1975, Loftus herself became
the first expert to testify in Washington State court on the subject of eyewitness
identification limitations (Zagorski, 2005). As her oeuvre proliferated and expanded, the
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notion of suggestibility continued to gain momentum, especially in cases that hinged on
eyewitness testimony (Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Faller, 1996, Motzkau, 2010). The McMartin
trial would become a critical point in this landscape. In 1983, the issue of suggestibility
was established enough to raise questions about the influence of interviewing techniques
on the reliability of eyewitness testimony, but still a fledgling area of research with
limited large-scale practical application. McMartin and the other landmark cases of the
1980s hermeneutically reflected and contributed to the evolution of this emerging view of
memory and its potential fluidity (Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Lamb, La Rooy, Malloy, & Katz,
2011; Lyon, 1999). These circumstances provided high profile, real-world forums for
these suggestibility theories to be further cultivated, fanning the flames of interest in a
very public, impactful manner.
Complicating factors: trauma and age. Even in her early work Loftus (1979;
Wells & Loftus, 1984) mentions event type and age as significant variables when
attempting to measure memory distortions and recall ability. Nevertheless, at the time of
McMartin the growing body of suggestibility research did not focus in depth on
memories of traumatic experience, nor on child eyewitness accounts (Faller, 1996). How
both of these variables might influence memory demanded further inquiry in the context
of preschool trials of the 1980s, where verdicts became so dependent on young children’s
accounts of their own experience.
How applicable are Loftus’ findings to instances when the memory in question is
a traumatic one? Though the exact categories vary, literature presents a general consensus
that memories can be classified into type and that the processes involved in their
development and expression may differ across these classifications. For example,
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autobiographical memories tend to require different mental processes than semantic
memories (Goodman & Bottoms, 1993), which tend to involve “more contextually free
facts, ideas, or similar knowledge” (Pope & Brown, 1996, p. 32). When the
autobiographical experience is one of trauma, there are compelling reasons to expect
memory will be impacted in some way. Faller (1996) explains, “Some traumatic memory
researchers and clinicians have countered that traumatic memory (e.g., memories of
sexual abuse) is fundamentally different from narrative memory as represented in analog
studies. Traumatic memory is more likely to be sensorimotor than verbal [and therefore]
… not subject to forgetting” in the traditional sense (p. 88).
Also important to consider are the longstanding psychodynamic understanding of
repression (as outlined above), as well as the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, which links traumatic experience with memory disruptions quite
clearly (5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In its possible
diagnostic criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, the DSM-5 lists both “recurrent,
involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories of the traumatic event(s)” and
“dissociative reactions” (p. 271). Of course, it is important to note that not all sexual
abuse is experienced as traumatic, and that not all child eyewitnesses have been abused or
allegedly abused. These individual differences further frustrate attempts to generalize
what is fair to expect of child eyewitnesses.
Developmental considerations also prove vital in suggestibility studies; thus
another offshoot of Loftus’ research and the growing prevalence of child testimony
during the climate of McMartin was a hunger for research that addressed potential age
differences in the reliability of these accounts. Studies in this vein tend to acknowledge
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two potential challenges to accurate child reporting: ability, the extent to which it is
possible for a child to recount information and/or experience; and suggestibility, the
extent to which a child’s recounting may be influenced by post-event information (e.g.
Bruck & Ceci, 2013; Goodman & Reed, 1986; Quas, Qin, Schaaf, & Goodman, 1997).
In terms of ability, memory research draws on the three main processes widely
known as encoding, storage, and retrieval (Pope & Brown, 1996). The work of Loftus
(e.g. 1975; 1979) and colleagues (e.g. Wells & Loftus, 1984) offers strong support that
people of all ages may demonstrate fallibility at any of these stages. One example of this
non-discrimination is addressed above, in terms of the challenges repression or
dissociation may present to memory retrieval. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the literature
suggests that “age is an important determinant of memory capacity” as relates to
encoding, retrieval (Malloy, Johnson, & Goodman 2013, p. 109), and storage (Goodman
et al., 1991). There is also research to suggest a logical correlation between memory
capacity and verbal abilities such as comprehension and vocabulary, which of course also
develop with age. As Faller (1996) argues:
Children’s interpretation of recollections of sexual abuse may be another obstacle
for the interviewer. The more a person knows, the more accurately he or she
interprets an experience. Children may have encoding problems with experiences
they do not understand (Brainerd & Orenstein, 1991). This might happen with
sexually abusive experiences because children do not usually have background
knowledge about sex and sexual abuse. Children may also have trouble
interpreting and communicating their experiences because they do not have the
language to do so. This may particularly be a problem with sexual activity
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because children may have no names for the private body parts or words for
sexual acts. (p. 88)
Malloy et al. (2013) suggest that in addition to these language limitations hampering
children’s memory encoding and retrieval, they may also affect how children interpret
interview questions, stating that “children’s concrete or literal interpretation of language
means that they may fail to understand the true, underlying purpose of an interview
question” (p. 110). Thus what researchers or interviewers might interpret as errors in
memory may in fact be errors in communication, further complicating any conclusions
one might draw regarding the accuracy of child memory.
Nevertheless, research has also found that in many cases even young children,
especially those over age 4 (Faller, 1996), can demonstrate memory capacity comparable
to or surpassing that of adults (e.g. Bruck & Ceci, 2013; Goodman & Bottoms, 1993;
Goodman & Reed, 1986; Lyon, 1998). The influence of suggestibility, however, does
seem to pervade children’s recall responses to experimental interview questions and to
affect children more than adults (Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Goodman & Reed, 1986; Malloy
et al., 2013; Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). These findings are perhaps most foundationally
explored in the work of Stephen Ceci and his colleagues (see Lyon, 1999 for a
comprehensive summary). Ceci and Bruck (1995) begin their landmark book Jeopardy in
the Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis of Children's Testimony by plumbing various child
interview transcripts from many of the most famous 1980s day care trials for examples of
suggestive interviewing and its consequences. (Their methods and conclusions have since
faced criticism [e.g. Cheit, 2014; Lyon 1998].)
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Taken holistically, this body of research promotes a near-universal understanding
that, individual differences notwithstanding, for a wide array of experience, young
children appear both capable of accurate memory recall and vulnerable to suggestibility
influences. Therefore one outcome of these studies has been an increased emphasis on
ideal child forensic interview circumstances:
With considerable advances made over the last few decades, researchers are rarely
asking, “Are children reliable or unreliable in forensic contexts?” Instead, the
question has shifted to the more complex, “Under what circumstances are children
more or less reliable?” There are numerous cognitive and sociomotivational
influences on the reliability of children’s memory and event reports, and the
influences may be different for children at varying points in development.
Furthermore, children’s (and even adults’) reports are affected by the manner in
which they are interviewed. (Malloy et al., 2013, p. 108)
Indeed, this amended question has become foundational in the ensuing legal and forensic
psychology handbooks, training materials for professionals faced with the thorny
prospect of child testimony. It currently falls largely to the interviewer to gently coax
forth an untainted account of a child’s experience.
In sum, questions regarding the opacity and porosity of memory have a long
history in psychological and forensic contexts. McMartin demonstrates the beginning of a
shift in understanding memory inconsistencies through the lens of repression to that of
suggestibility, a perspective that continued to calcify through subsequent landmark cases
over the next decade. In the 35 years since McMartin, psychological research has
proliferated largely in response to these suggestibility concerns (Motzkau, 2007). Faller
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(1996) describes the “commonsense argument” (p. 84)—that a child has no personal
incentive to make false allegations against an adult—as predominant in the years
preceding McMartin; one function of the emphasis on suggestibility was to doubt this
assumption. This research seemed to make possible the fear that, tainted by interviewers
who were at best ignorantly well-intentioned, at worst unethically litigious, children
might give false testimony without even recognizing they are doing so.
Suggestibility in Legal and Forensic Psychology Handbooks
In research on the topic of child testimony, the framework of suggestibility
maintains dominance even today, and the extent to which a child’s testimony may have
been influenced by others remains one of the most significant and contentious aspects of
this conversation (Faller, 1996; Malloy et al., 2013). Though varied in the extent to which
they support children’s capacity for memory recall, these suggestibility studies share a
unifying focus on identifying the factors that will preserve or sully a child's "accurate"
account of the situation in question, especially in accordance with legal standards. Legal
and forensic psychology handbooks and their best practice guidelines for professionals
navigating child testimony and assessment have traditionally drawn heavily on the
aforementioned body of suggestibility research (e.g. Fanetti, Fondren-Happel, &
O’Donohue, 2013; Faust, 2011; Kuehnle & Connell, 2009; Melton, Petrila, Poythress, &
Slobogin, 2007; Weiner & Otto, 2014). The result is a subsequent focus on interviewer
responsibility to solicit a detailed and specific account of abuse without tainting it with
the interviewer’s own biases. As Lamb et al. (2011) summarize:
We now know that children—even very young children—can provide reliable and
accurate testimony about experienced or witnessed events. We also know that
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children (like adults) are suggestible, and that we must be aware of ways in which
suggestibility can be minimized. We further know that the level of accuracy and
the amount of detail provided by young witnesses is largely dependent on the
ways in which children are interviewed and that the role of the interviewer is thus
paramount. (p. 4)
In stemming from a framework of suggestibility, these guides face the difficult task of
reconciling the nebulous nature of human memory with the rigidity of the legal system
and cry for a generalized structure for interviewers to follow when interacting with child
eyewitnesses.
In many instances these handbooks, especially those directed towards mental
health professionals, attempt to honor the highly individualized nature of allegations and
the children recounting them, even as the guides argue for the particular best practices
methodology they set forth. As Condie (2014) explains:
Because the band of possible referral questions is not narrow, adherence to a
particular methodology in all instances is neither feasible nor indicated.
Nonetheless, enough is known about the basic features of commonly recurring
referral questions in care and protection matters to develop relatively consistent
methodologies. (p. 251)
Here is but one example of the tension that appears to underlie many of the conclusions
set forth in such handbooks. On one hand, there is a clear message that to interview
alleged child victims of abuse in a manner that is most ethically in service of the child,
the accused, and the profession, one must adhere strictly to methods that have been
developed systematically (that is, those outlined in the training manuals). On the other,
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interviewers must also adopt the onerous burden of knowing how to tailor these methods
to account for specific contextual circumstances and the imprecision inherent in human
memory, without unduly influencing the child’s account.
The way these handbooks discuss identifying and implementing an appropriate
interview methodology is not the only area in which inconsistencies arise. In conveying
the importance of these interviews, Lamb et al. (2011) aver “Information originating from
investigative interviews may powerfully affect legal and administrative decisions that
may profoundly affect the lives of children, families, and suspects, so it is imperative that
children’s reports are clear, consistent, detailed, and accurate” (p. 3). Sixty pages later,
however, the guide warns interviewers not to place “unreasonable expectations on [child
interviewees] regarding the amount or specificity of information recalled” (p. 63).
Kuehnle and Connell (2009), too, extoll the interviewer’s quest for accuracy in child
narratives, while in almost the same breath noting that in drawing any conclusions about
said accuracy, professionals should always “adopt an appropriately humble tone” (p.
174), that is, temper the expectation that a child account of memory is wholly accurate.
Thus while forensics-friendly, this dichotomist conceptualization of memory as
either true or false, accurate or inaccurate, remains a dramatic oversimplification.
Forensic handbooks seem to recognize this even as they set forth an expectation for
interview protocols that can elicit completely accurate accounts from their child
interviewees. Clearly there is a dissonance here, and even some acknowledgement that
current ways of addressing child testimony do not align well with the systems and
standards in place. In fact, given the many challenges and controversies explored in the
preceding pages, handbooks even evoke a sense of dread about the complexities of
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addressing child narratives at all:
Children pose many dilemmas for the legal system. Yet to protect children and
others from harm and ensure justice, society has little choice but to include child
witnesses in legal cases, especially when other evidence is lacking or when the
children’s testimony plays a key role in a prosecution. (Hobbs, Johnson,
Goodman, Bederian-Gardner, Lawler, Vargas, & Mendoza, 2014, p. 597)
This conceptualization locates blame for problematic nature of child testimony with the
child—the child is the one failing to meet the criteria imposed by the established forensic
system. Other handbooks are similarly forthright about the complexities surrounding
child testimony, but allow more for the possibility that the system itself is flawed. Lamb
et al. (2011) caution forensic assessors that “Memory has its own ‘laws’ which frequently
do not fit neatly within legal systems that specify the need for specific and detailed
evidence. How legal systems can better accommodate the workings and limitations of
human memory remains a challenge” (p. 63). Regardless of where the gap between
expectations of child memory and expectations of forensic standards originates, however,
the general consensus is that it is the interviewer’s responsibility to bridge it. This
narrative conclusion surfaces again and again in training handbooks and the suggestibility
research on which they are based: forensic interviewers must work to accommodate the
peculiarities of how children process and recount their memories in order to meet
existing, exacting, legal standards. Thus it is important to understand how, exactly, the
handbooks present the evaluator’s identity and role.
Another factor to take into account when considering the prevalence of
suggestibility in forensic handbooks is the ways that our culture constructs and interprets
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children. After all, these manuals hermeneutically serve as a manifestation of broader
socio-historical norms even as they create and reinforce future understandings of children
in the legal system and subsequent evaluator actions. It is therefore necessary to
recognize that these texts do not exist in isolation, but rather are products of the systems
they will go on to influence in return (see methodology section for further elaboration).
Because the meaning of childhood has changed over time (e.g. Aires, 1962; Hart, 1991;
Smith, 2002; Simms, 2008), so, too, have laws and public policy involving children
(Grossberg, 2012; Haugaard, Reppucci, Laird, & Nauful, 1991; Smart, 1999). In the
United States and the western world more generally, this has meant historically swinging
between viewing children as vulnerably in need of protection and as individuals with
“rights to self-expression and inclusion in decision making” (Cascardi, Brown, Shpiegel,
& Alvarez, 2015, p. 1). Grossberg (2012) terms these two ideologies as “caretaking” and
“liberationist.” He explains that the caretaking understanding resurfaced in the late 1970s,
in part as a response to cultural shifts: more women were joining the workforce, divorce
rates increased, and high profile cases of child abuse and abduction, including McMartin,
received prolific attention.
In describing the history of how child testimony regarding sexual abuse has been
taken up in forensic systems internationally, Motzkau (2007) discusses a related
observation. She states that child sexual abuse was largely absent from cultural awareness
from the turn of the 20th century until “the late 1960's and 70's, when the campaigning
effort of the growing feminist movements gained political momentum and managed to
put issues like domestic violence, rape and child sexual abuse back into the public arena”
(p. 5). Nevertheless, Motzkau (2007) also recounts that “Children have traditionally
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enjoyed a dubious reputation as witnesses in courts of law” (p. 4), and cites the
“astonishing frequency” (p. 4) with which the Salem witch trials are cited in the literature
as contributing to a trenchant distrust of child witnesses. She goes on to describe how the
highly publicized backlash from cases like McMartin contributed to a simplistic public
understanding of children’s suggestibility, and to the conceptualization of children as
vulnerable, limited, and dependent. This would be in keeping with the caretaking
discourse that was dominant at the time. In the legal setting, this translated to “a
persistent wariness about the reliability of children's memory and their ability to testify in
court” (Motzkau, 2007, p. 6), one that is reflected in forensic assessment manuals even
today. Further exploration of these factors and their implications for this study is included
in my discussion section.
The Lived Experience of Remembering
As mentioned above, suggestibility is by no means the only way that memory has
been conceptualized; an array of scholarship explores facets of memory to offer
supplementary and alternative frameworks. This literature encompasses a wide range of
circumstances that influence the various processes of memory and recounting, including
cognitive styles (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, & Miller, 1986; Tversky, & Kahneman,
1973), personal expectations (Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson, & Cronk, 1997; Redelmeier
& Kahneman, 1996), and self-presentation concerns (Burhn & Last, 1982; Verger &
Camp, 1970).
Still other scholars have proposed a more complicated view of child memory
through the context of the lived experience of human development. For example,
Winnicott’s (1964) theoretical contributions demonstrate that for children, the distinction
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between self and other is far less clear than suggestibility research would conclude. Later
research (e.g. Gerson, 2005; Nelson & Fivush, 2004) extends this Winnicottian concept
of “other” from familial attachment figures to broader cultural forces, examining the
individual as always embedded within and constructed by societal influences. Burkitt
(2003) invokes Merleau-Ponty in factoring embodiment into children’s process of
making sense of their experiences:
Because of our embodiment in the world, neither the world nor meaning is
external to us: which is to say that meaning is not created from the abstract
manipulation of symbols, then matched against an equally external world to judge
in some objective way the precise fit between the meaningful categories and
objective things. Meaning is derived not from its correlation with things but from
the embodied experience of humans in the world. (p. 324-325)
Like the suggestibility model, approaching human memory through lived experience
(referred to here as a phenomenological approach) similarly acknowledges memory’s
fluidity and malleability. However, the “true  tainted  false” sequence set forth in
suggestibility studies seems dramatically oversimplified when considering the palpable
complexity of memory processes as we live them. For example, upon even cursory selfreflection, suggestibility’s tidy assumption that memories exist as either “true” or “false”
quickly begins to fray. It seems this familiar, dichotomist way of thinking is indicative of
a conceptualization of memory that aligns much better with the demands of the United
States legal system than with the phenomenon of memory itself. This dissonance invites
further questions about attaining a more comprehensively nuanced understanding of what
is happening when human beings—and perhaps children specifically—remember.
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In particular, the phenomenological works of Edward Casey and Paul Ricoeur
explicate memory according to a descriptive, experience-near manner that accounts for
the inherent fluidity of memory without automatically associating this quality with a
memory’s factual validity. By challenging the assumption that memory is a
predominantly cognitive, individual process, this approach thoroughly complicates two of
the apparent binaries assumed in the suggestibility model: that memories are either true
or false, and that memories are either entirely personal or altered by others (and therefore
invalid). These theories are grounded in thorough philosophical consideration of how
people move through the world, of how we exist as humans. Because of these tenets, a
phenomenological approach contends that in order to better understand how children
remember, it is necessary to explore child experience more broadly. Scholarship from
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Eva-Maria Simms, and Richard Rojcewicz examines children’s
lived experience in the phenomenal world, offering additional context for understanding
child experience and memory according to this perspective. While the phenomenological
conceptualization of child experience/memory is elaborated in greater depth in later
sections of this study, as are implications for applying this philosophy to children in
forensic settings, a short summary of these issues is presented here to afford readers a
foundational familiarity.
Memory and truth. Casey (2000) and Ricoeur (2004) both discuss the
constitutive role of memory in human experience to help explain why the factual
accuracy of our memories has become so prioritized. If my memory cannot be trusted,
how can I know myself, my very existence? Casey (2000) identifies the introduction of
computers and their subsequent rise to ubiquity as accelerating this dynamic and
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heightening our prizing of factual accuracy in memory. In comparison to computers,
human memory is deemed inferior, an issue that demonstrates only “tacit understanding
of the authority, scope, and value of human memory in its own domain—in its ongoing
performances in everyday life” (Casey, 2000, p. 5). Indeed, Casey (2000) argues that the
factual, “mechanized” (p. 5) memory characteristic of computers is part of the human
experience of remembering—known as a largely cognitive process and an area in which
it is difficult not to appreciate a computer’s prowess. However, to consider memory in
only these terms, he contends, is narrow and reductive.
Thus both Casey (2000) and Ricoeur (2004) acknowledge the inherent porosity of
human memory, but challenge the notion that this malleability or forgetfulness is
pathological, instead embracing these characteristics as basic structures of the
phenomenon. As such, they each explore the aspects of memory that appear uniquely
human, and go on to conceptualize memory as being lived through many interrelated
dimensions of experience, or existenialia, including body, space, time, language, things,
and others. As Ricoeur (2004) suggests, because human experience is not only cognitive,
but rather fluidly enmeshed in these other facets of being, memory, too, cannot be
considered as only cognitive, a shift which has implications for how we understand truth
in memory. Casey (2000) thereby introduces the concept of experiential truth in memory,
a complement to the fact-truth of cognitive (and mechanized) memory. He writes,
“Implicit in all remembering is a commitment to truth concerning the past, a truth that
reflects the specificity of this past even if it need not offer an exact likeness of it” (p.
283).
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While Casey (2000) and Ricoeur (2004) are theorizing about human memory in
general, there is scholarship to suggest that this experiential truth plays an especially
prominent role in child experience. A phenomenological examination of child experience
suggests that children are particularly embedded in the sensory, phenomenal world, rather
than a more adult-like, cognitive abstraction from this world (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 1962;
Rojcewicz, 1987; Simms, 2008). Given this primacy of an embodied, sensory
relationship with the world, the cognitive dimension of memory and its corresponding
fact-truth appears less meaningful for young children than it is for adults (and the adultcentric legal system).
Memory and ownership. At the heart of the suggestibility model lies the
incredibly fraught question of “Whose memory is this?” As demonstrated so vividly in
cases like McMartin, viewing memory through the lens of suggestibility often renders
child narratives tainted by outside influence. Phenomenology, on the other hand, loosens
this dichotomy by proposing that memory can at once be autonomously “mine” and
simultaneously related to and shared with others in my world. That is to say, from a
phenomenological perspective, the fact that a memory has been influenced by “external”
factors does not render it invalid. Again, Casey (2000) and Ricoeur (2004) draw on a
study of human experience in general to ground their conclusions, largely by challenging
the traditional notions of “internal” and “external.” Because, as we have already
established, phenomenology asserts that human experience is fundamentally interwoven
with various existentialia—including others—it is inter-subjective as a given.
Once again, issues of autonomy and dependence are especially acute and
conflicted when considering child experience (e.g. Grossberg, 2012; Simms, 2008):

21

Children’s cognition, then, is not merely an a-logical thinking, it arises from a
different experience of the world: the world for children is not an external,
objective, conceptual, hard “reality,” it is suffused by the child’s intentions and
the feeling-tone of his or her social relationships. Young children have no
interiority, and the world has no exteriority. (Simms, 2008, p. 71)
Simms (2008) goes on to focus on the indelible link between children’s experience and
the people populating their lives, explaining, “Self and other are distinct people for the
three-year-old…but they participate in the same experience” (p. 71) which thereby fuses
their existence. Because memory is experience, memory is similarly inter-subjective from
its inception. Just as an individual is interrelated to and influenced by the others in her or
his life without necessarily invalidating her or his own personal experience,
phenomenology proposes the same can be true for our memories. Clearly this
phenomenological scholarship offers fertile ground from which to harvest a complex,
nuanced understanding of child experience, with memory as a cornerstone of said
experience. Thus far, however, little research has been done on applying these theoretical
contributions to the technical practice of forensic psychology.
Methodological Considerations
Discourse Analysis: Foundations
Given the emphasis on child memory in our post-McMartin legal system, the
expansive breadth of research on memory and its contextual influences, and the apparent
tension between these areas as demonstrated in training handbooks, it seems important to
carefully analyze how child memory is constructed in forensic psychology manuals. To
do so requires a method capable of examining the discourses around forensic evaluation
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of children, that is, a discourse analysis. Interest in societal discourses emerged when the
rise of social constructionism and the “turn to language” in the late 1960s and early 1970s
generated a renewed attention to language, its meanings, and its functions (Parker, 1990).
Discourse analysis gained popularity as a research method in the 1970s and 1980s as a
means of studying the constitutive power of language in social psychology, principally in
the United Kingdom. In the ensuing years, discourse analysis has proliferated widely,
branching out through newly developing procedural elements and being applied to
subjects beyond the realm of social psychology (e.g. Harper & Thompson, 2012; Potter &
Wetherell, 1987; Schiffrin, Tannen & Hamilton, 2001; Wodak, 2001). Such an expansive
means of inquiry affords incredible openness and flexibility as a qualitative research
method, and with it dramatic variations of its use a potential for misunderstanding. In
their seminal work on discourse analysis, Discourse and Social Psychology (1987),
psychologists Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell state that when it comes to
defining the method, “perhaps the only thing all commentators are agreed on in this area
is that terminological confusions abound” (p. 6). They go on to note, “It is a field in
which it is perfectly possible to have two books on discourse analysis with no overlap in
content at all” (p. 6). Given that the term discourse analysis can be taken up in so many
ways, it becomes especially crucial for researchers employing discourse analysis to state
their philosophical orientations and technical intentions with as much clarity and
specificity as possible (Cheek, 2004; Wodak, 2008).
As a social constructionist approach, discourse analysis is generally taken up with
the assumption that reality is systematically constituted and sustained through institutions
and social practices. From this foundation, Georgaca and Avdi (2012) describe the
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approach as encompassing “two distinct yet partly overlapping trends” (p. 148):
discursive psychology and Foucauldian discourse analysis. Discursive psychology is
philosophically rooted in linguistic philosophy, semiology, and ethnomethodology, and
primarily focuses on “the ways in which speakers in everyday and institutional settings
negotiate meaning, reality, identity and responsibility” (p. 148). Alternatively,
Foucauldian discourse analysis is informed by post-structuralist theories and as such
“examines the ways in which discourses construct objects and subjects, and create, in this
way, certain versions of reality, society and identity as well as maintaining certain
practices and institutions” (p. 148). For the present study, I have adopted elements from
both of these traditions, but operated mainly from a hermeneutic orientation, described in
greater detail below. In addition, while some discourse theorists assume the relativist
view that there are no objective means by which to prove the truth of various conclusions
(Potter, 1996), the study at hand instead maintained a critical realist position. This
orientation assumes “knowledge is always mediated by social processes but propose[s]
that underlying enduring structures do exist and that these can be known through their
effects” (Georgaca & Avdi, 2012, p. 149).
Furthermore, a working definition of discourse for this study is in order, one that
is more precise than Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) “all forms of spoken interaction,
formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds” (p. 7). While intentionally inclusive,
this magnanimous description ascribes a degree of stasis to the notion of discourse, while
overlooking its dynamic functionality. It also does not explicitly affirm that discourse is
not simply the product of a given individual but rather a framework within which said
individual dwells. As Parker (1990) explains:
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Discourses do not simply describe the social world, but categorize it, they bring
phenomena into sight. A strong form of the argument would be that discourses
allow us to focus on things that are not “really” there, and that once an object has
been circumscribed by discourses it is difficult not to refer to it as if it were real.
They provide frameworks for debating the value of one way of talking about
reality over other ways. (p. 191)
In keeping with this sentiment, for this study I drew on Georgaca and Avdi (2012), who
define discourses as “systems of meaning that are related to the interactional and wider
socio-cultural context and operate regardless of a speaker’s intentions” (p. 147).
In addition, I have adopted a discourse analytic method grounded in the
hermeneutic tradition. Given its emphasis on interpretation, hermeneutics seems to me
quite well aligned with the present research questions regarding how child memory is
constructed in forensic psychology. Indeed, when considering this phenomenon,
questions about interpretation seem to be relevant at the intrapersonal level (i.e. memory
encoding/formation), at the interpersonal level (i.e. the recounting of said memories, in
particular to evaluators), as well as at the societal level (i.e. the implications of these
accounts within the broader legal system and society at large). It is in these dynamic
interactions that I have been most interested, given my sense that it is by more fully
understanding these intersections between personal agency and situational context that
we might better posit forensic practices that honor children’s accounts appropriately and
respectfully. As a hermeneutic discourse analysis, this project devoted particular attention
to discovering central themes in the discourse of child memory, as well as how these
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central themes “are interrelated in broader augmentations both within texts and intertextually” (Heracleous, 2006, p. 40).
The legal system at large presents an appropriate and fruitful area for discourse
analysis, “especially since law is such a highly verbal field” (Shuy, 2001, p. 437). Since
the 1990s, the subfield of forensic linguistics has begun to blossom, yet as the name
would suggest, this work tends to implement a linguistic definition of discourse, rather
than applying a hermeneutically-informed inquiry. It is important to note that because
this study addressed “the way in which texts themselves have been constructed in terms
of their social and historical ‘situatedness’” (Cheek, 2004, p. 1144), the discursive
analysis extended beyond the level of linguistics, grammar, and syntax. Informed by a
hermeneutic attunement, the methodology at hand recognized discourse as a set of
statements that serves as a simultaneous product and perpetuator of both explicit and
implicit assumptions, and is therefore necessarily laden with values in varying degrees of
transparency. The forensic assessment training manuals employ a discourse that is
constructive of a version of reality; however, the present hermeneutic discourse analysis
acknowledges that no text exists in isolation from the intersecting sub-cultures from
which it simultaneously arises and co-constitutes. Recognizing that these training
manuals and the ways in which they are used form a complex hermeneutic process, the
current study used discourse analysis to illuminate and explore that process and its
implications, drawing on the manuals themselves as a point of access.
In Ricoeur’s contributions to a hermeneutic, philosophical anthropology, he
acknowledges the significance of constructive influences and forces that in many ways
constitute our experience while still allowing for personal agency in terms of how we
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engage with that experience. He writes, for example, “What must be the nature of the
world … if human beings are able to introduce changes into it? [And] what must be the
nature of action … if it is to be read in terms of change in the world?” (Ricoeur
1986/1991, p. 137). In drawing from Ricoeur’s work, I have attempted to ground my
discourse analysis in an epistemology that values the inevitability of interpretation
without lapsing into a relativist perspective that risks minimizing the functional
consequences of the interpretive act.
While no study as of yet has focused on the version of child experience/memory
that is constructed in handbook instructions to evaluators, there is some precedent for
employing discursive methods to examine child experience in various related contexts.
Bergnehr and Nelson (2015), for example, analyzed how children were discursively
positioned across 10 research articles on mental-health promoting interventions that
implemented an array of methodologies. Blank and Ney (2006) applied a Foucauldian
perspective to examine the legal and mental health discourses informing the concepts of
“parental alienation” and “child alienation,” formulations prevalent in high-conflict
divorce cases. Additional studies focus on exploring children’s discourse. In order to
explore children’s knowledge, Edwards (1993) performed a discourse analysis of
classroom talk between a teacher and a kindergarten class, while Aronsson and Hundeide
(2002) examined children’s responses to examination questions as a means of exploring
child thought processes. MacMartin (1999) offers a comprehensive theoretical argument
for treating children’s reports of sexual abuse as discourses and proposes an integrative
approach to understand these disclosures as “socially situated collaborations” (p. 503).
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MacMartin’s work proved influential to psychologist Johanna Motzkau, who has
performed a number of studies most similar to my project. These include an examination
of how child witnesses are positioned through “the interaction of legal rationales and
paradigms of developmental psychology” (Motzkau, 2007, p. 1), and an application of
Deleuzian theory to unpack “issues of experience, memory, suggestibility and self as they
become relevant at the intersection of psychological and legal practices” (Motzkau, 2011,
p. 58). Motzkau also focuses on the area of child suggestibility in particular by
discursively analyzing child witness research and practice in Britain and Germany (2005,
2010). Clearly discourse analysis has proved a useful method in exploring children’s
experience and how it is taken up in various settings, including the legal and mental
health systems. Further exploration of these study findings and their implications for the
validity of this project are elaborated in the discussion section.
Discourse Analysis: Procedures
Potter and Wetherell (1987) outline a “systematic overview of discourse analysis
methodology” (p. 159), even as they acknowledge that the diversity of discourse analysis
applications is antithetical to the rigidly “conventionalized and formalized” (p. 159)
methodologies of experimental studies. For the current project, I adhered to Potter and
Wetherell’s general procedural structure, modified slightly—as they suggest—to meet the
particular pragmatic needs.
Stage 1: Research questions. As Potter and Wetherell describe, “The research
questions discourse analysts do focus on are broadly related, as we have seen, to
construction and function: how is discourse put together, and what is gained by this
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construction” (p. 160). For the sake of clarity, my research questions discussed in the
preceding pages are repeated here again:


What version of child memory/experience is constructed in forensic
psychology manuals, and what are the practical implications of these implicit
and explicit assumptions?



How does this conceptualization compare with phenomenological
constructions of child memory/experience, and what are potential practical
implications of accounting for the lived experience of remembering in this
context?

In keeping with Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) guidelines, each of these questions is twofold, with the first half inquiring about what has been included (and excluded) from the
construction of a discourse, and the second half considering the functional consequences
of those decisions.
Stage 2: Sample selection. To determine which texts would best enable me to
address my research questions, I drew on preliminary research that provided ample
evidence that forensic psychology training manuals can compose a dataset incredibly
well-suited to the demands of my project. In addition to being accessible and directly
intended for the evaluators in question, these handbooks serve as a concrete nexus at the
intersection of the mental health and the United States legal systems, and one where the
points of convergence and tension between these systems are apparent even upon an
unmethodical reading. Furthermore, Ricoeur (see 1981; 1986/1991) also significantly
enmeshes written text and meaningful action in a way that resonates with the instructive
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function of these handbooks; in offering guidelines for best practices, the boundary
between text and action blurs in a particularly germane way.
The market is glutted with myriad forensic psychology handbooks, some devoted
entirely to issues pertaining to evaluation of children and adolescents. In considering how
to determine the most appropriate sample for a discourse analysis, Potter and Wetherell
(1987) are careful to note that the sample selection must be determined by its alignment
with “the specific research question” (p. 161). Given the present study’s questions about
how the broad, dominant discourse of child memory is constructed and functions, it was
most fitting to turn to the more generalized, widely used handbooks as a primary point of
focus. Thus for my study, I selected as my sample two forensic psychology training
manuals: Psychological Evaluations For the Courts (PEC) by Gary B. Melton, John
Petrila, Norman G. Poythress, and Christopher Slobogin (2007) and The Handbook of
Forensic Psychology (HFP) by Irving B. Weiner and Randy K. Otto (2014). These books
were chosen based on careful consideration of a number of factors, including how
relevant (year of publication), how popular (citation counts on Google Scholar), how
definitive (number of editions), and how much emphasis on practical applications
(American Psychological Association, 2011).
The first edition of PEC was published in 1987, and as of December 30, 2018
there are 2,214 citations listed on Google Scholar (citations of all editions have been
counted in this total). This number could be attributed in part to the text’s appeal to an
especially broad audience; the American Psychological Association (APA) promoted
PEC as “the definitive reference and text for both mental health and legal professionals”
(APA, 2011, emphasis mine). This sentiment is echoed in user reviews, informally on
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Amazon.com as well as in academic contexts, for example in The National Psychologist
where it is referred to it as “an indispensable and authoritative reference work” (Guilford
Press, 2018). In addition, Mohan Nair of UCLA Medical Center, a practicing forensic
neuropsychiatrist for over 35 years and contributing author to the textbook Principles and
Practice of Forensic Psychiatry (Rosner & Scott, 2016) deemed PEC “an invaluable
resource for child and adolescent psychiatrists who are significantly involved with the
legal system and a must have for all forensic psychiatrists” (Nair, 2009, p. 211).
HFP was also first published in 1987. While PEC appears to be the dominant
player in this market, HFP maintains 188 Google Scholar citations as of December 30,
2018 (again, all edition citations have been counted) and an equally high billing from
users on Amazon and in formal reviews. For example, APA (2011) referred to HFP as
“the top academic work in forensic psychology,” and forensic psychologist William J.
Ryan, an experienced expert witness and instructor affiliated with Queens College
CUNY, highlighted the enduring relevance of HFP in his review. Here he stated: “Like
the prior three editions, this fourth edition of [HFP] provides an authoritative and
comprehensive resource for understanding theoretical and historical foundations of
forensic psychological issues” (Ryan, 2016, p. 553).
Indeed, in the field of forensic psychology, PEC and HFP are foundational texts.
As I anticipated, this sample proved plenty capable of addressing my research questions.
That being said, it should be noted that I was prepared to conduct a similar review and
selection process to include additional, more specified handbooks had I discovered
otherwise. Such an amendment would have been appropriate and allowed for within
Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) framework. One challenge that did arise as I began to
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engage with these texts in July 2017, however, was a new edition of PEC. This fourth
edition was released in January 2018, and its publication required me to thoroughly
compare the new version with its predecessor in order to determine which would be most
appropriate to use here. In doing so, I discovered that aside from updated citations and
some transitional sentences, the majority of the 2007 text in the sections on child
eyewitness testimony and maltreatment evaluations was repeated nearly verbatim in
2018. The fact that there are few significant differences between the two texts is a
primary reason my committee and I ultimately agreed that the 2007 third edition was a
better fit with my research goals, a decision I discuss in greater depth in my analysis
section.
Procedural modification. Stages 3-5 (collection of records and documents,
interviews, and transcription) discuss steps relevant only to studies using spoken texts.
Because this is superfluous to the focus of this particular study, I omitted them.
Stage 6: Coding. The authors describe this step of their methodology as a time
“not to find results, but to squeeze an unwieldy body of text into manageable chunks” (p.
167) according to categories that are “obviously and crucially related to the research
questions” (p. 167). As per the methodological guidelines, I first winnowed the text of
these handbooks by identifying and concentrating on the sections that reference
evaluations involving children, based on the manuals’ tables of contents and subject
indexes. In making these early determinations, I made two important decisions about
sections not to include in my analysis. Firstly, I narrowed the scope of the study to the
discourse of evaluating children, rather than children and adolescents. As I began to
collect data, it became clear that adolescents are treated very differently than children in
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this area, and that those differences (while interesting) were too far beyond my research
questions to align well with this project. Along similar lines, I excluded chapters covering
education evaluations when it became apparent that introducing a third institution (the
education system) would be too unwieldy for the scope of my study. Both of these areas
would make excellent ground for research in the future. Apart from these sections, the
remaining topics were directly pertinent to my research questions, and focused on child
maltreatment evaluations, custody evaluations, and child eyewitness testimony.
From there, I carefully read these passages (roughly 160 pages total) and further
pared down the text to focus on times when the handbook offered instructions or
guidance to the evaluator. (See my analysis section for further elaboration on my process
of making these classifications.) I then transcribed these excerpts in an electronic,
searchable table, taking care to note the chapter, page number, and section heading of
each for future reference. I also included a column where I could record any additional
notes that corresponded with each entry. This text compendium is included here as an
appendix. It should be mentioned that Potter and Wetherell (1987) encourage that Stage 6
“be done be as inclusively as possible” (p. 167, emphasis in original), that is, to exclude
examples that may appear to fall on the borders of these criteria would be prematurely
limiting. The intention at this point of the method was to generate a manageable
compendium of text; the ways these excerpts are and are not relevant to the research
questions was determined in the following step.
Stage 7: Analysis. Decisions about limits and further categorization were
reserved for the analysis stage. At this point, I first re-read every entry in the text
compendium I compiled, each time asking if the text was offering an explicit or implicit
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instruction. While some examples were clearly at one end of this spectrum or the other,
there were some that I termed “borderline” explicit or implicit, and a few that I deemed
too far from any instructive function and omitted. I documented all of these decisions in
the notes column of the table. During this reading, I also noticed and documented my
observations and impressions about what I was seeing, keeping the following questions in
mind:


What are the instructions the manuals offer on how to conduct evaluations
involving children?



When offering instructions on how to evaluate children, what implicit
assumptions are being made?



What is the explicit reasoning or basis the handbooks offer for these
conclusions?



How are these manuals talking about child memory in these instances?



Are there places of conflict/contradiction in these guidelines?



Is there anything that seems to be missing or unaccounted for in these
instructions?

As per Potter and Wetherell (1987), the primary exercise of the analysis stage is to search
for patterns in the data vis-à-vis these issues. To do so, I formulated key words and
phrases based on my initial notes and utilized the computer program’s search function to
check how frequently and in what context these themes emerged. These terms ranged
from directive words such as “should” and “recommend” to more content-based words
like “memory” and “complex.” This process proved fairly hermeneutic, with me revising
my expectations and next steps as I took into account the search results that emerged. For
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example, I had not initially planned on searching for the word “important,” but soon
realized the handbook authors introduced instructions with the phrase “It is important
to…” at least as often as they wrote that evaluators “should” do something. These data
searches offered me a means of accessing patterns that emerged from the compendium
entries I compiled, and led me to identify four interrelated patterns regarding how the
evaluator is constructed in these sections and six patterns about child memory and
experience more specifically. I then considered and hypothesized about the potential
functions and effects that might stem from these patterns, drawing on explicit linguistic
evidence in which to ground my conclusions.
Stage 8: Validation. Potter and Wetherell (1987) explain that validation, as with
any of the steps they list, is not sequentially confined to a particular point in a study, but
rather an issue that is engaged with more and less figurally throughout the research. For
example, I took steps to ensure the trustworthiness of my findings by systematically
selecting which handbook text to analyze, and by grounding my analysis in textual
evidence. Despite the acknowledgement that in some ways validity is a concern
throughout a project, however, Potter and Wetherell (1987) still devote a stage of their
methodology specifically to validation. I find the notion of dedicating specific attention
to the validity of my findings quite resonant, as well as useful in my quest to perform a
rigorous qualitative study. Here they suggest four measures by which to approach these
questions: participants’ orientation, coherence, fruitfulness, and new problems. While
participants’ orientation is not directly applicable to this study, which does not include
human participants, the other three afford important lenses through which to consider my
work.
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In terms of coherence, Potter and Wetherell (1987) claim that “Analysis should let
us see how the discourse fits together and how discursive structure produces effects and
functions. … If the explanation covers the broad pattern, and accounts for many of the
micro-sequences, then we will take it more seriously” (p. 170). This principle was a
guiding tenet as I conducted my analysis and reported the subsequent findings. It is
further reflected in my research questions, which intentionally speak to both the content
of the version of reality constructed in forensic assessment manuals as well as its
functions. In addition, I have taken care to balance an explication of overarching patterns
and observations with attention to specific textual examples of these themes. I have also
included those instances when there appear to be contrasts between the two manuals
making up the dataset, as well as textual divergences from the primary patterns. In doing
so, I have endeavored to uphold Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) notion that the report of
discourse analysis findings “constitutes part of the confirmation and validation
procedures itself” (p. 172). In adhering to this level of transparency, it is my hope that
readers can and will have the opportunity to follow my reasoning and contribute their
own analyses, whether confirming my conclusions or drawing alternatives. By nature of
the dissertation process, this report will already reflect contributions from my advising
committee, but it is not meant to be a static document of reified claims—further
readership will ideally provide additional validity checks. As Potter and Wetherell (1987)
describe, “In this sense discourse analysis could be said to be more rigorous than
experimental reports as it is often impossible to independently check the analysis in these
cases” (p. 172). Another notable aspect of Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) coherence
measure is that of “apparent exceptions to the analytic scheme” (p. 170). In these cases,
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acknowledging an aspect of the account that does not seem to fit the general pattern can
be categorized more definitively as an exception to the pattern, and thereby can serve as
confirmation of that pattern.
Similar to coherence, fruitfulness is another measure of validity that is in many
ways dependent on future readership. Fruitfulness “refers to the scope of an analytic
scheme to make sense of new kinds of discourse and to generate novel explanations” (p.
171), and is rooted in the observation that across disciplines, research that resonates with
the field to an extent that it offers these sorts of contributions tends to carry more validity
(and power). One of my goals in conducting this research and composing my write-up as
I have is that it can and will “be used to generate fresh solutions to the problems in a
field” (p. 171). Nevertheless, this is, of course, a validity measure that requires the time
and patience of waiting to discover how my work is taken up within the community at
large and across disciplines. It certainly cannot be determined at the time of writing, aside
from noting that fruitfulness is one validity dimension that will remain in my awareness
in the years to come.
Finally, Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) concept of “new problems” offers a third
measure by which to approach the validity of this discourse analysis study. The reasoning
behind this dimension is not unlike that behind the importance of exceptions to the
coherence of a discursive pattern; evidence of a problem (and of a solution to that
problem) that emerges from the way a discourse is constructed ultimately affirms the
presence of that hypothesized discourse. The authors look to car mechanics for a
metaphor, explaining, “If we think of a car engine, it converts chemical energy into
mechanical propulsion reasonably effectively, but in doing so it generates heat. Thus the
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car needs a cooling system to mop the excess heat and keep the engine working
smoothly” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 171). In the present study, this would likely
manifest as instructions towards solving a “problem” that has been introduced by the
text’s own discursive pattern.
Of course, there are inherent limitations to validating any findings in an
interpretive discourse analysis, including mine. As Bell (2011) explains, “As discourse
analysts, we know that we are not actually able to prove that our reading of a text is
‘right’ or even the best one” (p. 537). That being said, Bell goes on to draw from
Ricoeur’s proposal that careful sensitivity to and analysis of the features of the text and
its reception context enable us to “demonstrate that competing readings are less valid or
probable” (p. 537). To more comprehensively address these particular validity challenges
inherent in this project (and in interpretive discourse analysis more broadly), I enhanced
this study’s rigor by expanding this stage of Potter and Wetherell’s procedural guidelines
in two ways. Firstly, in an effort to consider how other scholars have interpreted the
structure and functions of the discourse of child accounts, I compared my study’s
findings with literature that specifically focuses on the discourse analysis of child
experience and memory in an array of contexts, including forensic. Secondly, to the
extent it is possible, I attempted to access and track my own process of forming questions
and drawing conclusions by keeping a journal. Here I recorded my reactions as I engaged
in this research, with particular attention to moments of frustration, anger, excitement,
and shifts in my thinking. This knowledge proved useful in validating that my findings
are grounded in the data rather than solely in my preconceived assumptions.
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Stage 9: Report. Finally, Potter and Wetherell (1987) describe how the
endeavors of the preceding steps are summarized and synthesized in a single document,
one that is written with explicit transparency:
The goal is to present analysis and conclusions in such a way that the reader is
able to assess the researcher’s interpretations. Thus a representative set of
examples from the area of interest must be included along with a detailed
interpretation which links analytic claims to specific parts or aspects of the
extracts. In this way, the entire reasoning process from discursive data to
conclusions is documented in some detail and each reader is given the possibility
of evaluating the different stages of the process. (p. 172)
This attunement in effect serves as an additional measure of validity, and furthermore
highlights the non-rigid temporal fluidity of moving back and forth across many of these
methodological stages throughout the project. In addition to what Potter and Wetherell
(1987) outline here, my report also makes use of a phenomenological conceptualization
of memory as a point of comparison to the findings I present. This organization helps
elucidate the ways the manuals’ discourse of child memory converges with and/or differs
from a phenomenological discourse of child memory, with a discussion of explicit
implications for how this perspective can inform the ways the current legal system
handles evaluations involving children.
Stage 10: Application. It is my hope that the findings of this study will inform
our understanding of how children’s accounts are taken up in forensic settings, and help
ensure our legal system can be one that more fully honors child experience and
narratives.
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Analysis
Global Differences and Similarities
This analysis will begin at the global, macro level before zooming in to focus on
more detailed, nuanced aspects of the forensic assessment manuals that make up this
dataset. This is not to suggest any sort of hierarchy, but rather to provide appropriate
context in order to more fully understand the totality of this discourse and the reader’s
experience with it. In doing so, it is my hope that this report will come closer to capturing
not only an analysis of the text but also of its greater meaning in the world. I also hope
that this thoroughness will afford a degree of transparency to my work, in keeping with
Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) discourse analysis methodology. I invite the audience
reading to speculate along with me about the findings I have identified and the
meanings(s), function(s), and utility(ies) they may possess and serve.
The physical specifications of the manuals are virtually identical. According to
Amazon.com, The Handbook of Forensic Psychology (HFP) measures 7.3 inches across,
10.3 inches tall, and 2.2 inches thick. It spans 944 pages and weighs 3.8 pounds.
Amazon.com lists Psychological Evaluations for the Courts (PEC) as measuring 7.2
inches across, 10.2 inches tall, and 2 inches thick. It has 930 pages and weighs 4 pounds.
Both books are encased in substantial hardcover binding. Published by John Wiley &
Sons, HFP is in its fourth edition, published in 2014. At the time of writing the price for a
new hardcover copy through the publisher is $160.00 (WILEY, n.d.), though it is
available from Amazon for $101.89. PEC is published by The Guilford Press, which, as I
mentioned in my methods section, released a new, fourth edition during the course of this
study. After reviewing the new 2018 edition, however, my committee and I deemed it
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most appropriate for my project to draw on the third edition, which was published in
2007.
Comparing the two editions revealed few significant variations in the sections
pertinent to my study, but I did recognize two main ways the text differed between them.
Firstly, many of the fourth edition’s revisions reflect shifts in cultural norms about
inclusiveness. For example, references to “mental retardation” in the 2007 edition were
updated to “intellectual disabilities” in 2018. In the Special Populations subsection of
Chapter 16 (on custody evaluations) the populations expanded from three in 2007 to
seven in 2018, with amendments including “Multinational Families” and “Parents who
are Batterers.” This demonstrates the manual authors’ attention to addressing the needs of
a more diverse array of people and to using more sensitive language while doing so. This
attitude reinforces the notion that these handbooks serve reflect the context in which they
are created, and it appears that at least one driving factor behind these changes is that the
body of research they draw on warrants such updates. Secondly, the 3-page subsection
The Technique of Custody Evaluations in Chapter 16 was organized differently in 2018,
with a new half-page additional text of more explicit guidelines to evaluators. The overall
effect of this organization and detail is greater clarity and a somewhat more direct tone of
instruction to the reader. Still, in overall tone, conclusions, and function, there is little
divergence between the 2018 and 2007 editions. Additionally, given that my research
questions focus on understanding a broad discourse and its functional consequences, my
committee and I determined it would be more appropriate to use the version of the text
that is more accessible and that has already been widely used, reviewed, and adopted
rather than the brand new one. That is, while the new fourth edition could eventually
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become as highly regarded and widely utilized as its predecessor, this assumption has not
yet been proven. The third edition of PEC is not available for purchase from the publisher
directly, but a new hardcover copy currently is listed at $126.10 on Amazon.com.
In short, these books are substantial, expensive tomes. Their heft implies
comprehensiveness, significance, and a certain gravity. Taken together, these physical
properties send the message that these books are serious, and serious in a manner that
befits the content inside. These are not pocket-sized guides that one might keep in a
briefcase or backpack for handy reference; these manuals live on shelves or maybe a
desk, demanding concerted attention from studious professionals. Also, given their girth
(and price tags), it seems unlikely that evaluators would invest in more than one manual.
They each appear to be designed with the intention of needing only one. Though I did not
draw on virtual texts in this project, there is an e-book format of HFP available through
the publisher for $128.00 (WILEY, n.d.) and $96.80 for a Kindle version through
Amazon. The third edition of PEC is not available as an e-book from The Guilford Press
or through Amazon.
Despite their physical similarities, the manuals differ in some significant ways,
including in their intended audience and in their authorship. Regarding audience, PEC
makes clear from its subtitle, “A Handbook for Mental Health Professionals and
Lawyers,” that it endeavors to serve as a resource for individuals in both systems. HFP is
a bit more opaque, but the publisher bills it as “Ideal for professional forensic
psychologists and graduate students” (WILEY, n.d.). As a result, PEC tends to devote
more text to legal precedent, procedures, landmark cases, and historical context about the
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legal system. Notably, the vast majority of these examples were not offered as
instructions to evaluators, and therefore not included in the text compendium.
In terms of authorship, PEC lists four principal authors (Gary B. Melton, John
Petrila, Norman G. Poythress, and Christopher Slobogin) on the cover, and on the title
page adds two more consulting authors underneath (“with” Philip M. Lyons, Jr., and
Randy K. Otto). HFP, on the other hand, names two editors (Irving B. Weiner and, again,
Randy K. Otto) on the cover, but a different contributor or team of contributors have
authored each chapter. This contrast has three effects that are especially pertinent to the
study at hand. Firstly, HFP’s more compartmentalized authorship makes it more
transparent to the reader who is writing what. Secondly, PEC’s use of the same authors
for the entire handbook conveys a sense that this text is more monolithic, and perhaps
powerful, as opposed to a more diffused and multivocal narrative. That being said, the act
of including more expert professionals writing according to their specialties, as in HFP,
arguably assumes a certain power of its own. Thirdly (and relatedly) the title of editor
introduces a layer of hierarchy and affords Weiner and Otto a bit more distance from the
particular findings and instructions their chapters contain. These nuances are further
reflected in the way that excerpts from each handbook are cited in the present study.
Because it is formatted in APA style, quotes from and references to PEC will name the
same group of authors, the same four names (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin) or
more often the same one name (Melton et al.), regardless of the chapter from which they
are drawn. In contrast, though I often refer to HFP as “Weiner and Otto” to preserve their
presence in the account, using APA style ensures that direct quotes from their manual are
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attributed to their specific contributing author(s). As a result, it will be more readily
apparent in which chapter each quote is found.
Another difference between the two texts is in the formatting. Both use a font
similar to Times New Roman, but the text in PEC is small, closer to 10pt, and placed into
two columns. HFP has bigger text, closer to 12pt, and no columns. The resulting effect is
that PEC is denser, with more text on each page and a more journalistic air.
Contrastingly, HFP looks airier and more similar to a novel. With fewer words per page, I
turned pages more quickly while reading HFP than PEC, spending less time with a given
spread. In addition, the handbooks are formatted according to different reference styles—
HFP uses APA style, while PEC uses Chicago style. In terms of reader experience, the
most glaring consequence of this difference is the way each cites reference sources. In
HFP, the authors of the sources and years of publication are always embedded in the
body of the text, whether as part of the narrative or as parenthetical insertions
immediately following the paraphrased text. PEC also sometimes names the authors of a
specific study or source in the body of the text, but more often, sources are denoted with
anonymous superscript numbers directing readers to corresponding endnotes at the end of
the last chapter. Thus although the same information about these sources is available in
both texts, it is less visible and requires more effort from the reader to find it in PEC. In
an effort to mimic the experience of reading the manuals for readers of this project, all
parenthetical reference sources and superscript numbers will be included in the quoted
passages. (The corresponding endnotes to the superscript citations, however, will not be
included. Such an endeavor would prove too unwieldy for the project at hand, with
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minimal effect.) As a consequence, HFP’s use of APA citation style compounds the
visibly embedded multivocality engendered by HFP’s use of multiple chapter authors.
Lastly, the manuals differ somewhat with regard to the order in which they
present the domains included in the current study: custody, child maltreatment, and child
eyewitness testimony. In PEC, Chapter 15, “Child Abuse and Neglect,” and Chapter 16,
“Child Custody in Divorce,” fall under Part IV (Children and Families), while their
specific coverage of child testimony is in Part II (The Criminal Process), under the
subsection of Chapter 7, “Other Competencies in the Criminal Process,” called
“Competency to Testify.” This organization is not overtly accessible, and increases the
likelihood that an individual interested in these issues will have to sift through the index
to seek them out specifically. Similarly, in HFP, Chapter 6, “Conducting Child Custody
and Parenting Evaluations,” and Chapter 10, “Conducting Child Abuse and Neglect
Evaluations,” are also located in the same section of the book, Part Two (Applying
Psychology to Civil Proceedings). However, here child testimony is discussed in a full
chapter of its own in Part Four (Special Applications): Chapter 18, “Evaluating
Eyewitness Testimony of Children.” This composition affords the topic more
prominence, and therefore may imply that Weiner and Otto have assigned it more
priority, or perhaps deemed it more relevant to their readers than did Melton et al.
Despite these differences in presentation, however, the handbooks’ overarching
conclusions and ways of talking about evaluating children remain similar, and offer
ample overlap from which to draw conclusions about the account of reality being
constructed. Indeed, while these matters are important to keep in mind, the two manuals
ultimately prove more alike than they are different. This will be elaborated in the next
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section through a number of patterns that emerge in the instructions they offer to
professionals conducting evaluations involving children.
The Spectrum of Instructions
Before delving into an analysis of handbooks’ instructions to evaluators, it is first
necessary to discuss the process of determining what, exactly, to consider as an
instruction. This task proved more challenging than initially anticipated, and quickly
exposed my own assumption that the manuals in my data sample would clearly
differentiate their instructions to evaluators from the remainder of the text. This binary
view—that a sentence would be plainly either instructive or not—proved wishfully
simplistic. While there were certainly instances of unequivocal, imperative directives to
evaluators (e.g., “In young children, the evaluator should observe the way children and
parents relate with one another” [Stahl, 2014, p. 154]), it became apparent that there were
frequently instructive qualities in sections of the text even when they were not overtly
phrased as such (e.g., “Evaluators may be asked to address not only what might be done
to increase safety for a child, but also who might do it” [Melton, Petrila, Poythress, &
Slobogin, 2007, p. 528]). At a broader level, in fact, there is an argument to be made that
according to the fundamental tenets of discourse analysis, everything included in these
manuals functions as instructive simply by virtue of being part of a “handbook,” created
for the very purpose of guiding its readers. That is, there exists an implied, overarching
meta-instruction that evaluators be familiar with the content in these manuals; that this is
important information for those conducting forensic psychological evaluations to know.
Thus it was necessary to adopt a more nuanced understanding of “instruction,” and more
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effective to conceptualize the content of the manuals as on spectrum between implicit and
explicit instruction.
This shift meant refining the criteria for inclusion in my text compendium, while
still aligning with the goal of Stage 6 of Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) methodology, “to
squeeze an unwieldy body of text into manageable chunks” (p. 167) according to
categories that are “obviously and crucially related to the research questions” (p. 167).
Instead of simply compiling instances in which the manuals offer instructions to the
evaluator—a task that could have meant transcribing the entire books—I revisited the
task of defining “instructions” in a way that would best address my research questions.
Preliminary analysis of the text led me to recognize two different functions the data
seemed to be serving. Those passages on the explicit end of the instruction spectrum
served as directive commands, what I had initially assumed I would find when I
embarked on this project. Many of the sections that were implicitly instructive, however,
guided evaluators by way of educating. It became evident that in order to best address my
research questions, I would need to consider both definitions of the verb to instruct: to
teach as well as to direct (Merriam-Webster, 2018). In practice, this meant including in
my compendium any procedural explanations of what evaluations may entail and what is
expected of evaluators, as well as any explicit instructions to evaluators. The most
frequently omitted sections elaborated lengthy historical context and sample cases.
Though interesting, the educating instructive function in these instances was deemed
peripheral to the scope of this study.
While the handbooks contained a greater number of implicit, educative
instructions than expected, the final compendium revealed that in both manuals this type
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of guidance was still slightly less common than more explicit, directive instructions. In
Melton et al. (2007), I classified 51 text compendium entries as implicit instructions and
65 entries as explicit. In Weiner and Otto (2014), I classified 70 implicit entries and 76 as
explicit. It should be noted that despite their apparent precision, it is more appropriate to
interpret these counts as my best attempt to provide a broad estimate of the proportion of
implicit to explicit instructions in my compendium. As stated above, considering these
entries according to a rigid binary of implicit or explicit belies their underlying fluidity
across this spectrum.
Following my intended study procedures, after sorting through these issues and
collecting and classifying the data in my compendium accordingly, I set out to analyze
these instructions by posing the following questions to this assemblage of text:


When offering instructions on how to evaluate children, what implicit
assumptions are being made?



What is the explicit reasoning or basis the handbooks offer for these
conclusions?



How are these manuals talking about child memory in these instances?



Are there places of conflict/contradiction in these guidelines?



Is there anything that seems to be missing or unaccounted for in these
instructions?

However, as I began this undertaking, I quickly realized that my analysis questions now
overlooked a basic but vital subject: What are the instructions the manuals offer on how
to conduct evaluations involving children? The same fluidity that prompted me to
broaden my definition of “instructions” now made the omission even more figural.
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Clarifying at a content level what, exactly, the handbooks are advising readers to do is
essential to the project of further analyzing how they are doing the advising, including
their assumptions and reasoning. Per Potter and Wetherell (1987), a cornerstone of this
stage of discourse analysis is searching for patterns of convergence and divergence in the
data relative to these questions.
In posing these questions to the compendium text, a number of patterns emerged.
For the sake of clarity, I have organized these patterns under two main headings, those
that are foundational and those that concern child memory/experience more directly. The
foundational patterns arose primarily in response to questions about what instructions the
manuals are offering to readers performing evaluations involving children, and
thematically, they generally focus on how evaluators should conduct themselves
throughout the evaluation process. While child memory and experience are taken up less
overtly in these sections, they are essential to understanding the manuals’ discourse
around the evaluator assessing the children in question. Thus the foundational patterns
are so named because they serve as a foundation for addressing broader research
questions about how child experience (memory in particular) is constructed in these
manuals, and the functional consequences that potentially follow. The analysis then turns
to patterns specifically regarding child memory and experience. For all of these patterns,
my explication will be grounded in linguistic evidence such that the readers can better
trace my reasoning and compare it with their own as I postulate about the functional
consequences of the various patterns in this discourse. Although they will be taken up
here as separate findings, it should be noted that these patterns are not understood as
entirely discrete, but rather as having various areas in which they overlap or intertwine.
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Furthermore, although the two handbooks were generally similar in the majority of their
guidelines, each handbook of course contained its own particular idiosyncrasies and
distinctions. When these divergences were significant, they are discussed below.
Foundational Patterns in Compendium Instructions
Exercise caution: a ubiquitous guideline. The plea for evaluators to exercise
caution imbued virtually all of the instructions in the text compendium. Both in content
as well as in tone, this guidance appeared over and over again, in each of the analyzed
chapters and across a wide array of topics. The general directive to “be careful”
manifested in a number of specific ways. For example, both handbooks were fairly
straightforward in their advice that evaluators be careful in their use and interpretation of
specialized psychometric assessments. Melton et al. (2007) warn, “these instruments may
be helpful in clinical evaluation, but the fact that most have not been validated for use in
child protection dispositions should make clinicians cautious in interpreting observations
drawn from them” (p. 532). Similarly, Stahl (2014) notes, “no specific instruments can
directly assess the complex issues inherent in [custody] evaluations” (p. 155), and thus
“examiners should be aware of the controversies and arguments on both sides of the
issues when choosing to use those particular instruments…” (p. 157).
Ethical considerations, such as obtaining informed consent and avoiding multiple
relationships, were another area in which the manuals overtly espoused caution. In the
context of urging evaluators to take precautions against potential repercussions from
disgruntled parents, Stahl (2014) explains, “technically, informed consent is not obtained
when the court orders an evaluation; custody evaluators are encouraged to obtain consent
both in writing and orally at the start of the evaluation process” (p. 145). Regarding
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multiple relationships, “clinicians must guard against inadvertently being drawn into a
decisionmaker or advocate role when they have represented themselves as investigators
or evaluators” (Melton et al., 2007, p. 521), and “when a clinician is employed as an
evaluator, he or she should be careful not to slip into the role of intervenor unless the
parties or the court so requests. Even for those mental health professionals who are also
trained as lawyers, there are serious problems of dual practice and dual representation”
(Melton et al., 2007, p. 542).
Clarify the evaluator’s role. These latter instructions also speak to a larger
pattern present in the data: the importance of clarity about the evaluator’s role. The
handbooks acknowledge the challenges of establishing and maintaining this
differentiation, pointing out that cases involving evaluating children “are more complex,
involve more people, and entail more procedures than most” (Stahl, 2014, p. 151), and
(again, with superscript endnote reference included) that “drawing a bright line between
‘investigation’ and ‘assessment’ may be quite difficult143” (Melton et al., 2007, p. 509).
Melton et al. (2007) also acknowledge that “clarity in concept does not necessarily
translate to clarity in practice” (p. 508). As in other psychology specialties, the manuals
claim that clarity of professional roles in child-related forensic evaluations mitigates
ethical problems, most primarily the risk of the evaluator slipping into a “fact finder” or
“decision maker” position. In sum, the manuals instruct that the evaluator’s role
constitutes carefully gathering case information relevant to the specific referral questions
and synthesizing it with relevant literature to make measured interpretations. Evaluators
may then offer suggestions or recommendations, being sure these conclusions are
meticulously and explicitly grounded in the evidence that they have gathered.
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Importantly, the texts make clear that the evaluator’s role does not include making
decisions about a child’s living circumstances, necessary interventions, or
accuracy/honesty, but rather provides information to assist other authorities (e.g.
mediators, judges, juries, etc.) in making their ultimate determinations. In their discussion
of custody evaluations, Melton et al. (2007) warn:
The superficial relevance of everyday clinical practice to custody disputes; the
shifting boundaries and allegiances within families (and the resulting pulls on
clinicians); and even the related gender politics may sometimes seduce mental
health professionals into reaching unwarranted opinions.13 (p. 540)
Condie (2014) offers similar guidance in Weiner and Otto’s (2014) chapter on conducting
child abuse and neglect evaluations:
[I]t is important to remember that even the highest professional standards do not
require an evaluator to be a good judge of a child’s truth-telling capacity (APA
Committee on Professional Practice and Standards, 2011). That task is left to the
fact finder, and it lies beyond the scope of current scientific research and practice.
(p. 267)
Here the manuals suggest that encroaching on the responsibilities of trier of fact is a
phenomenon that can easily or unintentionally occur. Doing so can be feel natural—even
seductive—but is ultimately inappropriate, since it requires specialized training,
knowledge, and experience beyond that of a forensic assessor. Therefore vigilant selfawareness is required on the part of the evaluator.
Though examples occur in both manuals, Melton et al. (2007) are particularly
assertive that evaluators (frequently referred to as clinicians in this text) take care to
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adopt an attitude of humility in order to minimize the possibility of taking actions or
drawing conclusions beyond their knowledge base. In the chapter covering maltreatment
evaluations they caution, “clinicians must remain mindful that although dispositional
issues are conceptually within their province, their expertise on such issues may still be
limited” (p. 508), therefore, “they should have great humility in making predictions and
offering other opinions” (p. 518). Regarding custody, the authors go on to “remind
readers of the point that [they] have made throughout this chapter: Careful attention must
be paid to the limits of expertise in custody evaluations” (p. 558). And in the area of child
eyewitness testimony, “Another preliminary issue clinicians must address is whether they
have anything to add to what a trial judge will be able to discern with respect to
observational, memory, communication, and moral capacities” (p. 185). Here, the
authors’ reasoning for advising this humility is that human beings are fallible, and in the
complicated realm of these sorts of evaluations it can be difficult to identify and
remember how far one’s expertise extends. Throughout the manual, however, they also
claim even more fervently that evaluators must recognize their expertise is necessarily
constrained by limits in the relevant research literature, an explanation echoed in Weiner
and Otto (2014). The ways in which the manuals instruct evaluators to engage with
research merits analysis as a pattern in its own right, and will be discussed later in greater
detail.
Whereas Melton et al. advocate humility, Weiner and Otto (2014) adopt a slightly
different tack, emphasizing instead that evaluators should be thoroughly informed about
case specifics, relevant literature, and pertinent legal proceedings. Doing so, they suggest,
will minimize the risk of evaluators speaking beyond their expertise not only because
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they will be accountably knowledgeable, but also because they will be able to better
recognize the limits of what they know. In addition, Weiner and Otto present evaluations
involving children—especially custody evaluations—as more contentious affairs than do
Melton et al., and propose that this exhaustive knowledge base is one measure evaluators
can take to protect themselves from angry or litigious parents. Thus part of an evaluator’s
role is to “have the temperament to conduct very comprehensive evaluations and
recognize that they may be subjected to anger from parents and an adversarial trial
experience” (Stahl, 2014, p. 139). Later, they restate that “To be an effective evaluator,
one must develop a thick skin, because one or both parents are likely to be upset with the
recommendations” (Stahl, 2014, p. 163-164). Such a characterization adds another layer
to the manuals’ efforts to situate the evaluator as a distinct, clearly delineated position.
What are the functional consequences of these manuals defining the evaluator in
this way, as cautious, meticulous, and sharply distinct from those determining “facts” or
making final decisions? To start, by presenting forensic evaluations involving children as
requiring such abundant caution, these instructions position the evaluator as vulnerable,
needing to actively and constantly protect oneself from ethical lapses, professional
missteps, and even personal attack. Upon reading this characterization, it is possible that
some psychologists may be discouraged from pursuing this work further, while others
may be invigorated by the challenge set before them. Irrespective of where on this
continuum a potential evaluator’s reaction may fall, however, the manuals are quite
successful at implicitly arguing for their own necessity. The paramount importance of
being thoroughly educated and prepared certainly affirms the need for forensic
psychology training manuals (and the authors who publish them).
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Understanding this vulnerability as humility offers perspective on another effect
that stems from the way the manuals present the role of the evaluator, and that is a
paradoxical relationship with accountability and authority. On the one hand, the manuals
seem to place an incredible amount of responsibility on evaluators’ shoulders. In addition
to understanding “specific statutory or case law,” (Stahl, 2014, p. 153), evaluators are
expected to perform “comprehensive observation and interviewing of the parents and
children, and gathering of interview and archival information from third-party sources”
(Melton et al., 2007, p. 558). Moreover, the evaluator “serves as a consultant to the judge,
providing critical data about the family for a better understanding of the family dynamics
and the needs of the children” (Stahl, 2014, p. 141-142). The implications here are that
evaluators must take seriously and assume accountability for their professional role and
the many duties the court has assigned, and that doing so has significant bearing on the
outcome of the case.
On the other hand, however, the manuals also assert that one of the most critical
tasks evaluators face is recognizing the confines of and restrictions on their role and
duties. Crucially, they are not accountable for determining facts (e.g. whether or not child
maltreatment has occurred, whether or not a child is lying) or making ultimate decisions
(e.g. placing a child in a particular custody arrangement). This differentiation establishes
a check on the authority of the evaluator, despite also arguing for the prominence of the
role. As Stahl (2014) puts it, “Because the evaluator is the only unbiased person
providing information to the judge about the child (it is assumed that both parents will be
biased), such information is vital to the court in helping it to make the ultimate decision
about custody and parenting plans” (p. 154). From these handbooks, it would appear that
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evaluators must strive to remain in a fairly narrow margin of acceptable authority. That
the evaluator must relinquish control of how the results of her or his toil are ultimately
taken up and applied may be experienced as a frustration, relief, or some combination.
Regardless, the repeated guidelines distance evaluators from the final outcomes of their
cases, exonerating them from ultimate culpability.
Furthermore, the manuals also assume that evaluators are capable of the selfawareness the authors argue is essential to the task of knowing the limitations of one’s
knowledge, expertise, and professional role. Take, for example, this set of instructions
from Melton et al. (2007):
Although the issues typically are subtle, mental health professionals conducting
custody evaluations should take special care to examine ways in which their own
experiences and attitudes color their views about childrearing and “proper”
roles—especially gender roles—of family members. They also need to be
especially sensitive to ways that clinicians can be unwittingly drawn into taking
sides with a family member. (p. 562)
In this instance (and at other places in both handbooks), the authors are advocating for
some pretty sophisticated reflexivity on the part of the evaluator. The “experiences and
attitudes” they allude to are not superficially apparent by nature, but rather are frequently
deeply inveterate and habitual. Obviously there are practical restrictions on what can be
included in these already lengthy manuals, but omitting further discussion about how
evaluators might go about examining their inherent biases and proclivities assumes
readers will be able to determine how to do so effectively on their own.
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Be familiar with research literature, evidence, and its limitations. Another
pattern is readily apparent in the multifaceted way these manuals take up and present
research literature as they offer instructions to people conducting evaluations involving
children. Most overtly, there are multiple instances in which the books directly advise
readers to be familiar with a particular body of literature or research. For example,
Condie (2014) states, “To understand risk of maltreatment, it is important to understand
research on a variety of factors contributing to risk and mediation of risk” (p. 270), and
Melton et al. (2007) assert, “The clinician who is invited to evaluate a child’s competency
to testify should be aware of the large body of research on children’s skills as
witnesses191” (p. 513-514). Directives such as these, which demonstrate the value the
authors place on relevant research, tend to precede or follow the lengthier, more detailed
syntheses of particular research studies that constitute the bulk of the manuals’ content.
In addition to these stark advisements, the handbooks also frequently reference
research in more subtle ways as they present critical issues and offer instructions to
evaluators throughout the texts. In a section on determining the scope of a custody
evaluation for example, Melton et al. (2007) write, “Because of the significance of
interparental conflict in the literature on effects of divorce, special attention should be
given to the parents’ capacity for cooperation, the nature and intensity of disagreements
about the children, and points of possible compromise” (p. 558). Here, the authors
reference literature to justify the areas of focus they instruct evaluators to include during
their work. While there is no outright directive that evaluators know this particular
research, the phrasing implies that this literature is important, and that knowing it should
shape one’s work as an evaluator. There are also numerous instances in which the
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manuals cite, quote, or describe specific studies in greater depth, though the latter occurs
most prevalently in the manuals’ coverage of children’s eyewitness testimony. (See
pattern titled “Research is elaborated in detail, but conclusions are offered equivocally”
for further discussion of this phenomenon.) Again, in Weiner and Otto (2014), which is
formatted in APA style, these research studies assume a more visible presence than they
do in Melton et al.’s (2007) Chicago style, where citations are noted with superscript
numbers referring to endnotes in the back of the manual.
Indeed, these handbooks often read like literature reviews, with the authors
carefully structuring their chapters around the research study topics they have deemed
most prolific and/or important. The following passage from early in Weiner and Otto’s
(2014) chapter on evaluating children’s eyewitness testimony provides a fairly typical
example of this tendency:
In any case, it is clear that many factors play a role in children’s memory for
traumatic and stressful events—too many to review in this chapter. Here we first
consider some of the theoretical issues involved in memory for stressful and
traumatic experiences. We then turn to a subset of the factors that affect children’s
memory for stressful events, such as age when events occurred, language and
parental factors, centrality of the to-be-remembered information, whether the
individual is a participant or bystander witness, and whether events are repeated
or single occurrences. Additionally, we review research on physiological stress
responses—research that is furthering our knowledge about how stress affects
children’s memory of traumatic and stressful events. Clearly, a complex
multivariate model of children’s memory for stressful events is needed to
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integrate disparate findings. (Hobbs, Johnson, Goodman, Bederian-Gardner,
Lawler, Vargas, & Mendoza, 2014, p. 564)
We will return later to consider how the manuals engage with the topic of children’s
memory in its own right. What is notable about this excerpt for the present discussion is
the way in which research literature is foregrounded and prioritized over drawing
conclusions, that is, before offering any instructions. Eventually, the authors ultimately
direct evaluators to adopt “a complex, multivariate model of children’s memory for
stressful events,” but they also make explicit that this recommendation is absolutely
dependent on the data from the research they have reviewed. Their passive voice phrasing
even serves to distance themselves as interpreters of the data; rather than actively
advising readers to conceptualize memory a certain way, they simply draw attention to
what is “clearly” already there from the research that will be outlined, (despite apparent
discrepancies in said research).
The handbooks engage with research literature in many different ways, and taken
as a whole it becomes apparent in these manuals, research is granted the ultimate
authority. In keeping with their own instructions, however, the authors are also careful to
recognize and state the numerous instances when research is incomplete, flawed, or
contradictory. As alluded to in the previous section, the manuals caution readers about
the limitations of this body of literature, for example, gaps in research subtopics (e.g.,
“There is limited research on the effect of parental relocation on children.” [Stahl, 2014,
p. 150]), as well as issues with particular study designs. These advisories can be quite
granular, as when Melton et al. (2007) describe maltreatment evaluations where there is
the possibility of intimate partner violence in the family to consider. They note, “The
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information that is available from small, single-site studies gives ample additional reason
for modesty in making ideologically grounded assumptions, at least until large-scale,
more representative studies are available” (p. 527).
In addition, the manuals do not shy away from presenting contradicting research
findings. In fact, a common pattern throughout both manuals is for the authors to
introduce an issue relevant to evaluations involving children, present research findings
that suggest one conclusion about the issue, then describe research with an alternative
outcome:
When it comes to children, the courts’ obsession with truthtelling seems
overblown. There is in fact little correlation between age and truthtelling; in other
words, children are not more prone to lie than adults or to misunderstand the
concept of truth.201 Bussey found that “even preschoolers could differentiate
between lies and truthful statements about misdeeds [and] appreciated the
naughtiness of lying.”202 Another study of children ages four to six also found that
most understood the difference between the truth and a lie.203 However, consistent
with the research on suggestibility, these researchers did caution that “there may
be a small percentage of children whose definition of the truth may be influenced
by parental direction or its helpfulness to a friend.”204 (Melton et al., 2007, p. 184)
The authors then frequently “resolve” the stated discrepancies by stating that more
research is needed in this area and/or advocating the need for caution in one’s
evaluations. One example of this tendency occurs in Weiner and Otto’s (2014)
conclusion of their chapter on conducting child abuse and neglect evaluations, “Analysis
of child maltreatment risk should acknowledge appropriate caveats. Further research is
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needed to better understand the degree of concordance or possible discordance in risk
studies relevant to other samples of individuals and those involving risk of child
maltreatment” (Condie, 2014, p. 270). Melton et al. (2007) offer this analog, “Thus,
although research and theory on the dynamics of child abuse and the nature of children’s
experience in the legal process may be helpful in suggesting the possible effects of
alternative procedures, there is little research direction on the point, and that which is
available gives more reason for caution in predictions” (p. 512). Indeed, the authors of
both manuals strive to present a comprehensive overview of relevant research literature
and the potential challenges one might encounter when interpreting it.
This attitude of prizing thoroughness by integrating all findings, even those that
may contradict, is also expressed when the handbooks instruct evaluators about the
importance of balance in their work. Stahl (2014) asserts, “Examiners should be aware of
the controversies and arguments on both sides of the issues when choosing to use those
particular instruments, as presented in balanced reviews by Craig (2006), Dyer (2008),
Erard (2005), and Evans and Shutz (2008)” (p. 157). In this instance, the author suggests
that the balance in the reviews he cites is laudable and important, as it helps to offer
evaluators an exhaustive understanding of the issues—in this case, psychological testing
and parenting questionnaires in custody evaluations. This emphasis on balance sheds
light on another facet of the manuals’ treatment of research literature: that extensive
familiarity with research is essential tool for evaluators as they endeavor to achieve
objective neutrality in their interactions and reports.
Both manuals seamlessly describe evaluators as adopting the role of “neutral
experts,” though the intended meaning of “neutral” is twofold. At times, the word
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“neutral” appears to be drawn from a forensic lexicon to describe an individual who does
not formally represent any one party, as a lawyer would. For example, Stahl (2014)
explains, “a neutrally appointed child custody evaluator will spend considerable time
with both parents trying to understand their concerns and their perceptions of their child’s
needs” (p. 142). There are other instances, however, when the authors extend this
neutrality to encompass objectivity or a lack of bias. Melton et al. (2007) cite the
American Psychological Association’s Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in
Family Law Proceedings to remind readers that “child custody evaluators are often pulled
in conflicting direction by their concerns for the various individuals involved…. They
note that the psychologist’s role is ‘that of a professional expert who strives to maintain
an objective, impartial stance’” (p. 542-543). It is interesting to note that the notion of
evaluator neutrality is fundamental in both the legal and mental health systems, despite
variations in the connotations of the phrase.
The manuals also acknowledge factors or circumstances in which impartiality
may prove challenging. As discussed above, the authors name evaluator reflexivity as one
way to protect against the encroachment of personal biases, but thorough knowledge of
the research base is presented as an even more potent means of maintaining objectivity.
Melton et al. (2007) offer an example of this attitude in their chapter on child
maltreatment evaluations, instructing, “neither clinicians nor legal authorities should infer
from a diagnosis that a parent is unfit. To guard against such inferences, clinicians should
make clear in their reports and testimony that conclusions as to parental difficulties based
on the presence of a mental illness per se are at present scientifically unsupportable” (p.
522). Condie (2014) similarly demonstrates the importance of “empirically
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substantiat[ing],” calling on researchers and evaluators alike to be thoroughly familiar
with existing research and theory in order to appropriately inform and ground their
conclusions. “The multidetermined nature of child maltreatment must be considered by
both researchers and clinicians in order for them to better understand and empirically
substantiate the transactional process presumed to contribute to child maltreatment
(Belsky, 1993; Condie, 2003)” (p. 247). Indeed, throughout the manuals there is an
implication that knowledge of research keeps evaluators true to their role as “neutral
experts.”
While there are considerable likenesses in the ways both manuals take up research
literature, however, there is also a significant difference worth noting. This deviation
comes with regard to the instructions the authors offer about research limitations or
contradictions. Again, the direction to exercise caution in these instances is foundational
in both manuals, but Melton et al. (2007) appear more commonly explicit in directing
evaluators to be explicitly careful, with statements like:
Although the existence of mandatory reporting and central registries potentially
provides the foundation for actuarial determination of risk, the data analyses that
would enable empirically based predictions have not been performed.228
Moreover, the research on the effectiveness of various dispositional alternatives is
woefully thin. … Therefore, even when experts are involved in the relatively
uncontroversial context of dispositional decisionmaking, they should have great
humility in making predictions and offering other opinions. (p. 518)
They overtly present caution as a sort of solution when an evaluator faces problematic
research issues, framing these challenges as an extension of the evaluators’ responsibility
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to know the limits of their expertise. They implore additional research occasionally, in a
passing and matter-of-fact way, saying, for example, “More research needs to be done,
however, on whether children’s memory fades more quickly than adults’ when a
particularly negative event is involved” (p. 181).
Weiner and Otto’s (2014) manual is much more likely than Melton et al.’s (2007)
to advocate for additional research, and they regularly address researchers directly as they
make instructions, in imperatives like, “Therefore, researchers should study the veracity
of eyewitness statements when children disclose to a familiar person, such as a parent”
(Hobbs et al., 2014, p. 578). Examples like this elucidate a more openly critical attitude
towards the body of available research, and also express a greater sense of urgency, as
when they implore, “Researchers should address such discrepancies to identify the most
effective means of administering lineups to children. Moreover, instructions to improve
lineup performance in young preschoolers (e.g., 3-year-olds) still are sorely needed” (p.
589). This is perhaps unsurprising given the tremendous value we have already seen these
manuals place on their research base.
Hobbs et al. (2014) even go so far as to make recommendations for specific
elements of research study designs:
These findings offer further support for the importance of rapport building
between the interviewer and child eyewitness as well as researchers examining
the full range of ecologically valid factors that my influence children’s
suggestibility: Research on the effects of misleading questions should address not
only what is asked but also how and by whom. (p. 579)
They later state:
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Researchers should therefore avoid overgeneralized assumptions that repeated
interviews compromise children’s memory accuracy; instead, these findings
should enlighten debates on the complexity of factors influencing children’s
reports and their interactive or culminating effects (delay since the event, number
of previous interviews, exposure to misinformation, etc.). (p. 580)
By addressing researchers in this manner, Weiner and Otto’s manual subtly distributes
the accountability for managing these difficulties to include external “researchers,” rather
than lying solely or even primarily with evaluators. This trend is especially apparent in
Hobbs et al.’s (2014) chapter on evaluating children’s eyewitness testimony and
interviewing children, which will be more fully analyzed in the later discussion on
children’s memory in these manuals. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that eyewitness
testimony seems to be an area in which research and practice are particularly enmeshed,
and perhaps one in which the authors may be especially compelled (consciously or
otherwise) to relieve evaluators from the burden of perfectly eliciting testimony from
children.
Regardless of exactly how the authors engage with research in these manuals,
however, it is virtually always manifest as the reasoning behind the conclusions they
draw with regard to instructing evaluators. In other words, if one were to ask why a
manual is offering particular guidance, more often than not the answer will be “because it
is indicated in the literature.” Yet, as in any discourse, this pattern also is informed by
and perpetuates implicit assumptions that are important to consider and bring to light.
Perhaps most fundamentally, within the authors’ prizing of research and pleas for more
and/or better studies lies the assumption that more research will provide more and/or
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better knowledge, practices, and resolutions for evaluators. Their attitude suggests it is a
given that when it comes to these incredibly complicated issues, there is truth, definitive
answers, and an abundant, high-quality research base is the key for unlocking them. This
is only part of the picture, though, because the manuals also imply that in order for the
research to be effectively interpreted and utilized, it must be thoroughly examined by a
neutral, impartial evaluator. In these handbooks, the ideal robust body of literature and
the perfectly objective evaluator are in a sense co-constituted. Unbiased professionals in
this field create the research base by performing well-designed and balanced studies, and
the neutral expert status of the evaluator can be preserved by “just doing what the
research says.” Interestingly, while the handbook authors do reference limitations of both
research and evaluators, their cautions belie an assumption that it is possible (and highly
desirable) for research studies and evaluators alike to achieve objective neutrality.
The narrative that research literature, if properly employed by evaluators, will
provide them with definitive answers on how to properly perform their duties is readily
apparent in this example from Melton et al. (2007):
Drawing from research and theory about the nature, causes, and sequelae of child
abuse and neglect … clinicians may be able to ask the “right” questions to
identify the precipitants of abuse and neglect, the particular needs of the family as
a whole and as individuals, and the nature of relationships within the family. (p.
518)
This excerpt also speaks to some of the functional consequences that arise from the ways
the handbook authors engage with research literature. Presenting the ideal evaluator as
scientific, objective, and impartial serves to distance the evaluator from the complicated,
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potentially high stakes responsibility of making recommendations to the court. It offers a
means for evaluators to claim authority (as professional experts fluent in a relevant body
of knowledge) while still lessening personal accountability for their actions and
conclusions (as professionals simply carrying out best practices described by other
experts, in this research base). By adding quotation marks around the word “right,”
Melton et al. further distance themselves from the research they reference by hinting at
their hesitance to claim that these procedures will yield definitive and proper answers.
(For more on Melton et al.’s apparent skepticism, see pattern “Research is elaborated in
detail, but conclusions are offered equivocally.”) Thus this treatment of research
literature affords some potential relief in the ambivalence with authority that is apparently
inherent in the evaluator’s role, as described previously.
Another function that the manuals’ way of engaging with research literature
serves is to demonstrate to readers that the authors are following their own instructions to
be thoroughly familiar with relevant research and its limitations. By presenting
conflicting findings and working to integrate them, the manuals are in a sense practicing
what they preach, modeling for evaluators how to follow the instructions the authors
propose and fulfilling the ethical obligation they describe as linked to this practice. They
set an example for evaluators of the very type of comprehensive familiarity with the
literature that they are recommending. Relatedly, by embodying these values as a
synthesis of such a vast array of relevant research studies, these manuals again validate
their own existence and authority. By drawing on extensive research while
simultaneously instructing readers to draw on extensive research, the manuals implicitly
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emphasize that a handbook of this sort is at the very least useful, and likely preferred or
even indispensable.
To best serve children, conduct thorough evaluations and write balanced
reports. The manual authors’ call for thoroughness and balance as a way for evaluators
to navigate the incredible complexity of conducting evaluations involving children
extends beyond an attitude towards research literature to other aspects of the process as
well. This pattern emerges primarily in the context of custody and child maltreatment
evaluations, since the handbook authors designate these areas as evaluation processes in
which an evaluator will be responsible for composing a report of findings and
recommendations to a judge or other decision maker. As will be discussed later, the
manuals at times advocate for thoroughness in the context of children’s eyewitness
testimony, but with different intentions and purposes.
Before providing instructions on how to conduct these kinds of evaluations, the
handbook authors first introduce readers to what this work may entail. In his introduction
to child custody and parenting evaluations, for example, Stahl (2014) details some of the
complexities that evaluators encounter when taking on this type of work:
Child custody and parenting evaluations are among the most difficult and
challenging of all psychological evaluations. Reasons for this include:


The number of people and relationships in the family to be evaluated.



The different ages of the children.



The range of possible psychopathology.



The presences of significant situational factors affecting psychological
functioning.
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The limitations of psychological tests or interview methods designed for
the type of assessment.



The changing nature of a child’s developmental or psychological needs
relative to future time-sharing plans.



The expansive nature of individual questions a court may have about a
particular family.

In addition to these complexities, child custody evaluators must have knowledge
of relevant statutes and case law. (p. 138)
The implication here is that evaluators should have in mind these many factors when
conducting their work, and endeavor to ethically address them all. Similarly, Melton et al.
(2007) state, “In view of both the breadth of the best-interest concept and the multiplicity
of factors potentially affecting the outcome of various custody and visitation
arrangements, a child custody evaluation can be best summarized as comprehensive” (p.
558). Furthermore, regarding child maltreatment cases, Condie (2014) asserts “flexibility
in methodology across referral questions is needed to accommodate the degrees of
breadth and depth necessary to answer a given referral question or set of questions” (p.
248). Melton et al. (2007) echo, “given what is known about the multiplicity of factors
involved in child maltreatment, the evaluation should be wide-ranging” (p. 530). Clearly,
the manuals present evaluations involving children as intricate, challenging affairs that
require appropriate comprehensiveness and care on the part of the evaluator. Just as
evaluators were instructed to be fluently familiar with research literature pertaining to
their cases, they are advised to adopt similar measures when gathering and synthesizing
information beyond the pages of research studies.
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The manual authors instruct that this information should be gathered primarily by
observing and interviewing parents and children, as well as interviewing and reviewing
archival documents from third party “collateral” sources. Doing so provides rich and
robust context from which evaluators can base their recommendations, a process that the
manuals suggest is of utmost importance in meeting the ultimate goal of serving the
needs of the child(ren) at hand. For example, when discussing the evaluator’s position
during child custody evaluations, Melton et al. (2007) describe, “Starting from the
premise that the child’s needs must be paramount, 39 the American Psychological
Association’s Guidelines advise clinicians (as do we) to undertake a functional
assessment of the skills and values of the parents and their match to the needs of the
child” (p. 542). Weiner and Otto (2014) take a similar approach by instructing evaluators
to adopt a strategy of weighing potential risks and benefits of various custody
arrangements for the child(ren) in question as they present various options to the court.
Stahl (2014) advises, “Given that, in most evaluations, there is a range of custodial
options, it is important for the evaluator to provide a thorough risk-benefit analysis of
each custodial option and those data that support his or her conclusions” (p. 162). The
position that the interests of the children involved in these evaluations are the driving
focus of an evaluator’s work, and that thoroughness is essential in this endeavor, also
arises in the context of child maltreatment. Melton et al. (2007) aver, “clinicians
conducting dispositional evaluations should consider the nature of the supports that will
best facilitate healing, safety, and healthy development for the child” (p. 529). In their
argument for caution and comprehensiveness, Weiner and Otto (2014) inform readers,
“child maltreatment is multiply determined by factors operating at multiple levels of
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analysis that include evolutionary, developmental, situational/contextual, individual,
microsocial, macrosocial, and demographic” (Condie, 2014, p. 247). Pointing to the
various complicated, intertwining aspects that contribute to child maltreatment helps
bolster the authors’ argument that evaluators’ work and recommendations should be
grounded in knowledge from an array of interviews, observations, and all available case
materials in tandem with pertinent research literature.
Indeed, though one of these manuals’ implicit functions is to help evaluators
understand and navigate these complex terrains, they are careful not to do so by
oversimplifying the complicated issues that evaluations involving children present. One
area in which this is apparent is in the way both handbooks emphasize the parties being
evaluated as always embedded in larger, overlapping systems. These include sociohistorical and political contexts, but the authors devote more priority to relational ties,
particularly between parents and children. Yes, they do instruct evaluators to “provide
complete and relevant information about each parent” (Stahl, 2014, p. 161) and
“thorough and relevant information about each child” (Stahl, 2014, p. 161), as well as and
a descriptive record of various demographics and available tangible supports. However,
as Stahl (2014) summarizes, “Each step of the evaluation process is designed to help the
evaluator gather information critical to understanding the family” (p. 152, emphasis
added). He goes on to explain, “Although there is no reliable and valid way of measuring
whether a child is more bonded to one parent or the other, the job of the evaluator is to
describe the behavioral dynamics of the bond for the judge” (p. 154). Thus the manual
presents the evaluator’s task as not only to evaluate any one person or persons in
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isolation; the evaluator is additionally charged with assessing a network of relationships,
of emotional bonds and interpersonal dynamics.
Melton et al. (2007) echo this sentiment, here referring to dispositional
evaluations in child protection cases, stating, “ultimately the questions should shift from
parental competence as a personal characteristic, because the critical problem is one of
relationships” (p. 530). Melton et al. (2007) also exhibit this approach regarding child
custody evaluations:
Parents, stepparents, and children should all be interviewed as to their perceptions
of relationships in the family (past, present, and future), their preferences about
custody, and any special needs of the children. Because of the significance of
interparental conflict in the literature on effects of divorce, special attention
should be given to the parents’ capacity for cooperation, the nature and intensity
of disagreements about the children, and points of possible compromise. As a
means of observing parent-child relationships in a realistic environment, home
visits may be advisable as well. Nor should the evaluation stop with interviews of
the immediate family. Contact with extended family, teachers, social service
agencies, and even babysitters can illuminate potential sources of support (or lack
thereof) under various custody arrangements (e.g., switching between parental
homes). (p. 558)
Explicitly, this excerpt embodies the value the manuals place on evaluators performing
thorough investigative interviewing and research from multiple sources and methods.
More subtly, the authors capture the complex interrelatedness of a child’s existence, even
speaking to the temporal (“past, present, and future”) and spatial (home visits to observe
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“a realistic environment”) dimensions of the relationships that constitute a family and,
they argue, are important to consider when determining recommendations about
children’s well being.
By not retreating from these complexities, the handbook authors position
themselves to instruct evaluators on strategies to manage them. As in the case of
negotiating the challenges that arise when engaging with research literature, the manuals
again turn to advising evaluators to strive for balance and impartiality as they approach
challenges and conflicts in these other aspects of evaluations and their subsequent
reports. Weiner and Otto (2014) again offer specific instructions to evaluators working to
interpret a range of potentially disparate information, with statements like, “The child
custody evaluator looks for convergent and divergent data between collateral and other
data to help in understanding the various allegations and assertions made by the parties”
(Stahl, 2014, p. 158) and, “Examiners should pay particular attention to disparities
between what the child says during individual interviews compared with the observation
sessions” (p. 155). In addition, Stahl (2014) directs evaluators to “show your work and
explain the bases for all conclusions. It is important to detail the basis for any expert
opinions reached” (p. 162), but he is also careful to mention that “The Specialty
Guidelines also instruct the forensic evaluator to disclose data and information that is not
supportive of or contrary to the conclusions and recommendations offered by the
evaluator” (p. 160). Once again, the manuals propose that frankly incorporating a variety
of perspectives and interpretations, even those that appear in opposition, is an important
step that evaluators can enact to achieve balance in their work and reports.
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The concept of balance in these manuals is very closely related to the concept of
objectivity, or neutrality. In fact, according to Stahl (2014), “child custody evaluators
strive to use a balanced process in order to achieve objectivity, fairness, and
independence” (p. 145). As they did regarding research literature, Melton et al. (2007)
similarly advocate evaluators’ objective impartiality with regard to interview,
observation, and collateral information. For example, they advise:
Recognizing that the multiple lenses through which family members embroiled in
a high-conflict divorce are apt to be clouded by emotion, and that the scientific
foundation for prediction of postdivorce behavior is thin, the American
Psychological Association also admonishes clinicians to interpret clinical
information “cautiously and conservatively, seeking convergent validity.” 42 (p.
542-543)
Here, the authors not only acknowledge “multiple lenses,” the various perspectives
evaluators will be soliciting and required to make sense of during the evaluation process,
but also frame these viewpoints as “clouded by emotion,” that is to say non-objective and
ultimately unreliable. Coupled with what the manual characterizes as problematically a
“thin” research base, the evaluator is instructed to look for areas of overlap (“convergent
validity”) in these accounts, and warned to draw conclusions carefully and humbly.
Indeed, the pull for finding valid, unbiased facts appears so strong that Melton et al.
(2007) even suggest viewing case history as “experiments” to facilitate evaluators’
interpretation:
Sources outside the nuclear family may also give important, relatively objective
glimpses of children’s responses to arrangements developed during separations
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and under temporary custody orders. In that regard, the existing and previous
custody arrangements can be conceptualized as natural experiments of a sort. The
clinician should be sure to elicit information as to the parties’ attitudes and
behavioral responses to those arrangements. (p. 558)
The value these handbooks place on science, facts, and objectivity shines through in this
passage. With this pervasive attitude, the evaluator once more assigned the role of neutral
expert analyzing imperfect data, instructed to navigate the complexities of evaluations
involving children by exercising caution, thoroughness, and awareness of limitations.
In addition to the implicit assumptions and functional consequences already
discussed regarding the discourse in the handbooks around evaluators’ neutrality,
comprehensiveness, and balanced approach to their work, what refinements and new
conclusions can be drawn from analyzing this pattern? To start, considering objectivity in
the context of non-literature based data such as family interviews and observations
demonstrates more clearly the manual authors’ attempts to understand amorphous
phenomena such as family dynamics as concretized, “real” data, or facts. The authors are
careful both to emphasize the relational aspects of families as the focus of an evaluation
process as well as to name the complexities of such an endeavor. When instructing
evaluators as to how to navigate this challenge, however, the manuals seem to make an
implicit assumption that it is possible, in fact most appropriate, for evaluators to consider
these relationships as they would consider a body of research studies or perhaps as an
experiment they are conducting themselves. When the manuals advise evaluators to seek
“convergent validity” among the accounts of various parties, or to attend to “disparities”
between what children describe and what evaluators observe, the handbooks could just as
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easily be offering instructions as to how to approach a body of research literature as a
network of human beings. In practice, one outcome of this attitude is the message that a
high degree of rigor is valuable and necessary for evaluators to effectively, ethically do
their work. They must be attentive, thorough, and exercise critical thinking in order to
collect and interpret all of the data that will be pertinent to the question at hand. There is
also an appreciation for the likelihood (if not inevitability) that there will be diverging
perspectives and disparities that evaluators must work to make sense of through this
attention, thoroughness, and critical thinking.
One function of presenting this non-research information as data akin to that
found in research studies is to reinforce the persona of the evaluator as the neutral expert.
In the legal system, where impartiality and facts are highly valued, conceptualizing
interviews, observations, and collateral accounts as research data might be one way of
granting this information validity or perhaps even elevating it in the eyes of the court so
that it will carry more gravity. In turn, rendering evaluators as unbiased, skilled
professionals who simply convey the facts they have carefully amassed could serve to
elevate evaluators in a similar manner. This portrayal in a sense serves to make
evaluators more reliable, trustworthy, and less susceptible to the sullying inaccuracies
believed to stem from one’s personal biases. Once again, somewhat paradoxically,
promoting evaluators in this way also releases them from a degree of accountability,
enabling them to more easily assume a position of reciting objective data while
minimizing their own role of interpreting said data. By advocating so much caution and
humility, the handbook authors are in their own way arguably ceding some of their
personal responsibility, softening the directness of their instructions as if to distance
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themselves from many conclusions and to empower (or abandon) readers to stand on
their own.
The manual authors advise caution, humility, and balance in how evaluators
interpret and present their findings, and repeatedly reiterate that evaluators are not
ultimately decision makers, and must write reports as consultants to a separate authority.
However, for all of the efforts the handbooks take to minimize role confusion and present
evaluators as separate entities, it is notable that there do not appear to be the same
cautions about delineating between evaluators and researchers. Furthermore, invoking the
language of science, of the “neutral expert,” introduces a complicating factor to this
narrative. In doing so, the manuals foreclose some of the possibility to understand truth as
perspectival or multifaceted, and instead steer the evaluation process towards finding one
actuality. As in the colloquial discourse of science in general, there becomes an answer, a
truth, a best solution; it may not be the evaluator’s role—or perhaps solely the evaluator’s
role—to decide it, but it does exist, and even if it cannot be definitively determined, the
quest of the evaluator is to get as close as possible. The manual authors might instruct
evaluators to strive for fairness and transparency, but largely absent in these handbooks is
the acceptance that evaluators (people) are not inherently unbiased, and that the issues
they are evaluating are fundamentally not objective. The authors seem to champion
attempts to find “truth” or “facts” in areas where those concepts as we commonly
understand them may be nonsensical.
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Summary: Constructing the Evaluator and Implications for Child Memory and
Experience
Before moving to explore in depth how the manuals take up child memory and
experience, let us pause to reflect on how they have constructed the identity and role of
the people conducting evaluations involving children. In examining the instructions the
handbooks offer, we begin to get a picture of how the handbooks construct these
evaluators; their needs, their responsibilities, their authority, their limitations, and more.
The manuals’ ideal evaluators are cautious above all else. They are exhaustively
knowledgeable about all areas pertinent to their cases, including specific legal precedents
and procedures, family dynamics, socio-cultural issues, and especially relevant research
literature. Nevertheless, they remain humble with regard to the limitations of their
knowledge and expertise as well as to their role in the legal process. The ideal evaluators
never forget that they do not make ultimate decisions, but rather serve as consultants who
offer informed recommendations to the court. Relatedly, these ideal evaluators also strive
for the balanced neutrality in all of their endeavors, thoroughly discussing disparate study
findings and observations, and never showing preferential treatment to a particular party.
By embracing the role of the “expert” whose duty is to collect data and report it to the
court, they maintain a certain distance from the case and the parties at large. According to
the manuals, accomplishing all of these qualities lends credibility, validity, and power to
evaluators and the recommendations they set forth.
What might this conceptualization mean vis-à-vis the area of child
memory/experience? To start, the distance that the manuals appear to ascribe to the
expert evaluator might be especially problematic for children, especially those in the
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imaginably vulnerable circumstances that would require an evaluation. Even as the
handbooks describe these cases (especially custody cases) as involving myriad people
and relationship dynamics, there is not much attention to the ways the evaluator is by
nature similarly entrenched in this web. Children are arguably particularly acutely
embedded within larger family and social systems, and therefore expecting children to
confide in someone intentionally separate from these structures (even if illusorily) could
be inappropriate. For a child in the evaluation process, the evaluator is likely one of many
adults who is unfamiliar and yet important, and by design a thoroughly curious or
perhaps intrusive presence.
In addition, as mentioned above, it seems that the manuals set up evaluators to
pursue the difficult if not impossible task of searching for objective facts in areas that are
inherently fluid, transient, and knotty (e.g. family relationships). This is certainly true of
child experience, with the complicating layers of developmental and communication
considerations. The handbooks seem to suggest that if an evaluator ideally can serve as a
sort of super recorder, transcribing children’s accounts and supplemental information
about their experiences with meticulous precision, then these “facts” will guide the court
to fully understand the issues at hand and make proper decisions accordingly. This notion
does not account for the likelihood that even if it were possible to achieve a perfect,
complete representation of a child’s experience, it remains only one representation. The
accounts are always by nature situated and perspectival—elements may shift, or be
added, omitted, or emphasized differently in another conversation with somebody else or
over time. I do not mention this as a particular shortcoming of children, but rather as a
reality of a human condition that is complicated and dynamic.
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This leads us to the issue of truth. The handbooks’ instructions clearly present the
idea that evaluators’ work is in service of the pursuit of truth. The emphasis on
thoroughness, on research, on balance; it may not be the evaluator’s job to determine
truth, but helping the court to determine it remains the ultimate goal. Indeed, the manuals
state that one reason they advise evaluators to collect so much information when
performing these evaluations is the goal of finding verification, or lack thereof, for
children’s accounts. Seeing this focus, we can begin to understand the energy devoted to
determining the truthfulness and accuracy of child testimony/memory, and (coupled with
the particular embeddedness of child experience) why the threat of suggestibility would
loom so large.
Examining how the authors of these handbooks present the identity and role of
evaluators conducting evaluations involving children affords an adequate foundation
from which to consider more specifically how the manuals engage with the topic of child
memory and experience. Again, addressing this study’s research questions requires a
comprehensive analysis of how child memory/experience is constructed in these manuals
and the functional consequences of this discourse. In keeping with the principles of
discourse analysis as a method, this undertaking would lack appropriate nuance without
the context afforded by first studying the way the discourse in the manuals constructs the
forensic evaluation of children more broadly. (This attention to context is further
reflected in the analysis questions outlined in Stage 7 of the procedures section.) Now
that we have a clearer sense of how these handbooks reflect and participate in the systems
at large, it is possible to more mindfully shift the focus to the patterns that arise in the
compendium instructions particular to the topic of child memory and experience.
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Child Memory and Experience Patterns in Compendium Instructions
Indeed, given that this study focuses specifically on instances when the manuals
are offering instructions, the role of the evaluator remains present in the discourse even
when not being explicitly addressed. For example, the version of reality these handbooks
promulgate reveals a number of assumptions about child memory/experience, but they do
so in a manner that implicates evaluators as well. The following patterns present in the
text offer further insight as to how the manuals conceptualize child memory/experience,
but by extension this discourse also demonstrates how the authors propose evaluators
should understand (and work with) children.
Child experience is deeply intertwined with and influenced by adults. In
examining the instances when the compendium instructions discuss child memory and
experience, one dominant theme that emerges is the extent to which children involved in
evaluations are interrelated with adults—evaluators, parents, jurors, and whoever else
may be interviewing them. Discussion of this influence (or potential for influence) most
frequently arises in the context of suggestibility and credibility, that is, when considering
whether children’s accounts can be trusted as true representations of their experience:
Evaluators must keep in mind that one or both parents may influence their
children. To reduce the risks associated with this influence, appointments should
be scheduled equally with each parent bringing the children to appointments.
Although children’s suggestibility and the potential for being influenced by
parents or siblings is a topic that is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is critical
for those evaluating custody and parenting plans to understand this research.
(Stahl, 2014, p. 154-155)
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Here, the handbook names suggestibility as a “critical” area for evaluators to attend to,
the implication being that the sway “one or both parents” may hold on their children
might be so great as to color or even supplant the child’s own narrative. This scenario
would in turn make it difficult for the evaluator to know how to separate the children’s
true responses from the influence of their parents. Also apparent in this excerpt is the
attitude that in addition to being familiar with relevant research, evaluators can and
should take specific measures to mitigate the risk of this undue parental influence and its
effects. As Melton et al. (2007) echo, “In view of the small percentage of cases that reach
the courtroom, much more important from the standpoint of obtaining the ‘facts’ is
avoiding stress, suggestiveness, and other accuracy-reducing aspects of the investigation
process….” (p. 185). This trend appears throughout both manuals and will be discussed
in greater detail later.
Melton et al. (2007) likewise portray child experience as intricately interlaced
with adults, and elaborate a number of ways this interrelatedness may affect a child’s
perception and narrative account:
A court would generally also benefit from insight into whether the witness’s
memory of the legally relevant event is “genuine” and is being accurately
recounted, or instead is the product of suggestion or fantasy. As already indicated,
the difficulty is that by the time the question of competency is raised, the potential
witness is likely to have been asked about the alleged offense numerous times. If
it was perceived as a traumatic event or if a family member is the defendant, the
witness may also have been bombarded with diverging interpretations of the
event. Moreover, especially with a child, when the event in question was one
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previously outside the witness’s experience or one that he or she had not
previously identified as deviant, the witness may be dependent upon others to
provide meaning to the experience. 223 (p. 186)
In this example, the binary conceptualization of memory as being either “genuine” and
“accurately recounted” or “the product of suggestion or fantasy” that is fundamental to
suggestibility theory is at the forefront. In addition, this passage goes on to list factors
linked with the perspectival nature of human existence, but that here are believed to
further complicate one’s ability to preserve and recount a memory: being asked about it
repeatedly, and being “bombarded with diverging interpretations.” The authors even go
as far as stating that the child witness “may be dependent” on adults to superimpose or
assign meaning to a particular experience, further underscoring the degree to which the
manuals give power to the adults in these cases. This attitude reflects the reality of the
legal system, in which (as with most of the world) adults control the ultimate fates of the
children whose cases come before them. Hobbs et al. (2014) state, “When children testify
in court at jury trials, judges and jurors have the difficult task of assessing the accuracy of
the children’s testimony. Characteristics of children and of the jurors themselves may
affect whether children are believed or not” (p. 589), while Melton et al. (2007) remind
evaluators that an outcome “is based at least as much on juror’s competency in weighing
children’s testimony as it is on children’s skill in presenting it” (p. 513-514). In instances
like these, the handbooks acknowledge that children also influence adults’ experience;
however while this influence may be reciprocal, the power to make ultimate
determinations is largely unidirectional.
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Importantly, even as they discuss the risks and challenges evaluators face with
regard to the interconnectedness of child and adult experience, the handbook authors also
speak to the potential advantages of such impactful dynamics. In one such example,
Hobbs et al. (2014) cite research proposing that adult influence can serve to help children
feel secure enough to maintain confidence in their accounts to an extent that will prevent
suggestive distortions:
These findings suggest that children, when comfortable and familiar with the
interviewer, correct errors and resist suggestion more easily than with a stranger.
These findings offer further support for the importance of rapport building
between the interviewer and child eyewitness as well as researchers examining
the full range of ecologically valid factors that my influence children’s
suggestibility: Research on the effects of misleading questions should address not
only what is asked but also how and by whom. (p. 579)
They also refer to research purporting that adult interactions with children can be
beneficial at the level of improving memory processes, stating, “These findings suggest
that discussions parents have with their children about traumatic events can assist with
the encoding and storage processes necessary for memory retrieval (Chae, Ogle, &
Goodman, 2009)” (p. 567). Notably, these conclusions still assume the suggestibility
model of memory, and the understanding that adults (evaluators, researchers, and parents)
can and should take measures to preserve children’s intact, accurate narratives.
Child experience is defined relative to adult experience, and as such is often
presented as deficient. Another example of the relatedness of adult and child experience
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in the manuals is evident in the authors’ tendency to describe child experience as a
comparison to adults’, particularly in the area of memory abilities:
Even children as young as three and four appear to perform as well as adults on
some recognition memory tasks. For instance, a child who is asked to identify
previously seen pictures or faces should be able to do almost as well as an adult,
as long as no intervening suggestions have taken hold. 149 Research also indicates
that even when a previously unfamiliar perpetrator is present in a lineup, five- and
six-year-olds’ identifications are as accurate as adults’. 150 However, when the
child has had only brief exposure to the perpetrator or is very young, accuracy
decreases. Furthermore, when the suspect is not present in the lineup, children as
old as nine tend to make more errors than adults, 152 and there is some evidence
that young children may sometimes place familiar people at an event who were
not actually there. 153 (Melton et al., 2007, p. 181)
Hobbs et al. (2014) adopt a similar position:
“[R]esearch reveals that, by the age of about 5 or 6, children are often as accurate
as adults in identifying people with whom they have interacted when presented
with target-present lineups (i.e. lineups that include the target person—the
“culprit”). However, when the actual culprit is not in the lineup (i.e., “targetabsent” lineups), even older children (e.g. 10-year-olds) are more likely than
adults to falsely identify an individual and less likely to report that the target
person is not included in the lineup (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1999).” (p. 587)
In instances like these, adult performance in various domains becomes a standard by
which children are measured, and should aspire to achieve. From this position, it is
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almost taken for granted that children are inherently inferior to adults, and sets up a
paradigm in which young numerical age is an automatic disadvantage to be overcome.
Consequently, these manuals draw heavily on research to complicate the assumption that
by virtue of her or his age, no child is capable of remembering or reporting their
memories accurately. The authors take care to parse out the intricacies of performance at
various ages in an array of contexts. These endeavors appear to be at least in part a means
of advocating that children’s skills and competence should not be automatically
underestimated, and indirectly acknowledge that human memory and testimony processes
are fallible at any age.
Somewhat paradoxically, however, in adopting this comparative language the
handbook authors’ efforts to advocate for children also wind up presenting children as
deficient. The manuals seem to suggest that performing “as well as adults” lends
legitimacy to children’s experience, but this framing exposes subtle yet profound
assumptions of superiority. In other words, the manuals do not challenge the assumption
that adult experience and performance is, in fact, a standard by which child experience
should be measured and understood. Doing so sets children (especially young children)
up to be inherently inferior, lacking in certain skills and abilities. There is an implication
that their memories and narratives are especially fragile. Given the emphasis the manual
authors devote to these age trends, there is a message to evaluators that young children
require the greatest amount of care when being interviewed, and that their accounts
necessitate the greatest amount of skepticism. On the subject of child memory and
testimony, the discourse in the manuals is a strongly adult-centric account, relying
heavily on a prolific research base that appears to attempt to make sense of child
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experience through the adult lenses that are available. This tendency speaks to the
manuals’ place within a broader adult-centric system of forensic psychology, which
requires that children’s testimony be elicited and interpreted by adults, and that outcomes
be determined by adult decision makers.
It is also worth noting that in these instances the manuals are not comparing child
memory performance to just any adults, however. Melton et al. (2007) states matter-offactly, “the four categories of individuals most likely to trigger testimonial capacity
concerns are children, people with mental retardation, people with mental illness, and
those who have abused substances” (p. 180). Indeed, as in many systems, there are
particular adults in power here. It is their memory performance that becomes the baseline,
the control, the appropriate standard by which individuals from other “concerning”
populations should be measured and assessed, and it is expected that these latter groups
will not perform as well. By their very nature, certain populations—including children—
should “trigger” doubts about their “testimonial capacity,” the implication being that the
people who are categorized in these ways are not only special cases or in need of
accommodations, but also subtly framed as deficient adults.
Language impacts children’s memories and accounts of those memories. Both
manuals discuss language as an area of particular importance when instructing evaluators
about the challenges of child testimony. The topic arises in three contexts: the
relationship between children’s linguistic and memory abilities, the implications of
evaluators’ language when interviewing children, and the ways children verbally
communicate their testimony to the court. In the first domain, Hobbs et al. (2014) touch
on research discussing how children’s verbal fluency affects their memory processes:
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Generally, research reveals that children’s proficiencies in communication assist
them in being more accurate in recalling past experiences and more resistant to
suggestions from others. … These results imply that children with greater verbal
skills were more accurate and less suggestible than their peers. However, in other
studies, no significant associations emerged between verbal skill and
suggestibility (e.g., Bright-Paul & Jarrold, 2009; Quas & Lench, 2007), and the
opposite effect has even been reported, with verbal skills being positively
associated with children’s increased suggestibility (e.g., Kulkofsky & Klemfuss,
2008). This inconsistency could in part be due to methodological differences in
how the type of verbal ability (e.g., vocabulary, receptive language, narrative
quality) was assessed. (p. 581)
Though this topic is not a main focus in the manuals, here the authors summarize an array
of research that demonstrates the breadth of study in this realm, the general conclusion
that greater verbal fluency facilitates memory processes despite some conflicting
findings, as well as the types of linguistic skills that may be relevant in an evaluation.
In addition, Melton et al. (2007) point to questions about language, memory, and
comprehension of an occurrence, stating, “Children may also have difficulty grasping the
meaning of sophisticated conversations. At the same time, children still seem to be able
to register an event even if they do not understand it148” (p. 180). Differentiating between
memory, comprehension, and verbal communication adds important nuance to the
conversation. Doing so affords various possible areas in which children may excel, and a
number of ways for evaluators to more fully consider their interactions with the children
whom they are interviewing. On the other hand, the way these issues are framed—as
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prioritizing adult experience—again seems to imply that even when children can function
as adults, their immaturity is problematic, making them dependent on adults to determine
the correct meaning of events the children have “registered.” Along similar lines, Hobbs
et al. (2014) cite research that “children who remember an event up to 14 months after it
occurred do not use language in their descriptions that was not in their vocabularies when
it occurred (Hayne & Simcock, 2009)” (p. 567). Introducing this notion not only speaks
to another way that language and memory processes appear intertwined, but also
complicates any impulse to conflate children’s numerical age with verbal communication
abilities. It furthermore brings into question the extent to which children can “recall
information for which they did not have those specific words earlier” (p. 567), a
challenge that informs the manuals’ treatment of language and suggestibility concerns.
Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the instructive nature of the manuals, the
subject of how evaluators’ language can influence the quality of the account given by the
child being interviewed receives the most attention. For example, Melton et al. (2007)
caution:
Although adults who know better still often use difficult vocabulary and complex
grammar in questions to children, such linguistic lapses may be the most common
inhibitors of effective communication between interviewers and children.
Linguistic complexity lowers the accuracy of statements and testimony by
witnesses of all ages, but it especially does so in communication with children. 369
Good practical guides are available, however, to prompt adults to avoid such
miscommunication. (p. 531)
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Here the authors suggest that using inappropriately complicated diction and syntax is a
very frequent impediment to eliciting accurate narratives in general, but again,
communication with children is particularly fraught and therefore requires additional care
on the part of the adult evaluator. Also apparent is in this excerpt is the message that
these “linguistic lapses” are habitual; evaluators may have the common sense to use
clearer, more simplified language when engaging with children, but this knowledge in
and of itself often is not enough to prevent evaluators from communicating ineffectively.
This phenomenon begs the question of whether there are facets of forensic evaluation that
inherently call for more complicated, sophisticated, specialized, and/or esoteric language
such that it actually requires more effort for evaluators to speak plainly and accessibly
than to use the “difficult vocabulary and complex grammar” of the system in place.
Instead, the existing discourse places adults and children on opposite sides of a gulf that
must be bridged by the evaluator adopting specialized communication strategies in order
to accommodate children’s semantic immaturity and retrieve accurate narratives. There is
no overt condescension or hostility towards children here, and the manual authors place
accountability on the adult evaluator (rather than the child) to manage these linguistic
challenges. However, this framing again implies children’s inferiority when compared to
adults, and portrays children’s deficient linguistic abilities as the predominant reason
such difficulties occur and accommodations need to be introduced.
In addition to the mechanics of evaluators’ language, the manuals also discuss the
importance of using open-ended questions when interviewing children:
How questions are asked affects the way answers are given. When interviewing
children, particularly in a forensic context, it is vital to ask open-ended questions
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(Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orback, & Esplin, 2008). These questions are far more
likely to yield useful, accurate, and honest responses. Asking leading or
categorical questions limits the way that the child responds, and, therefore, limits
the usefulness and validity of those responses. (Stahl, 2014, p. 154)
These instructions demonstrate the threatening quality of suggestibility, emphasizing that
giving children as much freedom to recount their experience as possible will yield
accounts that are “useful, accurate, and honest.” The handbooks propose that affording
children the space to present their narratives in a manner that is their own is indisputably
the best approach for evaluators to take. However, while this position certainly appears
supportive of children and fostering an experience in the legal system that will best meet
their interests, the authors do not name these potential advantages as reasons for (or even
positive byproducts of) adopting this method. Rather, the focus here is entirely on
eliciting an account that is true, and therefore valid in a forensic context. In assuming this
emphasis, the authors implicitly contribute to a conceptualization that child
memory/experience is either accurate or inaccurate, and that as such it can be easily
“tainted” by influence from others (e.g., via “leading or categorical questions”).
Finally, the manuals also mention communication issues between children and
adults in the context of how child accounts are taken up by the court at large. Introducing
more adults into the picture introduces a new set of complications, and can position the
evaluator expert as a translator of sorts, responsible for communicating effectively with
both the child witness and an audience of adults:
[S]teps can be taken to increase the likelihood that the child’s testimony will be
understandable. In the typical abuse case, children will appear incompetent if the

91

examiner uses technical vocabulary rather than slang or dolls or drawings. …
Furthermore, several courts have permitted a child witness to have an
“interpreter” (e.g., a parent or child psychologist) when it appears that a child
cannot express him- or herself in a nonidiosyncratic manner. 196 (Melton et al.,
2007, p. 184)
Again, passages like this one do show sensitivity in how they acknowledge the challenges
of asking children to participate in such an adult-centric system and discuss ways to
manage these difficulties and support children. Yet at the same time, these instructions
also reflect and perpetuate a version of reality in which children are lacking, and in which
any misalignment between children’s needs and the needs of the court is more a result of
children’s deficiencies than deficiencies with the forensic system itself. For example, in a
hypothetical handbook that adopted the latter perspective, the first sentence of the above
quote might read, “Steps can be taken to increase the likelihood that the court will
understand the child’s testimony.” The overarching sentiment may be the same as in
Melton et al., but this new phrasing subtly shifts the locus of the problem towards the
adults in the court, rather than characterizing a child’s account as potentially problematic
and not “understandable.”
Research is elaborated in detail, but conclusions are offered equivocally. As
is evident from many of the quotes analyzed above, the manual authors continue to rely
heavily on research literature in their instructions regarding child memory and
experience. While this is a pattern that has been discussed earlier in the context of other
topics, there are some notable differences in the ways research is engaged with on this
subject. To start, the manuals are more likely to outline specific studies related to child
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memory and testimony in greater depth than in other domains (e.g., effects of single
parent custody, child maltreatment factors), as in this example from Hobbs et al.’s (2014)
section on misleading questions:
In contrast to children succumbing or agreeing with a forensic interviewer
suggestion as found in several studies (e.g., Leichtman & Ceci, 1995; Poole &
Lindsay, 1995), children in the Gilstrap and Ceci (2005) study were more likely to
respond to misleading questions with denial. Instead of interviewer bias
predicting children’s acquiescence, the children’s own behavior preceding the
misleading question was more strongly predictive of whether they succumbed to
suggestion. These findings were obtained by a novel approach of analyzing
children’s reports, as they occurred in a transactional exchange throughout the
interview, rather than considering only the immediate antecedent (i.e.,
interviewer’s misleading question) of a child’s error. (p. 577)
Indeed, here the manual commits to elaborating the details of this study by Gilstrap and
Ceci, which is included to serve as a counterpoint to other research suggesting
contradicting findings. The handbook not only presents the main takeaway of the study,
but also offers further particulars about the findings and even the research design. This
degree of specificity resounds throughout the manuals’ coverage of child eyewitness
testimony, wherein the authors explain elements of research studies like numeric age
trends, question types, time delays, and methodological designs in great detail. It seems
that the tendency to quantify and determine concrete facts that was evident in the
handbooks’ other chapters on evaluations involving children is even further magnified in
their discussion of child memory and experience.

93

Relatedly, it appears that in this subject area, the handbook authors’ commitment
to presenting a balanced picture of literature is similarly magnified; one reason why so
many studies are referenced in these sections is that the manuals are careful to cite studies
with contradicting findings. In this climate, the authors display even greater hesitance to
draw definite conclusions in the form of instructions about the theories or techniques
recounted in the literature. Instead, once again they frequently call for caution from
evaluators and/or additional research to help reach more definitive answers. In this
prototypical example from Weiner and Otto (2014), Hobbs et al. (2014) discuss
contradicting literature on how being interviewed repeatedly may affect children’s
memory via suggestion, before urging further research:
There are several reasons to suspect that repeated interviews may increase errors
in children’s reports, especially if misinformation is included in the interviews. …
In contrast, however, others argue that repeated interviews (even those with
misleading questions) do not necessarily have negative effects on children’s
reports and, under certain conditions, that they actually may assist children in
denying new false information by solidifying accurate memories reported
previously (e.g., Goodman & Quas, 2008). … Researchers should therefore avoid
overgeneralized assumptions that repeated interviews compromise children’s
memory accuracy. (p. 579-580)
For an evaluator seeking guidance about how many times it might be appropriate to
interview a child eyewitness, reading this synopsis of the literature will not provide a
definitive answer. Based on the literature, repeated interviews may have deleterious,
beneficial, or no effects on children’s ability to report their memories accurately.
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Paradoxically, the manuals may exhaustively reference facts and figures as they outline
relevant research but they offer virtually no quantitative conclusions or instructions,
advocating instead for balance and caution about overgeneralizing findings and rigidly
applying theory or techniques.
This pattern of presenting one finding, an opposing finding, and a call for
additional research appears over and over again. For example, to the question of whether
children can remember events accurately after a time delay, Melton et al. (2007)
expound:
When the time interval between the event and the attempt at memory recall is
short, children apparently do not do appreciably worse than adults. … As the time
interval between event and recall lengthens, however, children do not do as well
as adults in recalling events. 156 … More research needs to be done, however, on
whether children’s memory fades more quickly than adults’ when a particularly
negative event is involved. 160 (p. 181)
On the subject of whether or not adults can detect children’s lying, Hobbs et al. (2014)
state:
Most studies indicate that adults are not accurate at detecting children’s lies
(Crossman & Lewis, 2006; Goodman et al., 2006) and that they are no better at
detecting children’s lies than adults’ lies (Goodman et al., 2006). Coached lies by
older children may be particularly difficult to detect (K.L. Warren, Dodd, Raynor
& Peterson, 2012). However, Nysse-Carris, Bottoms, and Salerno (2011) found
that adults could detect 3-to-6-year-old children’s likes about their parents’
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transgressions at above chance levels. A goal for future research is to better
explain the difficulty in detecting children’s lying. (p. 585)
Clearly, there appears to be something about the subject of child memory and testimony
that evokes this particular equivocation and reliance on research. Notably, in their
exposition of issues related to child testimony, Weiner and Otto (2014) shift to instructing
researchers as much if not more often than evaluators, as they are more likely to do on
other topics. This occurrence is less striking in Melton et al. (2007), who at times suggest
that additional research would be helpful or even necessary, but rarely use phrasing as
direct instructions to researchers. Still, when the text does overtly point to a need for
more research, it is in the context of child testimony. Again, this tendency seems to show
the manual authors’ hesitance to offer specific instructions to evaluators, but it also
implies a desire or need to include some sort of directives or guidelines. As described
earlier, there are a number of ways to understand the handbook authors’ emphasis on
needing more research, none of them mutually exclusive. It can be viewed as an
assumption or hope that research—or perhaps “science” more broadly—will offer more
concrete and definitive answers in such a complex area. It may demonstrate prizing of
special knowledge to validate the evaluator’s identity as an expert. Or perhaps it can be
understood as an effort to externalize or disperse some of the accountability to determine
definitive “answers” when making recommendations to the court based on nebulous
information. If these dynamics were at play regarding the other manual sections
involving evaluating children, they appear to be even stronger in the context of child
memory and testimony, given the exceptional fervor about research here. What is it about
this topic that evokes this response so potently?
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One clue may be found in the uncertainty the handbook authors display about the
current body of research literature in this area. For Weiner and Otto (2014), this
skepticism tends to manifest in their emphasis on individual variation and questions about
generalizability of research findings. In a section discussing children’s memory for
traumatic events, for example, the chapter authors explain:
[Q]uestions arise concerning the external validity of laboratory research (e.g.,
how well laboratory research sufficiently mimics the levels of distress induced by
criminal events) and the internal validity of field research (e.g., how well field
researchers can pin down cause-effect relations). Ideally, findings from laboratory
and field research lead to the same conclusions, but this is not always so. (Hobbs
et al., 2014, p. 564)
This tension seems to be consistently in the background as they synthesize research on
child memory and testimony, often adding caveats such as, “That said, there are
important individual differences in suggestibility and misinformation effects within any
age-group” (p. 572). Again, the authors model caution against overgeneralizing based on
research, even when there appears to be a general consensus among pertinent studies.
Melton et al. (2007), however, demonstrate their reservations about the research
in this area with outright skepticism:
Since the mid-1980s, there has been extraordinary attention by researchers to
issues related to children’s ability as witnesses, 363 especially their suggestibility.
364

In our view, this concern has been overblown. 365 Research shows that most

children are resistant to suggestion for salient events, although the risk of
inaccurate reports in response to direct questions is highest among very young
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children (e.g., three-year-olds). 366 … Furthermore, much of what is known about
ways to minimize distortions in children’s memory (as in that of adults) and to
maximize the quantity and accuracy of information reported borders on common
sense. (p. 531)
This argument is a bit circular; Melton et al. criticize researchers’ concern with children’s
suggestibility as being “overblown” and then cite findings from that very research to
explain why. Nevertheless, it does offer some insight as to why research is taken up in
this particular way. If the authors of both manuals are in fact dubious about this particular
research, it would stand to reason that their reporting of it would be infused with both
detailed, equivocal exposition and a desire for more, theoretically better information.
Children’s suggestibility remains a principal concern. Another factor
contributing to the handbooks’ simultaneous devotion to and skepticism of research in the
area of child memory and testimony may be the reliance on the suggestibility model of
memory that so robustly proliferates these studies. Indeed, even when Melton et al.
(2007) express their explicit criticism that researchers have devoted too much concern
about children’s susceptibility to suggestibility, their argument is similarly dependent on
a conceptualization of memory as primarily cognitive and truth as binary. In other words,
defending children’s general capacity to resist suggestion during the forensic evaluation
process is based on the same understanding of memory that underpins the research with
opposing findings. As such, it is perhaps unsurprising how clearly the manual authors
instruct evaluators to be aware of, acknowledge, and manage the possibility of
suggestibility when interacting with children, even as they name the difficulties of such
an endeavor. Melton et al. (2007) explain:
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Determining with certainty the origins of a witness’s memories in such situations
may not be possible. But it will obviously be useful in this regard to determine as
precisely as one can when and with whom the child has talked and the content and
process of these discussions. If depositions have already been taken, they should
be reviewed and compared with the interview notes. As Christiansen stated in the
expert above, a “child’s competence as a witness cannot be determined unless
these procedures have been taken into account and any effects they may have had
on the child’s memory have been weighed.” 224 (p. 186)
Even though these authors have in other sections stated their questions about the extent to
which children’s memories might be vulnerable to suggestion, it is evident that the threat
of suggestibility still looms large enough to declare a child incompetent to testify.
Weiner and Otto (2014) offer similar directives, advocating that evaluators be
vigilant about the possibility of how outside influences may affect children’s memories as
well as the specific ways this suggestion might manifest in children’s accounts:
Although it is difficult to predict such individual differences, child forensic
interviewers should be knowledgeable about the possibility that children may
incorporate interviewer suggestions or misinformation and should have
appropriate expectations for children relevant to the children’s ages (Lamb,
Malloy, & La Rooy, 2011; Malloy & Quas, 2009). It is important for investigators
and interviewers to consider how children’s suggestibility can influence their
reports. (Hobbs et al., 2014, p. 572)
Therefore, regardless of what the manual authors or the studies they cite say about the
extent to which children’s memories are affected by suggestion, they continue to
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simultaneously reflect and perpetuate an account in which memory is dichotomistically
true or untrue, accurate or inaccurate, pure (not influenced by others) or tainted (distorted
by outside suggestion).
In addition to this understanding of memory as binary, memory is also a primarily
cognitive phenomenon in this version of reality. That is, memory is also understood as a
product of children’s abilities to mentally encode, store, and retrieve information about
various events. In fact, Hobbs et al. (2014) draw on exactly this computer science
language in this example from their discussion on traumatic memory:
In any case, it is clear that, despite relatively strong retention, memories of highly
stressful and traumatic events still may be subject to distortion and forgetting in
children and adults (Otgaar & Smeets, 2010). … [A]lthough memory in general is
often particularly accurate and enduring for central details of events relevant to
survival (Christianson, 1992), defensive processes may inhibit encoding, storage,
and/or retrieval of memories of such experiences, leading to memory deficits or
distortions in some individuals (Deffenbacher et al., 2004). (p. 565)
Viewing memory as a mental process performed by humans’ computer-like brains is
certainly not unique to these handbooks and the research they cite. Coupled with an
understanding of children as having brains that are immature or underdeveloped
compared to adults, however, further reinforces the discourse that children and their
memory are inherently deficient. As Melton et al. (2007) instruct, “Given the realities of
the courtroom situation, cognitive-developmental factors are an important consideration
in evaluating the testimony of children who are younger than seven. 189 They should also
be taken into account when interviewing such children; 190 several age-sensitive
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techniques have been suggested191” (p. 184). This is the assumption used implicitly and
overtly regarding age trends in memory capacity; broadly speaking, it is espoused that
adults have better memories than older children and that older children surpass young
children.
Memory is frequently conceptualized in terms of performance.
Conceptualizing memory as predominantly binary and cognitive leads the manuals and
the research they reference to frequently discuss memory in terms of performance. Hobbs
et al. (2014) make declarations like, “Overall, memory performance tends to improve
across childhood and into adulthood, including on eyewitness memory tasks” (p. 563),
“the predictors account for relatively little variability in [memory accuracy]
performance,” (p. 580), and “instructions to improve lineup performance in young
preschoolers (e.g., 3-year-olds) still are sorely needed” (p. 589). Melton et al. use similar
language, asserting, “children as young as three and four appear to perform as well as
adults on some recognition memory tasks” (p. 181), and stating that a particular
technique “increases [children’s] resistance to leading questions” (p. 532). Along with
this performance narrative comes the implication that both adults and children can be
trained to take measures that will elicit “better” memories or statements. Hobbs et al.
(2014) note, “Researchers should embrace multiple approaches to fully understand
conditions that minimize or exacerbate children’s suggestibility. And there may be
multiple suggestive influences on children” (p. 577-578). Along similar lines, Melton et
al. (2007) explain:
Children under the age of five are likely to have more difficulty with long-term
memory, resisting suggestions, and effectively communicating their observations,
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but with assistance even some three-year-olds may have the capacity to report
their observations accurately and understand the difference between a lie and the
truth. (p. 185)
Here the authors again draw on age trend concerns, but draw attention to the potential
benefit of “assistance” in shoring up a child’s ability to recount their memories
accurately.
This attitude and the corresponding interrelatedness of adult and child experience
during these evaluation encounters are also underscored in Melton et al.’s (2007)
discussion of a structured protocol called the cognitive interview:
[T]he cognitive interview increases elementary-school-age children’s recall of
facts without a decrease in accuracy, especially when the children have an
opportunity to practice the technique. 372 Again, however, children’s level of
performance depends on adults’ skill in communication. … Other techniques that
have been shown to improve elementary-school-age children’s recall include
training in comprehension monitoring373 and narrative elaboration374 (p. 532).
These instructions presuppose that children’s memory processes can be improved with
augmenting cognitive techniques; these additional strategies help compensate for the
inherent cognitive deficiencies of youth. A model of memory like this one, which allows
for enhancement via specific strategies and techniques, lends itself to more specific
instructions to the evaluators drawing on these handbooks to interview children about
legally relevant events in their lives. Melton et al. (2007) summarize a number of
approaches to improve child testimony by managing suggestibility. In addition to
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outlining in greater detail the cognitive interview mentioned above, they mention other
approaches as well in their section on eyewitness testimony:
The clinician must also try to avoid “creating” memories. One should avoid
asking about the event entirely, instead simply carrying out the third-party
investigation described above. The problem with this approach is that there may
be no current version of the story with which to compare earlier versions;
furthermore, useful information about communication skills may be obtainable
only by having the witness recount the event once again. If such an account is
viewed as necessary, Yuille et al. have described the following several-stage
process as a way of maximizing information while minimizing suggestion:
building rapport; asking for a free narrative account; and, only if the latter appears
ineffective, proceeding to open-ended questions, specific yet nonleading
questions, and finally leading questions. 225 (p. 186)
Here, the authors fully own the suggestibility model, and offer firm and specific
instructions to evaluators (clinicians) to extract children’s accounts of their memories
without distorting or “creating” false memories.
Weiner and Otto (2014) take a somewhat different approach. In their separate
chapter by Hobbs et al. (2014) devoted to child eyewitness testimony, they thoroughly
outline the theoretical issues and research findings regarding child suggestibility
concerns. Then, in their other chapters, the authors advise evaluators to be proficient with
this literature. In terms of offering particular directives, Weiner and Otto (2014) tend to
focus on instructing about the conditions of the interview to be optimally supportive of
children’s honesty and remembering more so than steps to minimize suggestibility. In
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their section on interviewing children in maltreatment evaluations, for example, Condie
(2014) advises:
The main goals in the initial appointment with a child are to set the child at ease,
develop an understanding of the child’s linguistic abilities, and provide a
notification of the limits of confidentiality suitable to the child’s comprehension
(Condie & Koocher, 2008). It is helpful to begin with innocuous questions, but
the questions should not inadvertently confuse the child’s understanding of the
purpose of the evaluation. Similarly, the evaluator should not immediately launch
into discourse or questions that will raise the child’s anxiety about loyalty bonds
with parents. The evaluator must be alert to the possibility that some children will
have been notified in advance of the evaluator’s role and evaluation goals, either
with accurate information or misinformation. Thus, gleaning information from the
child about his or her preconceived notions of the evaluation should take place at
the outset. … An artful approach is required to determine if information provided
by a child has been unduly influenced by other individuals due to recent contacts,
gifts, promises, or other methods of persuasion (Stahl, 1996). (p. 265-266)
Here the emphasis is less on preventing the evaluator’s influence on children’s memories
and more on providing appropriate interview conditions and then relying on one’s
expertise (and “artful approach”) to determine the extent to which a child’s account has
been altered by others. In other words, the handbook appears to make a distinction
between “whether the memory of the event has changed or whether the report of the
memory has changed” (Hobbs et al., p. 577) and to offer more explicit instructions about
analyzing the latter than preventing the former.
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Summary: Forensic Handbook Account of Child Memory and Experience
The preceding analysis of two widely-used forensic assessment training manuals’
instructions to individuals conducting evaluations involving children offers an in-depth
examination of both what reality the discourse in the handbooks assumes and how they
present it. At the global level, the two manuals in the dataset are quite similar in terms of
physical characteristics, and have considerable overlap in terms general content. There
are some differences between the handbooks, though, and for the purposes of this
discourse analysis, the most important divergence between these handbooks is in visible
multivocality. PEC (Melton et al., 2007) is authored by three primary individuals and
formatted in Chicago style, which cites references using anonymous superscript numbers
corresponding to endnotes at the end of the book. These factors downplay individual
contributions to the text, thereby lending a more monolithic quality to the discourse
therein. HFP (Weiner & Otto, 2014), however, is composed of chapters each written by a
different contributor or team of contributors, with two editors named as the primary
authors of the manual at large. In addition, this handbook is formatted in APA style,
citing sources by their author(s) last names and year of publication in parenthetical notes
embedded in the body of the text. These features make the multivocality of the text more
prominent, and draw more attention to the great number of experts contributing to this
version of reality. .
Moving to a more granular analysis revealed a total of ten of patterns across the
handbook instructions. I have categorized four as “foundational patterns” because they
provide foundational context about the evaluation process from which to more fully
understand how child memory and experience are taken up in the handbooks. They are:
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Exercise caution.



Clarify the evaluator’s role.



Be familiar with research literature, evidence, and its limitations.



Conduct thorough evaluations and write balanced reports.

Unsurprisingly, these patterns emerged largely in response to questions about what,
exactly, the manuals are instructing. As such, they tend to focus on how evaluators
should best approach evaluations involving children. In doing so, the manuals present the
identity and role of the evaluator as a cautious, neutral expert who is thoroughly
meticulous in studying relevant research literature, gathering supplemental data, and
writing balanced reports. This evaluator remains humbly aware of the limitations of
her/his expertise and of her/his role as consultant to the court rather than ultimate
decision maker.
In addition, I have also described six patterns that specifically surfaced within the
context of child memory/experience:


Child experience is deeply intertwined with and influenced by adults.



Child experience is defined relative to adult experience, and as such is often
presented as deficient.



Language impacts children’s memories and accounts of those memories.



Research is elaborated in detail, but conclusions are offered equivocally.



Children’s suggestibility is a principal concern.



Memory is frequently conceptualized in terms of performance.
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These patterns are in keeping with the first research question guiding this study: What
version of child memory/experience is constructed in forensic psychology manuals, and
what are the practical implications of these implicit and explicit assumptions?
To start, the handbooks portray child experience in general as profoundly
intertwined with and influenced by adults. While their embeddedness within family and
social systems might be inevitable, tolerable, or even useful in many contexts, the
manuals present a narrative in which this interrelatedness poses a threat to the integrity of
children’s memories and accounts. The handbooks assume that in the realm of memory,
influence from adult parties—including parents, teachers, evaluators, and other members
of the forensic system—distorts children’s accounts and is therefore to be protected
against and ideally avoided completely. The implication here is that memories are one
aspect of child experience that is fundamentally self-contained, that is, not related to
other people until the memories are voiced in conversation. Additionally, in the manuals,
these memories must remain unaffected by others in order to be considered accurate and
valid. These features are in keeping with the suggestibility model of memory, which is
heavily drawn upon in the handbooks.
Another tenet of the suggestibility model that is espoused by the manuals is
conceptualizing memory as a cognitive enterprise, an amalgam of encoding, storage, and
retrieval processes performed by the brain. Because the handbooks echo a larger societal
position that children’s cognitive capacities are immature and thus inferior to adults’,
viewing memory this way also deems children’s memory processes as deficient, or
lacking. The manuals tend to describe children’s communication, particularly verbal
communication, in similar terms, and cite these issues as further complicating the

107

prospect of obtaining an accurate account from a child being evaluated. Adopting this
approach to memory lends itself to considering the act of remembering in terms of
performance (e.g., how much or how accurately a child can recall and report), and
consequently suggesting strategies to help optimize a child’s performance. Even as they
refer to and outline these strategies, however, the manuals also reveal deep uncertainty,
skepticism, and/or equivocation about drawing definite conclusions regarding children’s
memory capacities. This ambivalence is expressed through presenting an array of
opposing research findings before advocating for additional research, or more directly by
espousing additional caution or criticizing the current body of literature outright. It seems
that the handbooks construct an account that reveals the limitations of conceptualizing
child memory in this way, but this account then also suggests these problems might be
best addressed with further research that assumes the same suggestibility model. The
following discussion section offers further elaboration of the assumptions informing these
conclusions, as well as some of their potential functional consequences. It also explores
an alternative approach to child memory/experience—phenomenology—and possible
implications of applying this framework in forensic settings.
Discussion
To consider these manuals as employing a discourse is to recognize them as both
reflecting and perpetuating their narrative within a broader institutional landscape, and to
appreciate the functional power that comes with presenting the narrative in an
authoritative manner. What are the assumptions that underlie this discourse about child
memory and experience, and what are the practical implications that follow? One theme
that warrants further elaboration in this context is the assumption that adult memory and
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performance is superior to that of children. It is important to note that the version of
reality in constructed in the manuals does not overtly vilify children for their immaturity;
on the contrary, there are times when the account appears quite sympathetic to what it
presents as children’s vulnerabilities:
It is important to avoid emotionally or morally laden phrases, such as “Bad things
that happen to children.” Developmentally, children are likely to blame
themselves for “bad things,” and they are unlikely to desire permanent separation
from parents even when those parents have maltreated them (Condie, 2003). From
their limited points of reference and experiences, “bad things” might be
interpreted quite differently by children, or may pale in comparison to other
events or qualities of individuals. There should be an assumption that their
egocentric interpretation sometimes precludes comparisons and contrasts.
(Condie, 2014, p. 266)
Still, despite the apparent concern and even respect for children’s experience and the
ways it differs from adults’, the language the author uses continues to perpetuate the
narrative that children’s differences make them inferior. They have “limited points of
reference” and are at heightened risk of overly “egocentric interpretation.” The
assumption that adult experience is superior to children’s is certainly not unique to the
realm of forensic assessment—one need only compare the connotations of what it
colloquially means to say an individual is acting “like a child” versus “like an adult.”
When considered in the current study, however, one consequence of this narrative is the
proclivity to presume that adults know what children’s experience should be rather than
being open to what arises on its own terms. Relatedly, imploring the evaluator to take
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steps to manage these risks on one hand adopts a sympathetic view, but also assumes that
adults have the power and authority to enable children to give their “actual” or
“appropriate” voice (i.e. one that will be understood in court, or memories that are true,
accurate, etc.). This is also a functional consequence; in making this assumption, the
manuals continue to cede this power to adults.
Furthermore, perpetuating a hierarchical schema based largely on age
demonstrates an implicit expectation that children fit into an adult system, and that a
predominant role of evaluators is to facilitate this mission. Given that the forensic system
leans incredibly adult-centric, evaluators are instructed to take measures to solicit
accounts from children that are appropriate for the court, even if this means having to
“translate” or “interpret” young children’s language. Though the manual authors devote
more energy to the ways evaluators can help children adapt to the system rather than
suggestions for systemic adaptations, both handbooks do mention the possibility of the
latter, most often using the language of “accommodations.” Both handbooks also report a
tepid or even controversial view of these actions in the field. For example, when talking
about mitigating potential testimony altering stress on child eyewitnesses, Melton et al.
(2007) state:
Concern over these effects has led some states to construct elaborate procedures
for taking juvenile testimony in abuse cases, including use of screens and
television monitors to distance the witness from the defendant and the trappings
of the courtroom. 215 Yet these procedures are seldom used, 216 apparently because
prosecutors perceive live testimony to be more influential, fear creating
appealable issues, and lack the necessary financial resources. 217 (p. 185)
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Weiner and Otto (2014) echo this sentiment in their discussion of closed-circuit television
(CCTV), which allows children to testify in cases without being physically in court, again
to alleviate the associated stressors. In their chapter, Hobbs et al. (2014) explain that
variations of this method and other video technology is standard in many countries,
including Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Finland, Norway and Sweden,
before turning to the United States:
One-way CCTV is employed at times in the United States although it remains
controversial as some argue that it violates the 6th and 14th Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution, which provide defendants the right to confront their accusers
during criminal trials and to due process, respectively (Hall & Sales, 2008). (p.
595)
The implication here is that while children may benefit from systemic modifications, this
is not happening regularly or readily in the United States. One factor contributing to this
occurrence may well be the assumption that children are lesser than adults, a narrative
which subtly places more responsibility on children to change than on a need for
institutional shifts. There is little mention in these sections or in the manuals more
broadly about the system’s contribution to this dynamic, for example the fact that it
requires particular language and a particular model of memory, neither of which seem
especially well suited for children.
Indeed, the manuals frequently follow their own instructions by transparently
naming the problems and limitations of the research they draw on and the practices they
recommend. However, when advising about how to manage these challenges, the
handbooks often suggest that evaluators proceed cautiously or that researchers perform
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additional studies according to the suggestibility model of memory. These measures may
be useful in some ways, but both maintain the adult-centric viewpoint. Another way of
addressing the limitations outlined in the manuals is to put their existing discourse on
child memory and experience into dialogue with another perspective, one that prioritizes
understanding the lived facets of child memory and child experience. For this we now
turn to phenomenology, and the second research question guiding this study.
Memory and Child Experience: Phenomenological Perspectives
By relying largely on a suggestibility model of memory, the forensic psychology
handbooks in this dataset both reflect and perpetuate a discourse that assumes child
memory is primarily cognitive. As such, memory is situated as a fundamentally personal,
private process, which in turn makes it vulnerable to distortion when brought into the
public realm via recounting, conversation, or interviewing. In addition, memory becomes
measurable in terms of performance, and therefore can be enhanced by introducing
particular techniques and strategies, or hindered in their absence. This notion heightens
an emphasis on determining the factual truth and accuracy of children’s memories, and
assigning value or credibility based on this standard. Now that we have some idea of the
version of child memory and experience constructed in these manuals, we can build on
the analysis elaborated in the preceding pages by turning to the second question guiding
this research: How does this conceptualization compare with phenomenological
constructions of child memory and experience, and what are potential practical
implications of accounting for the lived experience of remembering in this context?
Perhaps the most significant way a phenomenological approach complicates this
discourse is by approaching cognition as only part of a much broader, more nuanced
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picture of how people—and children in particular—remember. In his comprehensive
phenomenological study of memory, Casey (2000) pointedly “pursue[s] memory beyond
mind by recovering its roots in the world itself” (p. 144), specifically in terms of body,
space, things, and the social realm. Emphasizing these external loci of memory dovetails
especially seamlessly with phenomenological understanding of child experience, where
scholars like Rojcewicz (1987) and Simms (2008) expound on “children’s natural
tendency to attend to the bodily, sensuous world around them” (Simms, 2008, p. 221), as
well as to the role of adults in influencing and interpreting child experience. Language is
a related area of particular bearing in considering these issues (Simms, 2008; Ricoeur,
2004). Allowing for the fluidity of memory across body, world, and others, however,
problematizes our traditional notion of truth, including pull to categorize memory either
factually true or false. The following pages explore these primarily non-cognitive
dimensions of memory as they apply to children, as well as the impacts of this endeavor
on our way of viewing truth in child memory, and finally implications for forensic
evaluations involving children.
Memory, experience, and cognition. Again, conceptualizing memory as a
predominantly cognitive process is a hallmark of the version of child memory and
experience constructed in these handbooks and the suggestibility framework from which
they draw. This is abundantly clear, for example, in the lengthy discussion of various
theoretical perspectives explaining the origins of suggestibility and the “memory report
errors” (Hobbs, Johnson, Goodman, Bederian-Gardner, Lawler, Vargas, & Mendoza,
2014, p. 572) included in Weiner and Otto (2014). Interestingly, though the authors claim
that both “cognitive and psychosocial mechanisms that develop throughout childhood
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bolster one’s abilities to resist suggestion or misinformation” (p. 573), there is little
additional mention of such “psychosocial” contributions. Instead, the manual describes a
number of specific understandings of how memory works (or doesn’t), related entirely to
cognition. They aver:
From a memory trace theoretical perspective, memories are preserved as traces, a
consolidation of current features or attributes related to the person and event.
When activated, these traces assist in recalling the details associated with that
memory. Pezdek and Roe (1995) asserted that when memory traces are strong
(i.e., they contain elaborative details, such as of time, place, individuals involved
in the event) and are preserved during memory storage, they will be most resistant
to suggestion. (p. 573)
They continue:
This idea of strong versus weak traces is also relevant to Brainerd and Reyna’s
fuzzy-trace theory (FTT, 2002), which stipulates a dual process model for
memory encoding and retrieval processes. Memories are represented as either
verbatim traces, which hold specific details about the memory, or gist traces,
which hold the general meaning of the memory. … As verbatim traces hold more
details that cannot be maintained for every memory experienced, these traces
decay more quickly, often leaving only the gist trace behind. (p. 573)
And finally:
According to [source monitoring] theory, details for memories are discriminated
against one another via a decision process in which one attributes the source of
these details using perceptual processes (i.e., perceiving a cue) and cognitive
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processes (e.g., retrieval strategies). During retrieval, individuals engaged in
decision processes regarding source information (where, when, what, and with
whom details of events). Cues that are retrieved are evaluated with reality
monitoring (i.e., deciding if the detail actually occurred in reality or if it only were
thought about), and external monitoring (i.e., deciding if details were from this
event or another event) processes. (p. 574)
The mentalistic framing in this discussion is prolific and robust, with language that often
subtly likens human brains to computers or other machines. It is unclear if this
conceptualization stems from the research the manuals are citing, the chapter authors
themselves or, (most likely) both, but regardless the effect is to locate memory processes
squarely in one’s brain.
Given that Weiner and Otto (2014) have an entire chapter devoted to children’s
eyewitness testimony, textual evidence of this trend is more abundant in their manual
than in Melton, Petrila, Poythress, and Slobogin (2007). Melton et al. (2007) (again, with
superscript endnote references included here) also mention two non-cognitive
explanations contributing to children’s suggestibility in a bit more detail than Weiner and
Otto (2014):
This correlation between age and suggestibility can be explained in a number of
ways, none of them mutually exclusive. It is likely due in part to children’s
weaker memory over time, discussed previously. It is also likely due to young
children’s greater respect for authority—a hypothesis bolstered by simple learning
theory, which suggests that children’s behavior will be shaped by their
perceptions of adults’ expectations.171 Finally, it may have something to do with
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children’s moral development. As Fodor discovered, 172 children who yield to the
suggestions of an adult interviewer tend to score lower on assessments of level of
moral judgment (according to Kohlberg’s criteria) than children who resist such
suggestions. (Melton et al., 2007, p. 182)
Still, there are multiple instances from which it is clear Melton et al. (2007) consider
memory itself to be primarily cognitive, such as when they inform readers that “Recall
memory requires more sophisticated cognitive processes than recognition memory” (p.
181). They also outline a specific evaluation technique called “the ‘cognitive interview,’
which relies on mnemonic principles to increase the amount of information provided” (p.
531) by children being asked to recall the circumstances of a crime in maltreatment
evaluations.
This appreciation for memory as a cognitive process also manifests in both
manuals when they attribute children’s memory “errors” to their cognitive immaturity. As
elaborated more thoroughly in the analysis section, both handbooks frequently measure
child experience according to how closely their memory performance can match the
standard set by adult memory performance. This results in statements like, “According to
Ceci, children over 10 or 11 years of age tend to show adult levels of resistance to leading
questions. 167 But children under 6 may acquiesce fairly frequently…” (Melton et al.,
2007, p. 182), and “the ease with which false memories can be implanted tends to decline
as children age and acquire more cognitive abilities that allow them to create lasting
memories and monitor intrusions (e.g., Ghetti, 2008; Otgaar & Candel, 2011)” (Hobbs et
al., 2014, p. 575). In contrast, adopting a phenomenological approach loosens this adultcentric conceptualization. Rojcewicz (1987) draws on Merleau-Ponty to succinctly
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summarize a critical aspect of child experience that is often naively overlooked. He
asserts, “the consciousness of the child has its own structure; the child is not an adult in
miniature, with a consciousness like that of the adult, only imperfect, incomplete” (p.
201, emphasis added). Here Rojcewicz reveals a societal tendency—both overt and
implicit—to prize adult being-in-the world as the aspirational culmination of human
maturation, and therefore to view child experience in terms of its relative deficiencies.
Considering child experience in its own right, however, frees the endeavor from
predetermined evaluative measures, and enables one to appreciate what distinguishes this
way of being without necessarily interpreting its qualities as lacking. What this practice
reveals, Rojcewicz contends, is that children live in the realm of the phenomenal (i.e. the
lived, sensory world) rather than in the scientific, intellectual adult realms.
A conceptualization of child memory as reductively mentalistic simply does not
make sense when one appreciates the primacy of the phenomenal in children’s habitual
way of being. Given the constitutive link between memory and experience, we must
begin by inquiring about how children live, how they experience the world, in order to
begin to understand how children remember. Consequently, we must turn our attention to
the foremost non-cognitive dimensions of child experience—body, space, things, and
others—to explore their role in child remembering. Not wanting to fall into the trap of
defining child memory in terms of how well or poorly it aligns with the framework of
adult memory, I will explicate how each of these dimensions is experienced by children,
as well as phenomenological understandings of memory structures in general. Doing so
will facilitate my inferring what this might imply for child memory, particularly in a
forensic context. It should be noted that the distinctions among these categories of
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experience are in some ways illusory, as is referring to them as “non-cognitive.” Drawing
on a phenomenological stance assumes the profound interconnectedness among the
various dimensions of experiences like memory. As we shall see, phenomenological
inquiry about body memory, for example, implies a non-objectified body that is not
entirely divorced from space, things, others, or even cognition. Nevertheless, naming
each dimension allows us to access and communicate what is particular to it, as well as
how it interacts with other dimensions.
Body and space. In the context of child experience, it is difficult to overstate the
significance of the body, but it is also impossible to speak about the body without also
speaking about space. For children, body exists only as the lived body, which is to say the
body that exists in profound reciprocity with the world. In the realm of the phenomenal—
where children dwell—space is primarily, richly sensory, and these sensory experiences
occur through the body. This interaction can be so profound that it is not uncommon for
toddlers to unintentionally fuse their own consciousness with the spatial features of the
world around them:
[T]he concept of the body as a self-enclosed entity remains vague for a long time.
Children, like adults, encounter the body’s limits in pain: falling down hurts,
touching the hot stove burns. Pain recoils the body upon itself for a while and
reduces the action space. But we know from preschoolers that even pain is not so
much located in the body as in the thing that causes it. There are many stories of
children crying when someone else is hurt: one’s own body is confused with that
of the other. Or a toddler might slap the door after bumping into it…. The body as
mine is given to me not in itself and through the recognition of the boundedness of
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its skin but as an element in the equation of action space. Space clings to bodies
because bodies have an action history. (Simms, 2008, p. 42, emphasis in original)
This body-space nexus has implications for identity development as well. Rojcewicz
(1987) claims that children only know their bodies as the means of “mak[ing] contact
with the world” (p. 203), while Simms (2008) draws a similar conclusion from the other
direction, explaining that “people, spaces, things, time, and language are part of the
evolving fabric of a child’s embodied self” (p. 24). Therefore we see that the child’s lived
body makes the world, even as the world makes the lived body, in an ongoing interaction
that forms one’s identity.
This body-space primacy may be especially applicable to children, but Casey
(2000) also underscores the significance of body memory to human memory more
broadly. Invoking Whitehead (1978), Casey (2000) contends that because “the body is
‘our most immediate environment’” (p. 174) through which we encounter all experience,
“there is no memory without body memory” (p. 172, emphasis in original). He also
describes three types of body memories in depth: habitual, traumatic, and erotic,
comparing differences in affective quality and temporal orientation among them. These
distinctions hold particular relevance when considering memory in a forensic context,
especially given how frequently questions of suggestibility effects arise in cases of
suspected child sexual abuse. Whereas Casey (2000) defines habitual body memory as
“an active immanence of the past in the body that informs present bodily actions in an
efficacious, orienting, and regular manner” (p. 149), he describes traumatic body
memories as those that “arise from and bear on one’s own lived body in moments of
duress” (p. 154). Casey (2000) recognizes a number of attributes as specific to traumatic
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body memories, including their particular (rather than habitual or repetitive) nature and
the fragmentation of the lived body (in contrast to the coordinated body of habitual
memory). He also reasons that traumatic body memories are more distinctly situated in
the past than are other forms of memory, in part because of a defensive distancing that
seems to occur automatically. “If the trauma I am now remembering occurred there and
then,” Casey (2000) explains, “it cannot have such a devastating effect on me here and
now as I remember it” (p. 157).
This conceptualization in many ways aligns well with current psychological
thinking about trauma, including that one of the accomplishments of productive
psychotherapy is that it creates a space in which to safely bring the many complicated
dimensions of past memories into the present. Yet Casey (2000) does not discuss
instances in which the memory is of a trauma that has been inflicted upon one’s body by
somebody else. He briefly mentions a traumatic body memory of falling down the stairs
in his childhood as an example of how “the pain and poignancy of most traumatic
memories recede with time” (p. 156), a process facilitated by one’s ability to “transform
these memories into reminiscences and recollections” (p. 156). How might this process,
and perhaps the structure of the memory itself, might be different if, say, Casey’s mother
had intentionally pushed him down the stairs? In addition, what happens to the memories
of repeated trauma that is so tragically common in cases of child abuse? Do they become
less particular, less fragmented, and less finite than the isolated event of a tumble down
the stairs?
These questions are even further complicated in the case of sexual traumas. Casey
(2000) draws a clear distinction between traumatic body memory and erotic body
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memory but does not mention sexual assault or abuse. He only addresses erotic body
memories as positive, pleasurable experiences, so much so that he includes the
anticipation of a future erotic experience as a significant temporal component
characteristic of this sort of memory. But of course there are many instances of erotic
experiences that are not pleasurable, and are not remembered as such. Based on Casey’s
(2000) work, it would stand to reason that the more categories a memory fits into
(habitual, traumatic, erotic), the more affectively and temporally conflicted it becomes.
Subsequently, it would also seem that the more conflicted these memories are, the less
they fit with the forensic system’s assumption that accurate memories originate as perfect
recordings of events that are then at risk of becoming distorted by external factors
through the process of being recounted. For children, in whose experience bodies and
worlds are especially figural and especially joined, the potential for these conflicts
warrants even greater respect and sensitivity.
Things and others. Simms (2008) demonstrates once again the fluidity among
dimensions of experience in her rich description of the relationship between children and
things. Children navigate a world brimming with things, each inviting engagement and
texturizing the other dimensions of lived experience. The diction here is intentional, for
Simms (2008) refers to the German use of word thing, that is, as a gathering. For children
in the phenomenal realm, a thing “gathers sensory, spatial, social, and temporal meaning
around it” (p. 83). Things hold this gathering of lived experience and thus become
handles, portals to these not-presently-manifest experiences, homes for memories. Things
function in similar ways for adults (Casey, 2000), but seem to have a particular resonance
in child experience (Simms, 2008). This becomes quite clear in a child’s often
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inconsolable distress when a beloved thing gets lost or breaks. The experience for a child
is not only of a material loss, but also an existential one. In addition, things, with their
stable, material concreteness, offer children a means of accessing the liminal space
between a not-yet-fully-formed self and the ever-expanding environment. This function is
well captured by “transitional objects” (in this context, “transitional things” is more apt),
which Winnicott (1971/2005) introduces as “objects that are not part of the infant’s body
yet are not fully recognized as belonging to external reality” (p. 3). The transitional thing
tangibly manifests the lived fluidity between body and world for children.
The transitional thing also points to the important role of others in child
experience. With its soft and body-conforming properties, the transitional thing serves as
“an extension of the maternal field” (Simms, 2008, p. 98), a vital function for the infant
whose experience is so dominated by the most intimate coexistence with the mother (and
then other caregivers). While physical proximity and interconnectedness between parent
and child wane as the child ages, children remain firmly and thoroughly embedded in the
world with others. As a result, our experience, our identities and worlds, are all coconstituted by these others. In terms of child memory, Simms (2008) sums up the
implications of a highly interpersonal lived experience by stating concisely, “Our early
memories are cocreated by others” (p. 149). Casey (2000), too, masterfully complicates
the notion of personal authorship and ownership of human memory, of arguing that if
“there is no such thing as strict self-identity, or rather, such identity is thoroughly intersubjective from the beginning” (p. 244) then the same can be said for memory. In other
words, the inter-subjective experience of the phenomenal realm into which we are thrown
yields inter-subjective memory of that experience.
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The notion of a memory as an amalgam of multiple inter-subjective experiences is
as present in a suggestibility model of memory as a phenomenological one. In the
suggestibility dependent forensic system, however, this amalgam memory is regarded as
“tainted,” “distorted,” and/or “inaccurate,” the unfortunate and possibly outcome of
undue external influence or improper interview techniques. A fundamental philosophical
difference in phenomenology is conceptualizing memory as always inter-subjective; there
is never a time when it is not influenced by the rememberer’s situated context. As such,
the idea that a memory can be invalidated due to outside influence is simply nonsensical.
Indeed, as opposed to the all-or-nothing, either-or dichotomy that underpins a
suggestibility framework and frequently renders child narratives unreliably tainted,
phenomenological study describes a conceptualization in which memory can be both
intimately personal and indicative of my autonomy even as it is shared with and
influenced by others in my world. Casey (2000) goes on to eschew concern that these
worldly influences will dilute the potency or truth of a memory in some way, instead
claiming the opposite:
I am more, not less, autonomous when I remember in place and about place, in
and with my body, in and through others. The range as well as the subtlety of my
remembering is enhanced as I enter more fully into my memorial in-der-WeltSein. The same is true of the mnemonic modes studied in Part Two. By reminding
myself and others, I am a more autonomous agent in the world, less dependent on
the whims of others or on the vagaries of circumstance. …At every step, an
increased density goes hand in hand with an undiminished autonomy. (p. 266)
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Rather than decrying inter-subjectivity as a threat to personal experience, Casey (2000)
affirms that memory’s reciprocal influence on and from the world, including other
individuals, actually promotes autonomy.
In a related vein, Ricoeur (2004), too, places the issue of “mine” and “not-mine”
at the core of his work, affirming early on that, “This conjunction between (external)
stimulation and (internal) resemblance will remain, for us, the crux of the entire
problematic of memory” (p. 17). Grounding his text in comprehensive historical
examples, Ricoeur (2004) devotes a large section of his Part 1 to gently wending his way
towards a harmonious negotiation of seemingly opposing limit theories (i.e. Augustine’s
“tradition of inwardness,” (p. 96) with Maurice Halbwachs “external gaze” (p. 120)). In
the case of personal and collective memory, Ricoeur (2004) finds a way of navigating the
personal and social spheres of memory through the work of Alfred Schutz:
For [Schutz], the experience of others is a given as primal as the experience of the
self. Its immediacy is less that of cognitive evidence than that of practical faith.
We believe in the existence of others because we act with them and on them and
are affected by their actions. The phenomenology of belonging is then free to
provide itself with its own conceptual system without any concern with deriving it
from an egological pole. (p. 130)
Ricoeur contributes an original thought to this sentiment, reminding readers that the
collective other is in fact populated by many individual others, and that our “close
relations” (p. 131) can be drawn on to help bridge a potential gulf between memory that
is entirely personal (perhaps blocked or unable to be languaged), and memory that is
shared at the level of the collective.
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In a similar vein, the forensic manuals also note that children involved in these
evaluations speak more freely and openly to people with whom they feel a certain degree
of security. Hobbs et al. (2014) report that “the person to whom children most often
disclose certain crimes (e.g., child sexual abuse) is a nonoffending parent, typically
mothers” (p. 578), and also cite research whose “findings suggest that children, when
comfortable and familiar with the interviewer, correct errors and resist suggestion more
easily than with a stranger” (p. 579). Melton et al. (2007) also emphasize the importance
of first “building rapport” (p. 186) with children being interviewed, in service of
“maximizing information while minimizing suggestion” (p. 186). Weiner and Otto (2014)
even reference evidence that these conversations can facilitate memory processes, saying,
“discussions parents have with their children about traumatic events can assist with the
encoding and storage processes necessary for memory retrieval (Chae, Ogle, &
Goodman, 2009)” (Hobbs et al., 2014, p. 567). Just as with body, space, and things,
children’s worlds are acutely interrelated with others, and thus their experience of
remembering is likewise intertwined with these existentialia (facets of our lived world).
Both suggestibility and phenomenology models suggest that providing different
conditions and contexts for children to engage in remembering will likely impact the
recounting of the memories. It seems that utilizing close, familiar relations in forensic
evaluations may be one area that could better support children in the process of reporting
memories, especially those that are (in Casey’s (2000) terms) highly conflicted in terms
of moodedness and temporal orientation.
Memory, experience, and language. In both the handbooks as well as
phenomenological studies of memory and child experience, the topic of language
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receives a great deal of attention. Verbal language serves as a primary point of
intersection via which children interact with the adult others in their lives, especially in
the context of forensic evaluation. As such, the ways evaluators and children speak to one
another becomes a point of focus in the forensic assessment manuals. As the analysis
section of this study describes in depth, the way the handbooks discuss this issue again
demonstrates many of the broader assumptions their account adopts about child
experience. In short, they tend to operate from the narrative that because of children’s
cognitive immaturity relative to adults, their linguistic capacities are underdeveloped and
potentially lacking. Thus evaluators need to be cautious when interviewing children,
adopting carefully researched strategies and techniques when appropriate, and a degree of
skepticism when managing children’s testimonies, which can require interpretation in
order to be meaningful to adults. In Weiner and Otto (2014), for example, Stahl (2014)
issues this cautionary instruction to evaluators interviewing children in custody cases:
Evaluators must recognize that children’s language skills are not the same as
adults’. It is important to know that, although children often do not understand
their questions, they may respond as if they do. It may be useful to ask children to
repeat or to explain the questions to be sure that they understand them. (p. 154)
Similarly, Melton et al. (2007) warn evaluators that “If an event cannot be communicated
in a coherent, meaningful way, a witness’s observation and memory of it are useless to
the factfinder. Consequently, a person’s ability to conceptualize complex events and to
order them in space and time are of major legal importance” (p. 183). Excerpts like these
reveal the sentiment that not only do children and adults communicate differently, but
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also that the way the forensic system is currently structured habitually prioritizes adult
ways of communicating and remembering.
Thus it is logical that Melton et al., (2007) devote a section of their section on
eyewitness testimony to advising evaluators on factors to consider when determining just
how much like adults children are capable of communicating:
Shaffer has stated that “by age 5, children not only understand most of the
grammatical rules of their native tongue but are also constructing remarkably
complex, adultlike sentences.” 179 But children below that age, and indeed some
children above it, may not be able to communicate their observations effectively.
For example, to Piaget, the well-known theorist of child development, 180 it was a
truism that “preoperational” children, often up to age seven, are unable to
“decenter” from the most obvious attitude of a stimulus and make use of all
relevant information. (p. 183)
Demonstrating a thoroughness typical of these manuals, they then go on to describe
research from critics of Piagetian theory, questioning if children’s responses to Piaget’s
now famous tasks result more from cognitive immaturity or “linguistic deficits” 183 (p.
183). They also note that “preschoolers can be trained in conversation skills, contrary to
the Piagetian hypothesis that the necessary cognitive structures would not be expected to
have developed adequately” (p. 184). Still, Melton et al. (2007) ultimately conclude that
children are lacking when compared to the adult standards the courts require, and that
limitations of the system pose further challenges to the task of “enhancing” children’s
language abilities and ensuring better communication:
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These studies do not moot the point, however, that young children are likely to
have difficulty in conceptualizing complex events. Borke, for example, has
admitted that some of Piaget’s tasks are “cognitively too difficult” for children
below the age of five. 187 And although the work of Brainerd and others indicates
that children’s capacities can be enhanced with training, 188 such training is not
always available or feasible. (p. 184)
In the manuals and the suggestibility model of memory they promulgate, language
appears to be another way children are inferior to adults, and as such operates as another
barrier to the encoding, storage, and retrieval of “accurate,” “true,” and “valid”
memories.
From a phenomenological perspective, language serves as an example of the
complex interrelatedness of the perceived, felt world and the constituted world of
mentalistic abstraction. In languaging an experience, a memory, one has entered the
human, symbolic world of reflexivity. To flesh out the consequences of this shift, it is
helpful to consider phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) hyperdialectic, which
conceptualizes human experience (and time in particular) structured not as a linear
causality, but rather as a “web of intentionalities” (p. 373). Here Merleau-Ponty refutes
the popular assumption that past circumstances precede and cause present circumstances,
which precede and cause future circumstances, proposing instead that time is a web, such
that change in one area affects change in all the others in intricate ways. The
hyperdialectic offers a model for understanding that in language, the move to the
symbolic realm alters the perceptual field, and thus time, body, place, affect, etc. From a
phenomenological position, putting language to memory, especially in speech, invariably
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alters the memory experience. In contrast to a suggestibility framework, this is inherently
given, and not inherently problematic.
Ricoeur (2004), too, takes up the issue of how languaging experience (memory)
can alter the experience itself, and extends the discussion to consider its interpersonal
implications as well. In his section chapter titled Personal and Collective Memory, he
writes:
In its declarative phase, memory enters into the region of language; memories
spoken of, pronounced are already a kind of discourse that the subject engages in
with herself. What is pronounced in this discourse occurs in the common
language, most often in the mother tongue, which, it must be said, is the language
of others. But this elevation of memory to language is not without difficulties.
This is the place to recall the traumatic experiences mentioned above in
connection with thwarted memory. Overcoming obstacles through remembering,
which makes memory itself a work, can be aided by a third party, the
psychoanalyst among others. (p. 129)
In this excerpt, Ricoeur elucidates that ascribing language to memories is in and of itself
a move away from direct experience (even though we know our direct experience can
never fall away entirely). This passage introduces Ricoeur’s (2004) discussion of how the
highly personal, intimate, individualized qualities of what he calls personal memory enter
through language into the shared domain of the other, i.e. collective memory.
Here Ricoeur explicitly alludes to some of the implications for this process,
mentioning psychoanalysis as a model example of a situation in which speaking “the
language of others” with a “third party” facilitates the therapeutic project of “overcoming
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obstacles.” Notably, the nuances of his description are to some degree the inverse of
suggestibility model, which operates out of fear that speaking with another person will
impose obstacles to accessing the most truthful account of one’s experience. Again, in
thinking phenomenologically about memory, we can start to appreciate how at the level
of lived experience, boundaries between self and world are quite permeable, a
phenomenon very clearly associated with our experience and understanding of
remembering.
It is important to point out, however, that this focus on verbal language is another
example of the adult-centric lens through which the manuals tend to view child
experience. Just as a phenomenological perspective broadens the notion of memory to
include non-cognitive dimensions, it similarly expands the notion of language to consider
means of communication beyond the lexical. This view is again rooted in the assumptions
that in human experience, and for children in particular, the lived body is primary, and
that it is intricately enmeshed in the lived world (including space, things and others). This
mutually hermeneutic relationship is most figural in infant and pre-verbal child
experience, and is in part due to the communicative capacities of the lived body. In
infancy and childhood, the incredibly expressive gestural functions of the body-in-theworld are relied upon in more explicitly than they are for a literate, linguistically fluent
adult (Simms, 2008). Regardless of the extent to which adult society prioritizes verbal
communication, however, speech is embedded in the lived body, which co-constitutes the
lived world. As Simms (2008) describes, “gesture arises out of the chiasm between body
and world” (p. 180). The symbolic properties of language are especially germane to the
subject of memory, given the power of language to summon the presence of a
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phenomenon even when it is no longer in our immediate domain. In this way, experience
“becomes memory because it has been preserved in narrative” (p. 190). Ricoeur (2004)
speaks to the therapeutic power of narrating past experiences, especially traumatic ones,
in the presence of a trusted third party, as bringing this memory into a common language
enables it to be collectively shared and thus experienced in a new way. In terms of
children, Simms (2008), too, draws parallels between language and play, and both she
and Winnicott (1971/2005) offer illustrative examples of play therapy as analogous to the
process Ricoeur (2004) describes.
Though perhaps not as readily accessible to our cerebral adult sensibilities, one
might wonder whether our bodies and spaces communicate in their own languages. Given
how intrinsically meaningful these dimensions of experience are in child experience, it
would seem likely that they each carry their own way of narrating the lived past such that
it can again become a lived present. Casey (2000) concludes that the body does, in fact,
have its own non-verbal way of remembering, as he affirms, “many body memories
(above all, habitual ones) need not be accompanied by consciousness in any explicit
form” (p. 178). In children this body memory is perhaps demonstrated by the neonates
who pre-reflectively recognize their mothers’ voices, or the preschoolers whose daily
routine is so internalized that their legs habitually carry them to the music circle after
cleanup time. As for space, there is evidence to suggest its language is an affective one,
as with Simms’s (2008) conclusion that “early spatial experience is suffused with
feeling” (p. 45). Like Simms—and Rojcewicz (1987)—Casey (2000) also emphasizes the
inextricability of body and space, and notes that they infuse one another with a particular
and enduring affective quality. This emotional charge engenders a body-space amalgam,
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such that one will not be remembered without the other. With language, both verbal and
otherwise, we see even further examples of the fluidity between self, world, and others,
and the implications for children’s memory are perhaps even more visible.
Memory, experience, and truth. This section began by elaborating four noncognitive dimensions of child experience through a phenomenological lens. Each of these
dimensions, however, also exists in an objectified, scientific form: the anatomical body,
the space of physics and geometry, things as objects, and others as rational, skin-bounded
individuals who operate as intentional entities discrete from one another. Adults will no
doubt be familiar with these Cartesian analogues, since for a number of reasons, history
has distanced adults from the phenomenal realm, even naming this distance as one
achievement of development and maturity (Van den Berg, 1961/1983). There are
instances for which the non-phenomenal ways of conceptualizing these aspects of
existence are quite appropriate, as in the work of a surgeon or structural engineer, for
example. Phenomenology, however, inverts the traditional discourse of developmental
psychology and proposes adult experience as an impoverished version of child
experience (Rojcewicz, 1987). This discussion reveals two factors that must be taken into
account when considering how to understand “truth” in child memory: the distinction
between factual truth and experiential truth, and the related role of imagination in child
memory.
To the first point, in our predominantly objectivistic, Cartesian, adult-dominant
world, our reigning assumption is to equate truth with factual accuracy. This makes truth
a binary entity, and one that is readily quantifiable. As the findings from this study’s
analysis chapter suggest, this is the conceptualization of truth that guides the

132

suggestibility model and informs the discourse of child memory and experience espoused
in forensic assessment manuals. This notion is evident in the ways these handbooks
approach research and collateral information (i.e. interviews and observations)—as data
through which to locate “facts” to best devise “answers.” It is also apparent from the
energy they devote to instructing evaluators on soliciting “accurate” accounts from
children involved in these cases, and on helping the court determine whether or not a
child has been “honest” in her or his recounting of experience.
As in the suggestibility model, truth similarly emerges as a significant facet of the
phenomenological study of memory, as do the related issues of forgetting and
imagination. Both Casey (2000) and Ricoeur (2004) offer the same compelling
explanation as to why we tend to place such a high priority on the presumed accuracy of
our memories: these memories are our experience, confirmation of our very existence
and the existentialia that qualify it. Though this recognition informs our understanding of
why we seem to prize factually correct memory, both authors are quick to reframe the
common characterization of memory’s porosity as a deficiency. This so-called flaw
contributes to what Casey (2000) terms “memory’s decline in prestige” (p. 4) that is, the
historical shift from revering memory in Ancient Greece as a divine attribute to our
modern relegation of memory to a depersonalized (though consistently reliable)
mechanistic process made possible by computers. Ricoeur (2004), too, softens the
traditional view of memory as shamefully fallible early in his 2004 work, Memory,
History, Forgetting:
To memory is tied an ambition, a claim—that of being faithful to the past. In this
respect, the deficiencies stemming from forgetting, which we shall discuss in
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good time, should not be treated straight away as pathological forms, as
dysfunctions, but as the shadowy underside of the bright region of memory, which
binds us to what has passed before we remember it. If we can reproach memory
with being unreliable, it is precisely because it is our one and only resource for
signifying the past-character of what we declare we remember. (p. 21)
A phenomenological conceptualization of memory includes forgetting as an automatic
complement to remembering (with the possible exception of the rare individual with
exceptionally atypical memory capacity that borders on pathological). Recognizing this
givenness as embedded in the nature of memory invites new ways to make sense of
forgetting and the functions it serves.
Viewing forgetting as an absence further suggests the phenomenon of
remembering can comfortably be situated as a fundamental dimension of Dasein (Being).
To help unpack this notion, we can again turn to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the
hyperdialectic:
Being is made up out of bound wholes. Merleau-Ponty’s hyperdialectic is an
attempt to conceive of a set of principles that describes the complexity and
transcendence of Being as the constellation of bound wholes. It manifests itself in
the concrete presence of people, things, and events as they morph in time. This
presence, however, is permeated with absence. The unconcealed is surrounded by
the concealed. Things show some of their profiles, but withhold others. (Simms,
2017, p. 146)
Of course part of Simms’ point in highlighting the necessary presence of absence in
Merleau-Ponty’s theory is that an individual’s understanding of his or her being-in-the-
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world is always incomplete, in ways that extend far beyond forgetting. But in the present
context, the hyperdialectic seems to offer a theoretical model supporting the idea that
forgetting may be just as existentially significant as its positive counterpart.
We may find it comforting to believe—and suggestibility studies most certainly
assume—that a truthful memory is one which functions as a recording, perfectly
duplicating a scene in a manner devoid of subjectivity. Nevertheless, the
phenomenological approach to memory, one grounded in lived experience, offers a
compelling refutation. Casey (2000) proposes there are two different facets of truth that
memory can speak to, the truth of the “factuality of the event experienced” (p. 281), and
the truth of the personal experience of that event. A memory declared inaccurate or
distorted using the framework of suggestibility essentially recognizes only the first of
Casey’s (2000) truths. Being unable to “affirm that the past was thus-and-so as a fact”
(Casey, 2000, p. 282) renders the memory meaningless and could be enough to
completely discredit the rememberer as unreliable, given that suggestibility leaves little
room to value personal experience. In presuming truth as a binary entity, however, we do
not realize that this “fact-truth” is a concept that stems from our non-phenomenal
perspective, and one that is in actuality an abstraction from lived experience. Because
experiential truth is a fundamental and important aspect of memory, our memories dwell
in the ways we experience these various dimensions of being. Casey’s (2000) model not
only can accommodate both of these strands of truth in memory, but also gives them
equal respect as similarly implicated in the process of remembering.
Ricoeur (2004) implies there are many ways of understanding why one’s memory
might change over time, or why one’s account of a memory might be unintentionally
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different upon a retelling, and these ways have everything to do with Casey’s (2000)
second truth, that a memory is “true to experience” (p. 282). Because from a
phenomenological standpoint, human experience is vastly complex, ever-changing, and
non-dualistic, it is fitting that Casey (2000) would apply these same qualities to memory
as well:
What memory … brings back is not the ever-the-sameness of an essence. It
retrieves a past that is ever-different—different not just because of the erosion
effected by time or because of the different act-form of remembering it
corresponds to, but intrinsically different thanks to the action of thick autonomy.
(p. 286)
By “thick autonomy,” Casey (2000) is referring to the many ways in which memory is a
highly personalized experience. The very act of remembering, because it is a human act
and therefore subject to the intertwined embeddedness of all human experience, cannot
be completely divorced from the memory itself; in fact, the lines between noun and verb
are invariably blurred.
An illustrative example may be helpful in demonstrating how this
phenomenological picture of experiential truth in memory applies specifically to child
experience. Again, as elaborated above, children do not live space according to geometric
properties; thus asking a child how high she threw the ball yesterday likely will not yield
a response in terms of mathematical distance. When the child responds that she threw it
“As high as the clouds!” would one accuse her of being untruthful, or deem her memory
false? The notion is laughable. Her recounting may not have fact-truth, but most would
understand it as undeniably true to phenomenal experience. One can even imagine a little
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girl excitedly raising her voice and pre-reflectively pantomiming the act of throwing a
ball into the air with both hands, possibly even giving a little jump as she responds. The
image is teeming with the child’s initial lived sensory experience flooding back to her via
the act of remembering. And before dismissing the account as merely “cute” or “silly,” as
we adults are wont to do, it is important to appreciate it as an expression of the richly
nuanced domain of child experience. As Casey (2000) notes, “remembering cannot do
without reference to the actual—whether straightforwardly in allusion to the past, or
indirectly via perception—but it always manages to exceed any simple actualism of
experience” (p. 279).
Simms (2008) similarly points to the value of experiential truth in child memory
with the example of a four-year-old who claims to have been present at the birth of his
older brother. Though factually impossible and therefore untrue by that standard, Simms
elucidates the experiential truth in his memory, even though it differs somewhat from the
sensorial truth of the previous example. Instead, this boy had experienced his family’s
narratives about his brother’s birth, imagining the experience as he heard it recounted.
Because children’s understanding of existence is different from adults’, at age four this
boy has no way of comprehending his previous nonexistence. Through living among
others in the phenomenal realm, however, his “participatory consciousness internalizes
the family narratives, so that the impersonal past of [the other] … becomes the personal
past” (p. 149). Furthermore, Ricoeur (2004) recognizes that evaluating truth in memory
only according to fact-truth is to define memory only in terms of its mentalistic
processes. He writes, “a specific search for truth is implied in the intending of the past
‘thing,’ of what was formerly seen, heard, experienced, learned. This search for truth
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determines memory as a cognitive issue” (p. 55, emphasis in original). As we have
already seen, valuing only the cognitive properties of memory, however, thoroughly
ignores or devalues the non-cognitive contributions to memory that are so profoundly
inextricable from human experience, particularly for children.
Simms’s (2008) example anticipates another way of speaking about experiential
truth in child memory, that is, to invoke the notion of imagination in understanding those
accounts of the past which are faithful to some aspect of the child’s experience but
conflict with fact-truth. Indeed, Casey (1977, 2000), Simms (2008), and Ricoeur (2004)
all persuasively demonstrate the ways imagination and memory are co-constitutive. The
“short-circuit between memory and imagination” explains Ricoeur (2004), “is placed
under the sign of the association of ideas: if these two affections are tied by contiguity, to
evoke one—to imagine it—is to evoke the other—to remember it” (p. 5). Casey (1977)
implicitly draws on the phenomenological tenet that human perspective is by nature only
partial to help illustrate an example of when imagination fuses with memory to serve “as
a single (though internally complex) unit of mental activity” (p. 195) in a compensatory
effort that is not fully conscious:
No amount of historical evidence, however copious or firsthand it may be, can
restore the past event itself as seen from every significant perspective. It cannot,
in particular, incorporate the historian’s own perspectival position, which has to
be imagined into the event. And, still more generally, the historian must imagine
how the event as a whole held together and was experienced as a single, datable
happening. (p. 195)
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Though perhaps more exaggerated in the case of the historian, who is very obviously
required to negotiate so many perspectives, Casey (2000) goes on to describe how echoes
of this phenomenon reverberate in more subtle, commonplace instances as well. He
frequently references memory as a phenomenon that “deals with past actualities, which it
transforms rather than transmits” (p. 272). In addition, Romanyshyn (2001) contends that
imagination, or “story,” is more than simply an ancillary facet of phenomenon of human
memory; it subsumes the facts of existence and becomes the very “form of psychological
life and psychological experience” (p. 86). From this view, it is imagination’s
experiential truth, not the objectified facts of an experience, which holds the primary
meaning of our existence, and preserves it over time.
Summary: Phenomenological Account of Child Memory and Experience
In the preceding pages, we have explored in depth the places of overlap and
divergence between a suggestibility model of child memory/experience and a
phenomenological model of memory/experience. What is readily apparent is that while
these two approaches may highlight similar features of this human experience, the
meanings each position assigns to these qualities are strikingly different. According to a
suggestibility framework, memory is above all a cognitive process, the result of the brain
successfully encoding, storing, and retrieving data. In addition, memory is either “mine”
or “not-mine.” If it is “mine” (and therefore reliable), it is the product of an individual’s
brain successfully encoding, storing, and retrieving information without influence from
external factors. When a memory is affected by influences that are outside the individual,
it becomes tainted (no longer accurate or valid), and is therefore “not-mine.” The risk of
these influences distorting a memory is especially prevalent during the challenging, albeit
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necessary, process of recounting it through verbal communication. Therefore a truthful
recounting of a memory is one that functions as a recording, perfectly duplicating a scene
in a manner devoid of subjectivity or factual inaccuracy. Finally, because this
conceptualization relies so heavily on adult valuing of cognition and verbal language,
children’s memory capacities are viewed as in all likelihood lacking, their accounts
especially susceptible to these invalidating external influences.
A phenomenological perspective, however, espouses that as a human experience,
memory by nature extends beyond the cognitive. Human beings live memory in relation
to various existentialia, including, body, space, things, and others; these dimensions serve
as different though interrelated means of constituting, housing, and narrating memory
(and not always verbally). On the subject of ownership, because human experience is
inter-subjective as a given, “not-mineness” is present from a memory’s inception.
Therefore memory can be intimately personal and indicative of one’s autonomy even as it
is shared with and influenced by others in one’s world. Memory is fundamentally fallible,
and forgetting and imagination are inherent complements to remembering, serving
equally important functions in human experience. Thus, in addition to factual truth,
memory can also carry experiential truth (i.e. the truth of the personal experience of that
event). Both are valuable and to be respected. Because children inhabit the phenomenal
world more acutely than adults, these findings are even more applicable. For children, the
non-cognitive elements of experience and memory may be more primary, and fluidity
across these dimensions is even more prevalent than for adults but these differences do
not indicate that child experience is immature or impoverished compared to adults’ (if
anything, phenomenology proposes the opposite). From these findings, it would appear
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that phenomenology’s different philosophical approach to child memory/experience
affords many new ideas for improving the system such that it can better align with the
needs of the children being evaluated within it. These ideas are considered in greater
depth in the sections that follow.
Implications of a Phenomenological Account of Child Memory in the Forensic
System
In performing this study, I set out to better understand how child memory and
experience is constructed in the discourse promulgated by forensic assessment
handbooks, how this conceptualization compared with a phenomenological perspective,
and the existing and potential functional consequences of each. My research has yielded
many findings in keeping with this goal. To start, my discourse analysis of the manuals
revealed a conceptualization of children’s experience as deeply intertwined with adults’
to an extent that makes it difficult to determine what is a child’s “original” experience
and what may have been subject to distorting external influence. In this version of reality,
children are judged according to adult standards, and thus presumed intrinsically deficient
because of their developmental, linguistic, and cognitive immaturity. This holds
particular consequences for children’s memory processes, which are deemed
predominantly cognitive. Therefore their memory’s accuracy and reliability is threatened
by children’s acute susceptibility to outside influences. To help combat the threat of
suggestibility, the handbooks instruct evaluators to strive for objective neutrality by
exercising caution and performing thorough research and evaluations. The manual
authors themselves model this attitude by relying heavily on research literature, much of
which assumes a similar suggestibility model of memory.
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A phenomenological view of children’s memory emphasizes children’s
experience as primarily sensory, rather than cognitive, and as such it is characterized as
thoroughly interrelated with various dimensions of being (e.g. body, space, things, other
people) more acutely than for adults. According to phenomenology, because memories
constitute human experience, memories are similarly fluid and intersubjective by nature.
Expanding the notion of existence as one that extends throughout the phenomenal
world—including other people—challenges the assumptions that the world is external
and that influences from it can invalidate one’s experience or memory. It also
complicates traditional views of objectivity and bias for children and adults alike, and
introduces the possibility of acknowledging experiential truth in memory in addition to
factual truth. I have already mentioned some functional consequences of both the forensic
conceptualization as well as a phenomenological discourse, but questions still remain
regarding how a phenomenological perspective might inspire changes in the legal system
that more fully support child experience.
Looking at the preceding explication of how child experience/memory is
conceptualized in both forensic assessment manuals and phenomenology alike, it seems
that both discourses offer a number of similar conclusions. In each, human memory is
malleable; we are prone to forgetting and to shifting our narratives. This fluidity in large
part stems from the influences of our own imaginations and more visibly by other people
in our lives and the complex relational dynamics at play in our interactions. Relatedly,
our experience/memories are also affected when we put them into words and try to
recount or communicate them verbally. Finally, these qualities are especially potent for
children, whose experience is different from adults’ in many ways.
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While the forensic discourse and phenomenological perspective appear largely in
agreement about these structures of child memory/experience, the meanings attributed to
said features are incredibly different in each. As we have seen, according to the
suggestibility framework espoused in the handbooks, influences threaten to distort or
“taint” a once-pure memory. Children are especially vulnerable to these risks because of
their dependence on adults, their active imaginations, and most acutely, their immature
cognitive and language abilities (relative to adults). From a phenomenological standpoint,
both truth and ownership of experience are intrinsically non-binary. Thus all of
experience/memory is always already constituted by varying degrees of influence from
the context in which one exists, and this influence need not invalidate one’s
experience/memory. Children are especially entwined in the phenomenal world in which
the cognitive dimensions of experience are not figural or prioritized. Taken together, it
seems the particularities of child memory/experience are not inherently faulty or
problematic, but are situated within a legal system that makes them so. What can
phenomenology offer regarding systemic modifications—both practical and
ideological—to alter the system such that forensic evaluations involving children are
more supportive of the nuances of child experience/memory?
One important way phenomenology could inform the current dominant discourse
about child memory/experience in the legal system is by softening the complete focus on
“fact-truth” to include room for “experiential truth(s)” in child accounts as well. This is
not to suggest a total disregard for fact-truth, but rather to instruct evaluators and the
system at large to consider children’s accounts also in terms of experiential truth. This
may hold particular bearing when the memories in question include those of trauma,
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bodily trauma, and especially sexual abuse. Viewing these experiences as exceptionally
conflicted for children in terms of temporality and affect affords greater sensitivity to the
fact that though they may not be recounted in ways that align with adult notions of
cognitive fact-truth, this need not invalidate the child’s narrative. In general, this would
require operating from a baseline position that there is truth in child narratives and then
taking thorough measures to investigate the specific nuances of what that truth might be.
In addition, approaching child experience on its own terms opens up opportunities to
bring in ways of respecting and valuing children’s non-verbal communication, perhaps
through art, behavior, and symbolic play. Again, it is important to recognize that one
would not be considering these modes of communication as relaying purely fact-truth,
but experiential truth as well.
There is some evidence that the manuals already recognize the limitations and
impossibility of attaining this fact-truth; introducing the notion of experiential truth as a
complementary consideration may be one way of mitigating this concern and better
representing a child’s experience. Experiential truth may also be a useful notion to bring
up in interviews with other people who know the child well. Asking the parents, teachers,
neighbors, siblings, or other individuals who are being interviewed as part of these
evaluations for their ideas about what a child might mean when s/he says “X,” or if from
their perspective an element of a child’s account might have a particular meaning for the
child could offer invaluable context to consider. Importantly, these ideas would need to
be considered not as supplanting or “correcting” the child’s account, but rather as
enriching them. Along similar lines, phenomenology suggests that inviting people with
whom a child feels familiar, comfortable, and secure (such as a non-offending parent) to
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share in the interviewing/evaluation process would better enable children to provide
accounts that most fully express their experience.
The handbooks also cite some research in support of this idea but fully enacting
this strategy would require a loosening of the discourse’s current conceptualization of the
evaluator as a neutral expert and subsequent prizing of this objective ideal and its
corresponding privilege of authority. Indeed, many of these amendments would require
unseating long held assumptions about children, childhood, memory, and human
experience more generally. To this end, another takeaway from accounting for the lived
experience of children’s remembering could be to find ways of appreciating children’s
experience on its own terms, rather than as an undeveloped version of adult experience.
Doing so would alleviate the current pressure on evaluators, researchers, the court, and
any other adults involved in forensic evaluations of children to determine the extent to
which a given child is able to give “reliable” testimony. Allowing for children’s direct
input in how evaluations proceedings unfold and following children’s lead whenever
possible could help challenge the current paradigm but again, it would necessitate some
dramatic ideological shifts. Given the hermeneutic grounding from which I conducted
this study, it is important to understand the discourse in the handbooks as embedded
within a particular socio-cultural context. The handbooks served as a means of accessing
this historical context, but they also function as producers of future contexts; that is,
readers’ beliefs and actions have been and will continue to be influenced by these texts
and their broader discourses. Thus in order to suggest modifications to the current legal
system, we must try to comprehend the particular challenges of enacting change in this
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setting, which requires some reflection on how this discourse came to be. To
meaningfully look forward, we must also look backward.
Socio-historical context of childhood and suggestibility. As I alluded to briefly
in my literature review, the meaning of childhood has changed over time (e.g. Aires,
1962; Hart, 1991; Simms, 2008; Smith, 2002). One way these fluctuations have
historically manifested is in laws and public policies involving children (Grossberg,
2012; Smart, 1999). As Hart (1991) summarizes, “prior to the 16th century most children
beyond six years of age were considered to be small adults and were not separated from
adults as a class. … Parents were accorded almost unlimited power over their children,
and the children were ignored, abandoned, abused, sold into slavery, and mutilated” (p.
53). During this time, children were largely viewed as property—with no rights to speak
of—a conceptualization that gradually softened over the next three centuries. By the time
the 19th century ushered in mass industrialization, the cultural discourse had begun to
recognize children as a special class, and the future of industry, a population vulnerable
enough to the threats of urbanization to foster “a child-saving era to assure the health and
welfare of children” (Hart, 1991, p. 53, emphasis in original). A defining aspect of this
era was the beginning of governmental, private, and religious agency intervention in
family life to protect children.
Early common law followed a similar trajectory, with children initially being
deemed “incompetent to testify because of their presumed inability to remember and
describe events accurately” (Haugaard, Reppucci, Laird, & Nauful, 1991, p. 255). This
changed formally in 1895, when the Supreme Court ruled that “the admissibility of
[young children’s] testimony should be determined by the trial judge on a case-by-case
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basis through an examination of the child” (Haugaard et al., 1991, p. 255). Shortly
thereafter, the world saw the advent of juvenile court, first in Chicago in 1899; by 1919,
there was at least one juvenile court in 47 states (Myers, 2008). Cultural and legal efforts
to protect “vulnerable” children continued to proliferate until the 1940s, when post-World
War II attitudes concerning children began to shift again:
In reaction to a society too paternalistic in its handling of children and lacking
respect for the basic integrity of children in their own right, children were
declared "persons" under the law (Tinker v. Des Moines, 1969). They were
assured due process in juvenile courts and, under some conditions, were
recognized to be competent and worthy of limited freedoms. (Hart, 1991, p. 54,
emphasis in original)
Indeed, the tumultuous decades following World War II saw the expansion of civil rights
for many marginalized populations, and children were no exception. By the 1980s,
however, various cultural factors caused the dominant discourse on childhood to change
once more (Grossberg, 2012; Myers, 2008), and in ways that continue to impact our
current legal system and the handbooks in this study.
These vacillations reveal a longstanding conundrum that children have presented
in the forensic system and more broadly: how can we best understand and support people
who are autonomous even as they are profoundly dependent on others? In general, it
seems that laws and policy have swung back and forth between emphasizing these two
features of child experience, reflecting whichever conceptualization more dominated the
public discourse at the time. This pattern is described as alternating between children’s
“protection rights” and “self-determination rights” (Hart, 2001), “protection” and “rights
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to self-expression and inclusion in decisionmaking” (Cascardi, Brown, Shpiegel, &
Alvarez, 2015), and “protection” and “autonomy” (Melton, 2008). Grossberg (2012)
explains that these two contrasting conceptions of childhood have a long history of
existing in tension in the United States, and helpfully draws on the work of British
political philosopher David Archard in terming them the “caretaking” and the
“liberationist.” These ideologies differ most in their “understandings of children’s
competence, capacity, and maturity,” (Grossberg, 2012, p. 20).
Grossberg (2012) demonstrates how in the late 1970s, a caretaking understanding
of children’s rights resurfaced, reflecting a number of socio-cultural changes (e.g. women
joining the workforce, a spike in divorce rates, high profile cases of child abuse and
abduction) that contributed to a view of children as inherently vulnerable, incompetent,
and dependent on adults. (Notably, the events that spurred the McMartin preschool trial
and its ensuing concern about child suggestibility began in 1983.) The caretaking
discourse was bolstered throughout the 1990s by instances such as the exposure of mass
child abuse by Catholic priests and the Columbine High School shooting. Also, the rise of
technology, including the Internet, fueled societal anxieties about children’s safety and
moral corruption. Grossberg (2012) describes that legally, this return to caretaking is
evident in examples including states raising the legal drinking age, the Supreme Court
enforcing stricter censorship on student speech and expression, and imposing restrictions
on medical rights:
As part of a broader effort to restrict abortion and to increase the control of
parents over the sexual decisions of their daughters, state legislatures passed
increasingly stringent parental notification laws despite earlier decisions
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expanding teenagers’ abortion rights. By 2008, thirty-five states mandated some
form of parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision. Though the laws
varied, most ordered pregnant teens to include one or both parents in the decision
to terminate a pregnancy. (Grossberg, 2012, p. 34-35)
In considering this timeline, it is worth remembering that the handbooks I used in this
study were published in 2007 and 2013, very much in the midst of this caretaking
atmosphere.
The history of how child eyewitnesses and child testimony has been taken up in
the legal system is similarly intertwined with shifts in the public discourses involving
childhood. Again, Motzkau (2007) cites numerous sources tracing public skepticism
about child witness reliability back to the Salem witch trials in the 1690s. Suggestibility
as a concept, however, did not gain traction until the late 1880s, when it became a central
research topic for pioneering psychologists including Wilhelm Wundt and Albert Binet
(Motzkau, 2005). The initial prominence of suggestibility, however, was relatively shortlived:
While memory remained a central topic, the interest in suggestibility waned in the
early twentieth century, and between the 1950s and the late 1970s suggestibility
vanished completely from the scientific agenda. … Suggestibility only reemerged as a research topic in the 1980s in the context of the growing concern
over children’s evidence in sexual abuse cases. (Motzkau, 2010, p. 67)
Indeed, because child sexual abuse is “the most frequent reason for children to be called
as witnesses in criminal courts” (Motzkau, 2007, p. 4), the history of child testimony is
largely a history of the public discourses surrounding child sexual abuse. Though there is
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some evidence to the contrary (e.g. Smart, 1999), there is general consensus that attention
to child sexual abuse as a rampant problem in need of legal and societal addressing really
rose to prominence in the public discourse of the 1970s (MacMartin, 1999; Motzkau,
2007; Myers, 2008) (contributing to a resurgence of the caretaking ideology). This was
also the same decade that Elizabeth Loftus was conducting her landmark work that called
into question the assumed reliability of eyewitness testimony.
This history helps put into context the reliance on child witnesses in the McMartin
trial and others like it, as well as the backlash triggered when children’s accounts were
called into question as having been the product of suggestive interviewing:
Driven by the climate of intense concern about child abuse, parents and
professionals had been absolutely convinced something must have happened, and
this spurred their (well intentioned) eagerness to get a disclosure. These cases
sparked a sudden and intense research interest in children's suggestibility, a topic
that had so far not been on the scientific agenda at all. (Motzkau, 2007, p. 6)
As discussed in my literature review and in the handbooks themselves, this research,
while prolific, is marked by contradicting and inconclusive findings. Nevertheless, its
prominence both reflected and fuelled the narrative that children’s vulnerability to
suggestion is of primary concern when determining their credibility. Taking this sociohistorical background into account, we can see that what adults expect from children (and
childhood) unavoidably influences how we interpret the veracity of children’s memories
in a forensic context and beyond.
Assuming, as does Grossberg (2012), that our current society still leans more
heavily towards a caretaking attitude, what would the adult co-constituting this society
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habitually expect child memory to look like? What does twenty-first century America
expect from children, including their memories, and how do these assumptions influence
what we then experience? Through this caretaking lens, it makes sense that children
would tend to be viewed by adults as naively vulnerable to influences from the outside
world. According to the suggestibility framework, this influence would in turn easily taint
the veracity of their remembered accounts. However, since children are likely to struggle
with fact-truth, they will therefore paradoxically depend on responsible adults to educate
them about the world and to coax forth “accurate” memories. One possible result of this
dynamic is that children’s memories often will be interpreted as unreliable and flawed,
i.e., factually untruthful. Another result, however, is to position evaluators as neutral,
objective, and balanced, thereby enabling them to accurately assess for competency,
reliability, and truth in child accounts, even if the manuals are careful to state that
evaluators are not the ultimate decision makers in a given case. Indeed, as views about
children’s competency have shifted, so have views about adults’ role in determining that
competency. Inquiring about experiential truth, moving towards understanding
experience as “intersubjective” rather than “biased,” and being open to sharing some
evaluator responsibilities with the important others in children’s lives are all efforts that
could contribute to better aligning this current dynamic with children’s experience.
Reviewing the socio-cultural history of childhood and child testimony also affords
context to the reigning inclination to define child experience in comparison to adult
experience, a tendency that informs so many aspects of the forensic handbook version of
reality. This occurrence seems to be one byproduct of childhood gaining status as
different from adulthood, and then adults believing that population is one that should be
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more protected, held accountable, or both. In addition, because babies and young children
are dependent on adults in very concrete ways, there is a perpetual power differential,
with adults having the authority to generate discourses and enforce their corresponding
laws and policies and children largely subject to them. I am aware that in some ways I
speak as a product of the caretaking ideology that has been dominant throughout my
lifetime, but I certainly want to be clear that I am not advocating for adults to shirk their
responsibilities to care for and protect children. That being said, I also recognize the ways
that an unexamined adult-centric system operates according to what adults
assume/perceive/believe is “best” or “right” for children, often guided by the implicit
presumption that children are too immature to know what is “best” or “right” for
themselves.
One way to change this is quite simple, at least in theory: involve children more in
the decisions about the forensic evaluation processes in which they are involved. Inquire
about their feelings and preferences, and take their input seriously. Have ongoing
interactions that include opportunities for verbal and non-verbal expression, and allow
children space to change their minds or be uncertain. The goal of doing so isn’t to have
children take full control over their situations per se, but to make these difficult,
complicated processes as collaborative as possible. One could think of this different
position as adults ceding some of their power, a difficult practice for even the best
intentioned, but another way to conceptualize it is as wielding one’s power in a way that
is more supportive of children.
How can these changes be implemented? Another takeaway from this historical
reflection is that although discourses about childhood and child testimony are transient,

152

systemic change takes time. It seems probable that a return to a liberationist
conceptualization of childhood, or at least a 21st century version of one, is imminent, but
of course the future is impossible to predict. Based on my study findings, however, it
seems that if we want to work towards amending the current dominant discourse, one
place to start is in the forensic assessment manuals. Educating the adults involved in
these cases—evaluators, but also judges, juries, lawyers, police investigators, social
workers, parents, etc.—about alternative ways of viewing and honoring the particularities
of child experience/memory could have monumental impact. Doing so could spur
changes in protocols, policy, and public discourse that are beyond even my speculation at
this point. Because these manuals rely so heavily on research literature, drawing on
research that supports more child-centric practices seems to be one way for forensic
evaluations involving children to become more aligned with child needs.
The area of child advocacy offers many studies in support of taking children’s
perspectives seriously (e.g. Cascardi et al., 2015; Smith, 2002), as does psychology (e.g.
Hart, 1991; Motzkau, 2007). Psychological Evaluations for the Courts lead author Gary
Melton himself has published numerous works advocating for a more comprehensive
approach to child services, including increased child participation (e.g. Melton, 1999;
Melton, 2008). Still, while the forensic manuals in my study were in many ways sensitive
to the complexities of evaluations involving children, their account remains largely adultcentric, especially where child memory is concerned. This appears to reflect the degree to
which the suggestibility model of memory maintains dominance in these handbooks and
the research from which they draw. As discussed in my analysis section, both manuals
staunchly advocate for additional research, frequently after presenting conflicting or
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inconclusive findings from empirical suggestibility studies. Instead of encouraging
additional studies with the same assumptions about child memory and experience,
research that offers an alternative perspective of child memory and experience—such as
phenomenology—could shed new light on ways to support children in forensic contexts.
While there is currently some research of this nature already available for the manual
authors to draw upon, these studies number nowhere near the prolific oeuvre of studies
that use a suggestibility framework. Clearly, there is more work to be done.
Contextualizing My Findings: Comparable Studies
Despite this apparent disproportion in the existing literature, my project and its
findings certainly do not exist in isolation—they participate in a larger body of research.
Thus it is important to recognize that another means of hermeneutically contextualizing
my work is to place my findings in dialogue with what other researchers have discovered
about ways that child experience and memory are discursively constructed. Considering
my work within this broader research context also affords the opportunity to uncover
possible alternative and conflicting interpretations of the phenomena in question. (This
endeavor also enhances the study’s rigor by serving as a further validity check.) Because
discourse analyses of child memory and experience in the United States legal system are
quite rare, here I also engage with the findings from other discursive studies of related
aspects of children’s experience and compare them to my own.
Findings from non-forensic child discursive studies. As I discuss in my
literature review, while there are few other discourse analyses focusing on children’s
accounts in the United States legal system, discursive studies of children in other contexts
offer useful findings for comparison. Bergnehr and Nelson (2015), for example, use
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discourse analysis to study how children are positioned in research articles on mental
health intervention. Similar to my motivations for the sample selection of this study, the
authors describe selecting their dataset in part because, “it is of great relevance to
investigate the conceptualisations [sic] of children and children’s health found in texts
that have high societal status and are likely to have an influence on praxis” (p. 187,
emphasis mine). The authors find variation across the ten articles they study, with some
“instances in which children are positioned as active subjects, their opinions are in focus,
and their health and wellbeing are connected to social relations and context” (p. 184).
These examples prove to be exceptions, however; the study describes a general
positioning of children as “passive and formed by adults” (p. 186) within this discourse.
Though the discourse in forensic assessment manuals here does not employ the language
of passivity and agency in its construction of child memory/experience, this sentiment is
comparable to the ways the handbooks describe (and assess) child experience in relation
to the standard of adult experience.
Along similar lines, Bergnehr and Nelson (2015) also find that in the mentalhealth article discourse, “Children’s participatory rights are restricted vis-à-vis adults due
to their ‘immaturity,’ that is, their age” (p. 186). The forensic manuals in my study
similarly position children as deficient because of their immaturity, and charge evaluators
with determining the extent to which a child’s participation (e.g. testimony) is appropriate
for a case. Still, the immaturity the handbooks describe is more related to cognitive
abilities than numeric age (despite a frequent correlation between the two factors). Lastly
for the purposes of this discussion, Bergnehr and Nelson (2015) furthermore note a
somewhat paradoxical treatment of children in the discourse they study as being formed
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by adults but not influenced by their situated contexts. They describe, “Most of the texts
do not reflect global ambitions to consider children’s experiences and objectives, … or
sociology of childhood perspectives on health and wellbeing as contextualised [sic] and
relational” (p. 192). This sentiment is echoed in the forensic handbooks, which draw on a
suggestibility framework to present children as at risk of undue outside influence without
emphasizing the fundamental interrelatedness of child experience.
The intersubjectivity of children’s experience is a theme that emerges in studies
that focus on discourses about children as well as on children’s discourses themselves.
MacMartin (1999) for example, argues that children’s disclosures of sexual abuse are
best honored as discourses because doing so offers an effective means of appropriately
underscoring the intersubjective nature of a disclosure and child experience more
broadly. She explains, “a discursive approach to children’s reports of sexual abuse treats
disclosure as talk, emphasizing the historical, cultural and communal processes involved
in its production” (p. 504-505). (Johanna Motzkau, whose work will be discussed here
shortly, often adopts a discursive approach to child suggestibility in forensic settings and
explicitly cites MacMartin as a key influence.) Edwards (1993), too, emphasizes the
interrelatedness of child experience in his discursive study of children’s knowledge. Here
Edwards (1993) performs a discourse analysis of classroom talk between a teacher and a
kindergarten class to explore conceptual content in children’s talk. He concludes that
children’s discourse is “social-psychological” (p. 211, emphasis in original), and
therefore its particulars are determined by children’s previous experiences and contexts,
as well as the circumstances of their recounting:
We can study how children's explanations are derived from and are subjected to a
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discursive process, so that the psychology of conceptual development would at
the very least be unwise to ignore how concepts are culturally derived, culturally
formulated (in words that make sense to a common culture), and culturally
processed, in that their articulation is called for and takes shape within
organization and conventions of current talk and action. (p. 219-220)
As in a phenomenological perspective, Edwards’ (1993) embrace of the cultural
embeddedness of child (and human) experience as given dovetails easily with his
expansion of truth in discourse from a binary entity to a perspectival one. Though he does
not use the term “experiential truth,” Edwards (1993) concludes, “It is not so much a
matter of lies and deceit but of taking seriously the content of what [children] say for
what it tells us about what they think, know, or believe” (p. 209).
In addition, Edwards (1993) speaks specifically about the role of memory in
understanding how children think, reporting some instances in which it appears that the
children in his analysis are “remembering somebody else’s words rather than …
formulating their own conceptual understandings” (p. 213). He wrestles with the
possibility that these memories are clouding his pursuit of analyzing children’s “original”
thoughts, but quickly dismisses this notion in light of the primacy of memory in
experience and therefore in discourse, stating, “it is not clear that there ever could be a
discourse without remembering. All discourse has a history” (p. 213). He goes on to
remind readers that memory, and verbalized memory in particular, “is not merely a
reduplication of experience, altered not only by error and omission but also rich in
constructive and reconstructive conceptualizations where reports and repetitions are
altered, embellished, schematized, and imbued with the psychological and
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communicational concerns of the rememberer” (p. 213). Here, as in the discourse in the
training manuals, the malleability of children’s memory is acknowledged and afforded a
primary role in children’s narratives. Unlike in the handbooks, however, this fluidity is
not problematized as yielding distorted accounts, but rather taken as an invitation to
approach children’s responses through a different lens that better aligns with their
experience. Therefore, in keeping with my own findings, Edwards’ (1993) work affirms
that 1) children are suggestible by nature, and 2) this suggestibility need not invalidate or
discredit their experience.
In their discourse analysis of children’s interview responses, Aronsson and
Hundeide (2002) argue these points even more fervently. After analyzing children’s
responses to adults’ examination questions (questions designed to test children), the
authors conclude that “children’s interview responses should be read in terms of a
relational rationality” (p. 174, emphasis in original). In other words, when responding to
interview questions formulated and posed by adults, children follow a logic that is rooted
in their relational allegiances and motivations, as opposed to the “scientific rationality”
(p. 174) on which adults base their own answers and standards for judging children’s.
Though Aronsson and Hundeide (2002) propose that children communicate in particular
ways different from adults, they do not attribute these divergences to cognitive
immaturity (as in the forensic training manuals) or an acute existence in the phenomenal
realm (as do phenomenological perspectives). Instead, they place social desires/needs as
primary for children, and thus attribute children’s thinking and response patterns as in
service of addressing those desires/needs. They state, for example, “To the young child, it
can be more important to be part of a dominant group than to be truthful in terms of
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scientific norms” (p. 181) and that, “‘immature’ responses can be understood in terms of
children’s desire to please the interviewer” (p. 174). This notion introduces another
alternative explanation for a phenomenon that has been identified in both this discourse
as well as that of the forensic handbooks: challenges arise when using adult standards to
interpret children’s language.
Yet again, these challenges complicate the conceptualization of truth as binary.
Aronsson and Hundeide (2002) might not use the phenomenological phrasing of facttruth and experiential truth, but they make a similar comparison between logic that stems
from the “deductive logic and correspondence norms of scientific rationality” (p. 182)
and their proposed relational rationality. They explain, “A relational rationality can be
seen as a sensitive attunement to the attunement of others. We have a feeling about what
other persons expect and want. Truth values do not form the essence of the tacit metacontract of the conversation, and we adjust our comments to what seems appropriate
according to local alignments.” (p. 182) Here once more, the authors offer a proposal that
truth transcends the question of scientific, factual accuracy and instead reflects the
intimate and intersubjective reality of the child respondent. For Aronsson and Hundeide
(2002), this reality is fundamentally a relational one, to the extent that a child’s truth will
adapt based on the child’s attunement to the expectations and desires of the adults in
question. The suggestibility framework in the handbooks also accounts for this possibility
(as do phenomenological perspectives), but in a way that presents this dynamic as a
dangerous, deeply problematic distortion that is to be avoided. To speak this particular
relational truth according to the manuals’ version of reality is essentially to lie, a
phenomenon Aronsson and Hundeide (2002) blatantly acknowledge:
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In several different dialogue genres in modern schooled societies—family
argumentation, psychological experiments, police interviews, clinical testing
situations—children have other agendas than their adult co-participants.
Traditionally, young children’s responses have been classified as unreliable,
suggestible, or at worst untruthful. We argue that their response modes can instead
be understood in terms of different notions of what communication is about, a
relational rather than a scientific rationality. (p. 184-185)
Whereas the handbook discourse locates the problem in the child and instructs evaluators
to exercise techniques to enhance children’s memories and minimize suggestive
influences, Aronsson and Hundeide (2002) implicate problematic societal structures and
recommend adjusting the lens through which adults view children’s interview responses.
Findings from forensic child discursive studies. In addition to discursive
studies focusing on children in a variety of contexts, there are some studies that use
discourse analysis to explore children’s experience in legal settings in particular. In their
theoretical paper, Blank and Ney (2006) apply Foucaultian theories to the legal and
medical discourses in high-conflict divorce litigation, with particular interest in how
children are positioned. They present “a discursive examination of two formulations often
employed by psychologists, psychiatrists, mediators, and lawyers to deal with and explain
high-conflict divorce cases: “parental alienation” and “child alienation” (p. 137). As in
the discourse employed by forensic manuals, Blank and Ney (2006) emphasize the
weight that evaluations carry in the discourses they study. Nevertheless, the handbooks
appear more greatly concerned with establishing and maintaining the neutrality of the
evaluator despite the pressures that come with needing to offer consequential
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recommendations to the court. Blank and Ney (2006), instead contend that the reality of
power dynamics and a legal system that does not easily allow for ambiguity blurs the line
between evaluator and decision-maker that the manuals so fervently delineate, stating,
“Significant pressure is put on those who produce such assessments to arrive at a
formulation that has the unambiguous clinical authority to fit with the court’s need to
administer—legislate—a ruling (p. 135). They further explore the implications of the
black-and-white, binary thinking that dominates both the medical and legal discourses at
play in child custody cases, concluding that this rigidity aligns poorly with human
experience:
Neither the medical nor legal systems are efficient at working in gray areas of
human complexities, yet our culture chooses to value them over other realms. The
dynamics and nuances of the situation are either ignored, lost, or forced into the
simplistic dichotomies and oppositions. Unfortunately, a more flexible and
mutually compliable construction of the conflict is denied and obscured in order
to legislate “right” from “wrong.” (p. 141)
Furthermore, the authors find that an important consequence of this way of thinking is
that it forecloses opportunity to honor individual experience—especially that of children,
who are already subjugated within these adult-centric systems. They conclude, “The
child’s narrative (her/his personal discourse) is often co-opted or marginalized by these
competing and dominant discourses; here, agency is lost” (p. 139).
While these patterns resonate with my findings about how child memory is taken
up in forensic manuals, Blank and Ney (2006) notice a greater emphasis on pathology
and medicalization in their study than seems apparent in the handbooks I analyzed.
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Specifically, they draw attention to the power of the “iatrogenic features of these
discourses” (p. 135) in diminishing children’s position and agency. This topic was largely
absent in the handbooks, which do not offer instructions regarding diagnoses or other
means of potential pathologizing. If anything, the manuals advise exercising caution
before interpreting symptoms of the parties being evaluated or the results of
psychological tests that offer diagnostic implications. They also direct evaluators to avoid
drawing unwarranted causal conclusions between apparent symptoms and their
behavioral implications (e.g. the relationship between parental depression and child
neglect)—this is one example of the discourse pattern of remaining aware of the
limitations of one’s knowledge and expertise. It is possible that an emphasis on pathology
may be greater in manuals that are devoted entirely to child testimony and take up issues
like parental alienation in more depth, but I did not find this tendency to be a part of the
general discourse to a significant degree.
Though Blank and Ney (2006) offer comparative insight regarding child
experience in the United States legal system, a number of studies by Johanna Motzkau
explore areas most similar to my own research presented in this project. Motzkau’s (e.g.,
2005, 2007, 2010, 2011) work uses discursive theory and methods to specifically address
questions about how children’s memory is constructed in forensic settings (albeit those in
Britain and Germany), taking into account socio-historical factors as well as practical
applications and implications. Across her work in this area, Motzkau finds that
suggestibility concerns dominate many discourses concerning child memory, despite
discrepancies that arise in the research literature in this area. For example, she
summarizes:
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Intense controversies around memory development, children’s suggestibility and
the influence of different interview styles have continued to dominate both
research and practice. In particular, the question of children’s suggestibility has
sparked an immense research interest, resulting in a number of studies that have
produced valuable insights into the possible developmental, circumstantial and
personal factors underlying children’s propensity to succumb to suggestions.
However, research in this field faces various problems. When the findings are
subject to close scrutiny, it becomes clear that suggestibility research is riddled
with what appear to be contradictory results. (Motzkau, 2005, p. 201)
Both this dominance as well as the contradictory research findings in the area of
suggestibility are similarly reflected in the discourse in the forensic handbooks in my
study. In this particular article, Motzkau (2005) analyzes juridical, psychological, and
public discourses to conclude that “polarized and heated public debates about child
witnesses’ credibility and suggestibility” (p. 202) often distract from children’s actual
needs and wellbeing. In highlighting these reciprocal impacts among research, practice,
and public discourse, she furthermore elucidates the ways that child and adult
experience—and therefore memory—are inevitably intertwined, another pattern that
emerged in the handbooks as well. Motzkau (2005) even mentions the possibility that
children “can be as suggestive as they can be suggestible” (p. 204) with regard to ways
children may influence evaluators during the interview process.
Defining the implications of this interrelatedness as being problematic,
threatening, or invalidating for child memory is another pattern that Motzkau (2007)
identifies when “examining the interaction of legal rationales and paradigms of
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developmental psychology” (p. 1). In this exploration, however, she notes that children
are usually the locus of blame for this phenomenon that proves such a challenge to a
forensic system, and tend to be portrayed as passive and deficient. It becomes children’s
“fault” that retrieving reliable accounts from them is such a delicate and fraught ordeal:
Firstly, children are positioned as bad and unreliable containers of facts.
Information is seen to degenerate quickly in their minds and thus has to be
retrieved as quickly as possible. Secondly, children are seen be irritable
dispensers of information/evidence, as they are prone to misunderstand questions
and get confused and frightened by legal procedure. Hence they need to be treated
delicately and with great care when questioned. Thirdly children appear as
volatile interactants, that is, direct interaction with them bristles with reciprocal
effects and hazards of suggestion. (Motzkau, 2007, p. 6-7)
Here Motzkau not only discusses the positioning of children as lacking and the anxiety
about external influences distorting children’s memories, but also implies that in this
discourse memory is a mentalistic process—memory lives in the brain and optimal
circumstances must be upheld in order to retrieve an accurate recounting. Once again,
this conclusion echoes what is espoused in the legal handbooks analyzed in the study at
hand. In later work, Motzkau (2011) draws from a Deleuzian perspective to complicate
this conceptualization and return to emphasizing the relationality of memory. In stating,
“memory itself resides in the ongoing relationships between those involved” (p. 71) she
positions memory as a relational process rather than a mental one. This move in turn
serves to de-problematize the notion of suggestibility, shifting it from a hazardous threat
to an inherent inevitability. As in the phenomenological construction of memory,
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Motzkau (2011) reasons that because human experience is by nature interconnected with
others, memory shares this fundamental relatedness. She explains, “In relation to the
self/subject suggestibility could be said to express (constitute) the self/subject as the
result of instants of knowing in the process of relating” (p. 71).
Though there is much overlap among Motzkau’s contributions in this area and the
version of reality espoused in the forensic assessment manuals (and complementary
phenomenological perspectives), there are also instances when Motzkau identifies
different patterns or draws new conclusions not previously accounted for in my work. To
start, with the historical rise of suggestibility in the discourse of child memory, Motzkau
(2010) names a shift in focus from “potential deficits in memory encoding or storage to
the instant of remembering as such, i.e. attention is directed to the expression of memory.
Now the concrete conditions under which remembering is called for and occurs, and the
circumstances under which memory is reported, become key to legal considerations of
accuracy and credibility.” (p. 70). This shift is not especially evident, however, in the
manuals in the current study, which appear to caution against the impact of external
influence at any stage of the cognitive memory process, and discuss children’s potential
deficits in memory encoding and storage as well as retrieval. Motzkau (2010, 2011) also
concludes that this discourse’s emphasis on suggestibility implies that children are not in
control of their own memories. This angle varies slightly from the manuals, which state
instead that memory in general is difficult for anybody to control. Nevertheless, the
amount of common ground among my work and these studies generally offers support for
the validity of many of my findings.
There are some patterns, however, that I have identified as emerging in the
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discourse in these forensic handbooks that do not seem to be reflected in any of the
similar discursive research I have found. None of these studies discuss an emphasis on
caution when engaging with these topics or practices, and relatedly there is much less
emphasis on maintaining neutrality and balance in these discourses than I saw in the
manuals. Finally, whereas I read the handbook discourse as often describing memory in
terms of performance, this or similar framing did not appear in any of the other studies.
One possibility for these divergences could be my focus on instances when the manuals
offered instructions to evaluators. This distinguishing aspect of my study may have given
rise to these themes, which simply may not apply in a significant way within the contexts
of the other works references here. Alternatively, it is possible that these patterns are less
robust or supported in this area than I believed them to be upon conducting my analysis,
perhaps because of a methodological shortcoming, problems with procedural execution,
misreading and/or interpretation, or some combination thereof. Of course, I bring my
own frame of reference to any endeavor I undertake, and it is also possible that this
perspective has caused me to drift too far from the data in some cases. I turn now to a
more in-depth examination of this latter possibility as I attempt to address the ways my
personal experience conducting this research may have hermeneutically impacted the
process and product.
Personal Reflexivity
To help validate that my findings are grounded in the data rather than solely in my
preconceived assumptions, I turn now to an exploration of my personal experience while
engaging with this research. Though I acknowledge that it is impossible to entirely access
and track these experiences, it is my hope that this exercise in reflexivity (however

166

inherently incomplete) will serve as a means of better understanding how my situated
perspective may influence the findings I have presented. I embark on this process from
the position that pure objectivity is illusory, but by elaborating on my personal process as
transparently as possible I can again invite readers to think along with me about the ways
that my perspective has inexorably impacted the product I am presenting. In order to
track my own process of drawing conclusions as I engaged in this research, I recorded my
experience in a journal, taking particular note of questions that arose for me, as well as
moments of frustration, anger, excitement, and shifts in my thinking.
I have already touched on the issue that spurred the first moment of surprise and,
quite frankly, panic, as I began my data collection: the text of the handbooks was not
phrased as explicit instructions nearly to the degree I had been expecting. This discovery
forced me to sincerely question whether my project would remain viable; I had designed
this study carefully around the assumption that these training manuals would be
structured as predominantly instructive, and an absence of directions would seriously
jeopardize my proposed methodology. In considering how I might need to amend my
procedures, however, I was able to approach the text in a new way, to think deeply about
what makes language instructive and to table some assumptions I did not realize I had
been making. As I elaborate in my analysis section, I realized that the handbooks were
offering instructions, but not always in the ways that I had imagined, and in fact that a
tendency to soften explicit directions could be an important observation to further
unpack. Nevertheless, this experience helped me to recognize the extent to which I
imagined the discourse in these manuals to be authoritarian, rigid, and certain, and alerted
me to be aware of a potential pull to overstate these qualities during my analysis.
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Instead of offering clear, step-by-step advisements to evaluators working on cases
involving children, as I had imagined, I was also surprised to find that the authors of both
handbooks instead structured their text largely around synthesizing empirical research
studies. While this occurrence was interesting to me, it also caused frustration in a
number of ways. In terms of pragmatics, aside from complicating my procedures by
challenging my preconceived notions of how the text would appear, I also found that
these references could make the manuals dry to read and tedious to transcribe. During
one particularly long day of data collection, I grew angry that what I perceived to be the
handbooks’ overreliance on research was subsequently rooting these texts too firmly in
intellectualized academia and inappropriately removing them from the realm of
experience and practice. Once more, my irritation brought to light my preconceived
expectations of what I believed these manuals should include and the standards by which
I was habitually judging them. It also showed the possibility of a personal tendency to
value the practical over the theoretical.
The further I delved into my analysis, however, the more my thinking shifted
from this aggravation to an appreciation of the thoroughness and nuance this research
instilled within the account. I began to see the ways the handbook authors were sensitive
to the complexities of these cases and the issues they encompass, and would even start to
feel excited when I noticed places of apparent hesitation to offer firm directives,
especially regarding child experience. I most frequently noted feeling excited, however,
when I saw an area of the discourse constructing child experience/memory that I believed
could be enhanced by a suggestibility perspective. The altruistic motivation behind my
pleasure is that I was—and am—enthusiastic about ways that child experience might be
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better supported in the forensic system, and hopeful that phenomenology can offer one
means of doing so. The self-serving aspect of my excitement, however, was a mix of
relief that my study could continue in the direction I had generally proposed, and
gratification that the data appears to affirm some of the hypotheses and hunches that have
guided my interest in this topic and led me to this study in the first place.
Even as I am hopeful, however, my process journal also reveals a fair amount of
discouragement and confusion. This project has been a resounding demonstration that
there are not easy answers to the difficult and complicated questions that have spurred my
work in this area and continue to persist. These are questions like: Is it possible for the
United States legal system to better meet children’s needs? Is it possible for adults to
understand child experience? Will our society’s view of child experience as immature
adult experience ever shift, and what factors would facilitate change? How can any
system effectively balance institutional needs (e.g. upholding legal precedent) with
individual needs? It feels important to recognize that these sorts of questions and their
corresponding air of despondency were present for me throughout my engagement in this
work. They are indications that I was seldom unaware of the scope of the issues in my
study, and of the socio-cultural history and implications discourse analyses comprise.
Though I cannot control how my study will be taken up in the future, it is my hope that
my work can be used to inform how child accounts are currently understood in forensic
settings such that our legal system might support children more fully.
What This Study Does Not Do: Limitations and Areas for Future Research
My discourse analysis of forensic assessment manuals’ instructions to people
conducting evaluations involving children has yielded much to be considered, there are
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also limitations to my work, areas that my study could not or did not cover. Many of
these limitations were determined as I decided the text on which to focus my analysis.
For example, I selected general, broad-scope forensic handbooks to address questions
about the broader discourse of child experience in forensic manuals; studying handbooks
whose sole topic was evaluating children could offer significant nuance and depth to this
conversation, or possibly contrasting findings. In addition, my decision to analyze only
sections of the handbooks pertaining to children largely excluded sections specifically
devoted to adolescents and the juvenile court system. This limited the generalizability of
my findings, which do not speak to this swath of the population or area of evaluator
work. The same can be said regarding education assessments, a context in which
evaluators frequently engage with children. While omitting these topics from my study
allowed for a body of text that best aligned with my research questions, there is every
reason to believe that discourses related to adolescent experience in the forensic system,
juvenile court, and education evaluations could serve as rich and important areas of
further inquiry.
Furthermore, analyzing written texts allowed for insight about a particular kind of
formal discourse, but distanced my study from the experiential richness and nuances that
interview transcripts and human participants can provide. These interviews can be
appreciated not only on a content level but also viewed through a critical lens to help
recognize the implicit assumptions, systemic power structures, and other factors at play in
creating the current dynamic. This issue is particularly relevant in light of my conclusion
that adopting more child-centric practices could have important consequences for
changing our current societal tendency to consider children as lacking adults. Working
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directly with children to learn more about their experiences of these evaluations could
offer crucial insight. (Efforts to find ways of bringing children’s voices to the forefront of
traditionally adult-centric endeavors are already underway [e.g. Alldred, 1998; Dixit,
2018]). In terms of conducting research to inform best practices and hopefully be
included in future manuals, however, interviewing any of the numerous parties involved
in forensic cases with child evaluations could be quite useful. Speaking with evaluators
themselves, as well as parents, judges, lawyers, police investigators, jury members, adults
who served as child witnesses, and many other groups could lend invaluable perspective.
This knowledge could continue to inform our broader understandings of how and why
children are treated as they are in forensic settings, as well as practices that appear to be
working and areas for improvement. One can hope that by the time the next handbook
editions are being drafted, there will be a wider, more visible array of varied research
from which the authors may draw.
Indeed, my study provides fertile ground for many areas of related further inquiry.
That being said, when speaking about the limitations of my research, the things that my
study did not do, I believe it is also important to recognize some limitations of research
more generally. It is certainly valuable to continue asking questions about how children
can be best supported in the forensic system, which will of course include queries about
how children remember. I would argue that studies focusing on the children’s experience
and research that does not assume a suggestibility model of memory are especially
underrepresented and as such have much to contribute to this conversation. However,
perhaps another implication of adopting a phenomenological approach to child memory
and experience is the uncomfortable reality that no quantity of research or perfect study
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design will get evaluators to a point where they able to determine the fact-truth of
children’s testimonies with total, unequivocal certainty. No matter how much research we
do, that sort of objectivity simply does not appear meaningful within the structures of
human memory and child experience, a difficult realization to sit with and accept. Still, it
is only by acknowledging this challenge that we can begin to imagine and implement a
forensic system—and society—that is more fully supportive of children.
Conclusion: Answers and Questions
In the preceding discourse analysis, I have presented a number of findings with
regard to the ways two widely-used forensic assessment handbooks understand child
memory and experience, as well as how they instruct evaluators to approach these topics.
These manuals tend to present the ideal evaluator as humble, cautious, objective,
balanced, and thoroughly knowledgeable about case documents as well as research
literature. It appears that one major reason these qualities are afforded so much value is
that the manuals describe children as fundamentally vulnerable to undue external
influence because of their cognitive and linguistic “immaturity” when compared to adult
standards. This narrative is in keeping with the dominant suggestibility model of
memory, and therefore becomes especially pertinent to the context of child testimony.
The handbooks and their conclusions are products of myriad socio-historical factors, even
as they simultaneously contribute to current and future discourses, as well as current
enacted practices. Still, even though the handbook authors draw on copious child memory
research assuming a suggestibility framework, they are also quite transparent about gaps,
contradictions, and limitations in this body of literature, and consequently often avoid
stating firm conclusions.
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A phenomenological approach comprises many of the same notions about the
fluidity of child memory and experience, but in this context these qualities are not
deemed problematic deficiencies, as they are in legal settings. This is in part because
phenomenology conceptualizes children as existing more phenomenally than cognitively,
and does not prioritize a cognitive, “adult” orientation. Understanding experience in this
way challenges traditional, binary approaches to truth and ownership of a given memory.
Given these considerations, it seems that adopting a phenomenological perspective
probably will not make an evaluator’s job easier, or a case more clear—in fact in many
cases the opposite may come to pass. But after engaging with this study, I would argue
that doing so achieves a better alignment with child experience, thereby enabling steps
towards not understanding children according to adult standards. Therefore, incorporating
a phenomenological perspective into legal settings can offer one means of better
supporting children in forensic discourses, practices, and beyond.
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137
[6: Conducting
In the past 30 years, there has been a steady growth in the use of
Child Custody
psychologists and other mental health professionals in child custody
and Parenting
matters. Evaluations conducted by psychologists assist the court in
Evaluations
determining custody, decision making, access, and parenting plans
Intro]
when parents separate or divorce. At the same time, there has been an
increase in the number of books devoted to custody evaluations and
broader forensic psychology practice.
137
[6: Conducting
In considering the necessary ingredients of child custody and parenting
Child Custody
evaluation practice, there are many areas in which a psychologist (or
and Parenting
other mental health professional) must gain proficiency. At a
Evaluations
minimum, these include child development; qualities of parenting;
Intro]
divorce and the impact of the separation and divorce of families;
psychological assessment; and “special issues,” such as alienation of
children, domestic violence, child abuse, relocation law, family
dynamics in cases of extreme conflict, and personality dynamics that
contribute to that extreme and ongoing conflict. Finally, evaluators
need to have a thorough understanding of the ethical issues that
surface when undertaking these complex evaluations for families and
the courts.
137[6: Conducting
These evaluations are time and cost intensive and potentially intrusive
138
Child Custody
to the family, and they risk putting the children in the middle of their
and Parenting
parents’ conflicts. When ordered by the court to participate in an
Evaluations
evaluation, parents are subjected to multiple interviews, perhaps
Intro]
psychological testing, and exposure of their conflicts to teachers,
therapists, and other professionals. Children are interviewed and
observed in offices and their homes. This lengthy process typically
takes 3 to 4 months to complete and yields a report that is potentially
insightful and potentially damaging to the family.
138
[6: Conducting
Child custody and parenting evaluations are among the most difficult
Child Custody
and challenging of all psychological evaluations. Reasons for this
and Parenting
include:
Evaluations
 The number of people and relationships in the family to be
Intro]
evaluated.
 The different ages of the children.
 The range of possible psychopathology.
 The presence of significant situational factors affecting
psychological functioning.
 The limitations of psychological tests or interview methods
designed for the type of assessment.
 The changing nature of a child’s developmental or
psychological needs relative to future time-sharing plans.
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The expansive nature of individual questions a court may
have about a particular family.
In addition to these complexities, child custody evaluators must have
knowledge of relevant statues and case law.
[T]he Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Family Law
Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, designed to
provide guidance to those who perform child custody evaluations,
direct that psychologists should strive to gain and maintain specialized
knowledge, augment their existing skills, acquire sufficient
understanding of the specialized child custody literature, and remain
familiar with applicable legal standards in the relevant state in which
they practice.
The evaluation process is associated with a dramatically increased risk
of licensing complaints against the evaluator and is often stressful for
the examiner. Thus, evaluators must have the temperament to conduct
very comprehensive evaluations and recognize that they may be
subjected to anger from parents and an adversarial trial experience.
Distorted representations or accusations against the evaluator by one
or both parents are not uncommon, both in complaints to the court and
in complaints to licensing boards. Because serious allegations are
common to the types of cases that fail at mediation and other attempts
at settlement, the evaluator’s recommendations can have particularly
significant ramifications for the child’s future.
Although this chapter cannot address all of the issues relevant to child
custody and parenting evaluations, it focuses on these issues:
 The best interests of the child standard.
 The purpose of custody and parenting evaluations.
 Ethical considerations.
 Basic research the evaluator must know, especially about
children and the impact of divorce on children.
 Critical research in special issues, such as conflict between
parents, alienated children, domestic violence, sexual abuse,
and relocation.
 The process of custody and parenting evaluation.
 Critical issues in report writing.
It is incumbent on the child custody evaluator to be familiar with the
law that governs these issues as they pertain to child custody. In nearly
all 50 states and in most Western countries, laws related to the best
interests of the child guide decisions about child custody and parenting
plans (American Law Institute, 2002; Lewis, 2010). Few states define
the term best interests of the child, although many identify specific
factors that judges are to consider when making decisions about a
child’s best interests (e.g., Arizona Revised Statute 25-403; Colorado
Revised Statutes 14-10-124), leading some commentators to argue that
the best interests standard is not defined (Emery, Otto, & O’Donohue,
2005). Indeed, judges are afforded great latitude to order a parenting
plan that they decide is in the child’s best interests. Lewis (2010)
argued that “[t]he elegance of the [“best interest”] standard is the
simultaneous focus on both the needs of the particular child and, with
appropriate weight, the normative child development factors” (p.21).
In jurisdictions where the legislature has identified several specific
factors that the judge must consider, the weight assigned to each factor
is left to the court.
The evaluator’s task is to gather and present those psychological data
related to the best interests factors and answer the questions post by
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the court. In Arizona, for example, several best interests factors call for
psychological data to be gathered. They include:
 The wishes of the child as to custodian.
 The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the
child’s parent or parents, the child’s siblings, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests.
 The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.
 Which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and
meaningful continuing contact with the other parent.
 Whether one parent, both parents, or neither parent has
provided primary care of the child.
Although the evaluator gathers and analyzes data related to the best
interests factors, the judge reaches the ultimate determination of the
child’s best interests based on his or her discretion.
Regardless of whether a state has specific factors delineated in its best
interests statute or whether there is a presumption associated with a
particular factor, the ultimate decision about weighting of these factors
is unique to each family and is left to judicial discretion. When
completing an evaluation of a given family, the evaluator’s task is to
provide a rationale as to why different factors might be more or less
relevant with that particular family. This rationale, of course, will be
reflected in the analysis of the data gathered and in the
recommendations provided to the court. This analysis can assist the
judge in considering and weighting the issues.
The primary purpose of the evaluation is to assist the court in case a
settlement is not reached. Judges order child custody evaluations for a
variety of reasons. These can include those circumstances in which
there are significant allegations regarding drug and alcohol abuse,
family violence, or child abuse, or significant mental health problems.
Often a judge is presented with two parents, both of whom appear
good enough at parenting but who cannot agree on a parenting plan. At
other times, one or both parents appear to have significant problems.
Increasingly, judges look to mental health professionals to help
them understand complex psychological questions of attachment
between the child and his or her parents, sibling relationships, and
the developmental needs of children.
Judges may order a child custody evaluation to address the relevant
psychological factors associated with the relocation question. For
example, in California, judges frequently request the assistance of an
evaluator in a relocation case in order to provide information to the
court about the relevant psychological issues described in the
LaMusga decision (In re Marriage of LaMusga, 2004). Among the
many issues identified in the case were various factors the court would
likely consider in a relocation matter. This guidance from case law
also helps custody evaluators in California focus on those relevant
psychological issues. Similar case law decisions in other states would
guide custody evaluators as well.
Although judges are guided by the law in making decisions regarding
the best interests of children, they may look to the child custody
evaluator to assist in understanding the family dynamics and the
relevant psychological factors in order to reach a decision about what
is in the child’s best interests. In many ways, the neutrally appointed
child custody evaluator serves as a consultant to the judge, providing
critical data about the family for a better understanding of the family
dynamics and the needs of the children.

187

Recommend
(not
instructions)

Need (not
instruction)

Need (not
instruction)
Critical (not
instruction)

142

For the Family

142

For the Family

142

For the Family

143

For the Family

143

143

For the Family

143144

Ethical
Considerations
in Child
Custody
Evaluations

Obviously, these families do not need to undergo an evaluation, nor
would the court order one. In fact, given the potentially intrusive
nature of child custody evaluations, in such situations it is highly
likely that an evaluation would be harmful to the family.
The primary value of an evaluation in these circumstances is that the
evaluation provides an opportunity for parents to voice their concerns
to a neutral expert. A neutrally appointed child custody evaluator will
spend considerable time with both parents trying to understand their
concerns and their perceptions of their child’s needs. This can be
comforting to parents and sometimes serves as a catalyst for them to
move toward cooperation.
By listening to children, evaluators can also identify when they are
caught in a loyalty conflict between their parents and describe the
impact of this conflict to the parents and the court. It is common for
children’s voices to be absent in the courts in the United States, and
participation in a child custody evaluation can help children voice their
concerns, share their wishes, and explore their feelings. Although the
child custody evaluator is not serving as a therapist, the evaluation
process may be therapeutic to children who participate in the
evaluation. If the evaluator concludes that the child is experiencing
significant problems, he or she can refer the child for therapy and help
the parents understand their child’s developmental needs. In these
ways, the evaluator serves to hear the child’s voice and advocate
for the child’s psychological and developmental needs.
A third potential benefit comes from the fact that the same mental
health professional is observing all family members. … By having a
neutrally appointed custody evaluator listen to and observe all family
members, interview relevant collateral witnesses, and consider
everyone’s input before reaching conclusions about the children’s best
interests, fragmentation is reduced.
At the end of the evaluation process, when an evaluator writes a
comprehensive report, parents benefit by learning about their child’s
needs and how they can work together to meet those needs. The report
can help parents focus on the child rather than on their conflicts with
each other and can help them learn ways to resolve their conflicts and
meet their child’s needs. Furthermore, the evaluator can help parents
understand relevant issues important to parents, such as when and how
to incorporate overnight time with each parent for their young child,
the impact of their conflict on their children, and the risks and benefits
of shared parenting. This understanding will enable them to parent
more effectively.
Ultimately, an evaluation is most helpful to the family when the report
and conclusions reduce conflict, help parents reach an agreement
without going to trial, and keep parents focused on their child’s needs
and best interests. Well-done evaluations often help parents recognize
the need for solution and compromise, and, while mediation may not
have been successful prior to the evaluation, settlement may be much
more likely after an evaluation (R.K. Kelly & Ramsey, 2009).
Along with any state or local rules or statutes, and in addition to the
AFCC Model Standards (2006) and the APA Guidelines for Child
Custody Evaluations (APA, 2009) described earlier, a number of other
advisory documents guide the ethical practice of the child custody
evaluator, including … These documents provide considerable
guidance for the evaluator. Child custody evaluators who are not
highly familiar with all of these documents are working at a
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considerable disadvantage and, therefore, are at increased risk for
failing to maximally serve the court and family.
Child custody evaluations are a unique type of evaluation, one that
requires specialized competence. … The Model Standards list 18 areas
of expected training for all child custody evaluators and 5 areas of
specialized training for those evaluators performing custody
evaluations in those particular areas. These areas of expected training
include, among other items:
 The psychological and developmental needs of children
 The effects of separation, divorce, domestic violence,
substance abuse, child alienation, child maltreatment, and
interparental conflict on the psychological and developmental
needs of children.
 How to assess parenting capacity and coparenting capacity
and construct effective parenting and coparenting plans.
Additionally, the Specialty Guidelines state, “Forensic practitioners
make ongoing efforts to develop and maintain their
competencies…[and] keep abreast of developments in the fields of
psychology and law” (see APA, 2013, Standard 2.02). These several
documents guide the evaluator in developing and maintaining ongoing
continuing education in areas relevant to child custody evaluations.
The APA Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations state,
“Psychologists strive to avoid conflicts of interest and multiple
relationships in conducting evaluations” (see APA, 2009, Guideline 7,
p. 11), as certain prior roles may impair the objectivity of the child
custody evaluator. Furthermore, the Guidelines for Child Custody
Evaluations advise against performing a child custody evaluation if the
psychologist has provided therapeutic services to any of the parties in
the past or present. … The appearance of conflict may be equally
important to actual conflict in these cases. Although there may not
be any actual conflict, and although no ethics will have been
violated by taking on the evaluation role in these circumstances,
evaluators should recognize the risk that a parent who feels
wronged by the evaluator’s recommendations might allege that
the evaluator was biased because of these prior relationships. If
such a parent later finds out about these relationships, it may serve as
further reinforcement of such bias in the mind of the parent. Advance
disclosure of all prior relationships helps reduce the risk of such
allegations.
Even though child custody evaluations typically are court-ordered,
parents still need to understand the process. Technically, informed
consent is not obtained when the court orders an evaluation; instead,
custody evaluators are encouraged to obtain consent both in writing
and orally at the start of the evaluation process (APA, 2009). The
document needs to explain critical issues, such as the general
procedures that will be used, each parent’s role in the evaluation
process, fees, and the limits of confidentiality. The evaluator needs to
inform parents that a child custody evaluation is not a health-related
procedure and that the evaluator will not bill a parent’s health
insurance. Additionally, because the EPPCC requires psychologists to
avoid doing harm when it is foreseeable (APA, 2002), the evaluator
should inform parents that one or both of them may be unhappy at the
end of the evaluation process. It is recommended that the evaluator
provide this document to the parents and their attorneys in advance of
the start of the evaluation. Finally, it is also important for the evaluator
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to inform potential collateral sources of the limits of confidentiality
and the purpose for which the collateral information is being gathered
(AFCC, 2006).
According to AFCC Model Standard 5.5, child custody evaluators
strive to use a balanced process in order to achieve objectivity,
fairness, and independence: “As one element of a balanced process,
the evaluative criteria employed shall be the same for each parentchild combination. In the interests of fairness and sound methodology,
evaluators shall ensure that any allegation concerning a matter that the
evaluator is likely to consider in formulating his/her opinion shall be
brought to the attention of the party against whom the allegation is
registered so that s/he is afforded an opportunity to respond. (2006, p.
15).
When the evaluator does not act in this way, it almost assuredly leads
to a complaint of bias, sometimes made to the parent’s attorney, but
potentially to the court or practitioner’s licensing board.
According to Guideline 10 of the APA Guidelines for Child Custody
Evaluations, “Multiple methods of data gathering enhance the
reliability and validity of psychologists’ eventual conclusions,
opinions, and recommendations. Unique as well as overlapping
aspects of various measures contribute to a fuller picture of each
examinee’s abilities, challenges, and preferences” (2009, p. 14). These
multiple methods (discussed in greater detail later) usually include, at
a minimum:
 Multiple interviews with the parents.
 Interviews with children when appropriate.
 Observations of children and parents interacting.
 Administration of psychological testing and parenting
questionnaires.
 Review of collateral documents.
 Interviews with relevant professionals, family members, and
friends.
Both of these require that the evaluator carefully consider the relevant
issues in the case and make recommendations consistent with those
issues. Identifying the scope in advance of performing the evaluation
also ensures that the evaluator has the necessary specialized training to
conduct the evaluation, as noted earlier.
In the Specialty Guidelines, psychologists are reminded: “In their
communications, forensic practitioners strive to distinguish
observations, inferences, and conclusions. Forensic practitioners are
encouraged to explain the relationship between their expert opinions
and the legal issues and facts of the case at hand” (APA, 2013,
Guideline 11.02, p. 16). Additionally, Specialty Guideline 11.03 states,
“Forensic practitioners are encouraged to disclose all sources of
information obtained in the course of their professional services, and
to identify the source of each piece of information that was considered
and relied upon in formulating a particular conclusion [or] opinion” (p.
17). Ultimately, this guideline is to help parents understand the
rationale for recommendations but also to assist the court in
understanding the evaluator’s reasoning. Within this context, it is
equally important to provide a description of the risks and benefits of
different options available to the court. This topic is discussed in
greater detail in the report writing section further on.
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Because records are subject to subpoena and full disclosure is
important in the interest of transparency and due process, the APA
Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations direct evaluators to keep
complete, readable records with the expectation that others will review
them in the event of ongoing litigation after the completion of the
report.
Given the admonition about training, this next section addresses basic
research with which all custody evaluators should be familiar.
[subsection headings are: Divorce Research, Parenting Plans for
Young Children, Shared, 50-50, or Sole Custody?, Conflict, Legal
Custody, and Decision Making. Relevant quotes: “If conducting a
child custody evaluation where young children are at issue, it is critical
to know this research.” “Less research has focused on legal custody
and decision making between parents than on residential schedules.”
Parenting coordinators (Sullivan, 2004), who work with a family to
help resolve conflicts on an ongoing basis, usually after there are court
orders in place, may prove of value when certain high-conflict
dynamics exist. This process helps many families avoid frequent
returns to court and enables decisions to be made for the benefit of
children more efficiently (Sullivan, 2004).
In addition to the basic research just described, many child custody
evaluations involve special issues, including allegations of domestic
violence, sexual abuse, children becoming alienated, and relocation.
Even more specialized knowledge is critical when performing
evaluations in these areas (see AFCC, 2006, Model Standard 1.2 (c)).
Perhaps the most emotionally charged of cases are those in which
there are allegations of child sexual abuse. The challenge in these
cases is that the allegation usually sets in motion several events,
including but not limited to:
 Independent investigations by child protective services and
law enforcement authorities.
 Criminal charges.
 A temporary order suspending or supervising contact between
the child and the alleged offender.
 Emotionally charged court hearings in which the alleged
offender denies the allegations and claims the allegations are
made for purposes of custody and the other parent simply
claiming protection of the child.
 A child custody evaluation designed to more fully evaluate
the allegations and make recommendations for a parenting
plan.
Kuehnle and Connell (2009) focus on the range of hypotheses that
must be considered in any case when such allegations are raised and
the thoroughness of the evaluation process required. They also identify
that the primary role of the evaluator is to perform a risk assessment in
these cases.
The one area where many judges and evaluators have the most trouble
making decisions is in relocation cases, which pit the right of adults to
live wherever they want and the right to parent. These cases come to
the court when one parent wants to move with the child and the other
parent opposes the move and wants the child to remain. Child custody
evaluators are at risk of confounding the research when performing
these evaluations by recommending against moves because of research
that demonstrates the benefit to children when both parents maintain
ongoing and regular access with their children (Austin, 2000). There is
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limited research on the effect of parental relocation on children. …
The primary focus in recent years has been on the consideration of risk
and protective factors in determining the ultimate decision in these
cases (Austin, 2008b; Parkinson, Cashmore, & Single, 2010; Stahl,
2010). … Parkinson et al (2010) wrote that, while it is tempting to
resolve these difficult cases with the assistance of wishful thinking,
research is needed to test that wishful thinking against the realities of
experience. They do not believe there is ample research support to
conclude that children who relocate with one parent while the other
parent is left behind will, by virtue of the relocation, automatically do
well or will be harmed. Rather, the only way to understand the optimal
relocation decision in a given case is by focusing on the risk and
protective factors existing in that case.
Child custody and parenting evaluations are very different from other
psychological or forensic evaluations. They are more complex, involve
more people, and entail more procedures than most. These evaluations
require a forensic mind-set versus a therapeutic mind-set and the
exploration of multiple hypotheses. Typically, there will be allegations
made by one parent against the other, and it is not unusual for the
evaluator to be unable to reach conclusions about the he-said, she-said
allegations in the case. Each step of the evaluation process is designed
to help the evaluator gather information critical to understanding the
family.
In most jurisdictions, a custody or parenting evaluation will be ordered
by the court or stipulated to by the parties. It results in appointment of
one neutral evaluator focused on assessing all relevant issues in
dispute. From a risk management perspective, it is important to receive
the court order before beginning the evaluation, as the authority to
conduct the evaluation comes from the court. … After receiving the
court order, it is common for the evaluator to have a joint conference
call with the attorneys to gather basic information about the family and
the reasons for the evaluation. Although some attorneys like to argue
their case for the evaluator, it is best to get some basic facts and
reasons for the evaluation during this call and lay out the logistics and
proposed time frame for the evaluation. During this call, it is helpful
for the evaluator to explain procedures and request documents to be
reviewed. … As noted, the retainer agreement describes the
evaluator’s and the parents’ obligations through the evaluation
process, limitations regarding confidentiality, and other critical
information about the evaluation process. It serves as a detailed
informed consent document, which is recommended even if the
parents have been ordered to participate in the evaluation.
A good way to start the first evaluation interview with each parent is to
ask the parent, “Why are we here?” This question allows the parent to
explain his or her concerns, observations, beliefs, and allegations in a
rather open-ended manner. With limited prompting, (e.g., “Tell me
more”), the evaluator can spend much of the first appointment trying
to understand the parent’s issues, concerns, and proposed solutions.
Parents often have a need to be heard, and focusing on the matters
important to them during the first interview facilitates cooperation and
participation. During the interviews, it is important for the evaluator to
focus on each parent’s:
 Concerns and allegations.
 Responses to the allegations and concerns raised by the other
parent.
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Understanding of the child and his or her psychological,
social, academic, and developmental functioning.
 Description of the history of the relationship between the
child and each parent.
 Description of his or her own family history, especially
focusing on relevant issues that may relate to the current
evaluation.
 Beliefs about the strengths and weaknesses of his or her own
ad the other parent’s parenting.
 Description of the coparenting relationship and the ability of
each parent to communicate with the other and make day-today decisions on behalf of the children.
 History of and ability to support the child’s relationship with
the other parent and if there are concerns about this moving
forward.
 Understanding of the special issues in the case (e.g.,
relocation) and how it may affect a parenting plan.
 Recommendation for the specific parenting plan.
In most evaluations, this information can be gathered in three to four
interviews, each of which might last 2 hours. It is important to gather
the information that each parent wants to relay, but the examiner must
be more than a stenographer and seek enough depth and breadth
associated with these issues while simultaneously having an
opportunity to ask each parent about the concerns raised by the other
parent.
In evaluations with more complex issues, the evaluator will want to
explore those in depth. … It is always important to explore for more
than what the parent initially describes, since many domestic violence
victims are reluctant to share details of the abuse.
In cases with allegations of alienation, it is important to explore each
parent’s history of involvement with the child, each parent’s
perception of his or her own and the other parent’s contribution to the
child being alienated, and the extent to which the child is rigid in his or
her rejection of one parent. The evaluator should explore whether the
child has a realistic basis for being estranged from one parent or
whether other dynamics are contributing to this alienation.
Finally, in relocation cases, in addition to best interests statutes, it is
important to understand specific statutory or case law pertaining to
relocation. … Evaluators need to understand these state-specific legal
issues in relocation matters. When interviewing parents in relocation
cases, evaluators must:
 Ask questions to understand the motives for relocation and
the motives for opposing it.
 Understand how each parent perceives the child will be
affected by the move, both positively and negatively.
 Collect family information to understand the social capital in
each community (Austin, 2008a).
 Gather information from each parent about a proposed
parenting plan should the court allow the move, or should the
court not allow the move, or should both parents end up in the
same location.
Interviews with the children are a crucial part of understanding both
the family dynamics and the relationship between the child and his or
her parents. Evaluators should:
 Start by establishing rapport with the children.
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Begin by discussing the process of the evaluation, the limits
of confidentiality, and the structure of the interview process.
 Encourage children to talk openly about their feelings and
help them understand that the evaluation is about their
interests and not their parents’ wishes.
 Inform the children that a report will be submitted to the
judge, which the parents will probably read.
 Tell children that they do not have to answer questions they
do not want to answer and that their parents or the judge will
ultimately decide where and how they will spend time with
their parents.
Evaluators must recognize that children’s language skills are not the
same as adults’. It is important to know that, although children often
do not understand their questions, they may respond as if they do. It
may be useful to ask children to repeat or to explain the questions to
be sure that they understand them.
How questions are asked affects the way answers are given. When
interviewing children, particularly in a forensic context, it is vital to
ask open-ended questions (Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orback, & Esplin,
2008). These questions are far more likely to yield useful, accurate,
and honest responses. Asking leading or categorical questions limits
the way that the child responds, and, therefore, limits the usefulness
and validity of those responses.
It is important for the evaluation process to be balanced. As such, it is
also important for children to be seen with each parent bringing them
to the office. Evaluators must keep in mind that one or both parents
may influence their children. To reduce the risks associated with this
influence, appointments should be scheduled equally with each parent
bringing the children to appointments. Although children’s
suggestibility and the potential for being influenced by parents or
siblings is a topic that is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is critical
for those evaluating custody and parenting plans to understand this
research.
Specific data are important to gather during interviews with children.
These include the child’s:
 Likes and dislikes, interests, friends, chosen activities, and
other aspects of the child’s day-to-day life.
 Schooling, including information about how each parent
participates in helping with homework and other schoolrelated matters.
 Perceptions of his or her relationships with each parent,
including things that the child likes and does not like about
each parent.
 Perceptions of discipline.
 Routines in each home and how the child deals with any
differences in routines between homes.
 Typical mood, and how the child typically expresses his or
her feelings and if there is a difference for each parent.
 Perceptions about the need to care for his or her parents
emotionally.
 Anything else the child wants the judge to know.
These data provide important information to the court about the child’s
life. Because the evaluator is the only unbiased person providing
information to the judge about the child (it is assumed that both
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parents will be biased), such information is vital to the court in helping
it to make the ultimate decision about custody and parenting plans.
A fundamental purpose for observing children is to understand the
nature of the bond between a child and the parents. Although there is
no reliable and valid way of measuring whether a child is more bonded
to one parent or the other, the job of the evaluator is to describe the
behavioral dynamics of the bond for the judge. In young children, the
evaluator should observe the way children and parents relate with one
another. Do they play together, smile and laugh with one another,
exchange affection with one another, or stay relatively distant and
isolated from one another? Does the child seem attentive to the parent
when the parent enters the room, or does the child seem disinterested?
When parents are in the room, it is important to listen to what they say.
Parents may want to talk about things that are inappropriate to discuss
in front of the child, because they have a need to provide more
information to the examiner. The observation session is not a good
time for this so it is always important for evaluators to understand each
parent’s ability to utilize adequate boundaries and keep the child free
from anxiety. If the parent offers inappropriate comments in front of
the child (e.g., something negative about the other parent or something
about the litigation), the examiner should try to understand how the
child feels about it, responds to it, and interacts with the parent about
it. For example, some children get into arguments with their parents
about things that parents say, and this provides valuable information
about the interaction between parent and child.
It is often helpful to provide tasks for the parent and child to complete.
Encouraging a father and daughter to draw a picture, for example, will
provide data about how they work together to complete a task. Are
they cooperative, are they playful, do they use each other’s assistance,
or do they become quite competitive with one another? This can help
the evaluator develop hypotheses about the child’s relationship with
the parent, which will need to be verified in other ways (e.g. with
collateral sources or interviews). Unstructured play, in which the child
initiates an activity of his or her choosing, provides an opportunity to
see how responsive the parent is to the child in his or her space. Many
parents can interact quite well with their children when they choose
the activity, but they may feel awkward and insecure when their
children choose the activity. At the same time, the examiner must
observe the affect of the parents and children. Are they relaxed and
having fun, or is there tension between the parent and child just as
there is between the parents?
Finally, with older children and their parents, it is important to talk
about the routines, day-to-day life in each parent’s home, and how
they and their parents deal with conflicts. Examiners should pay
particular attention to disparities between what the child says during
individual interviews compared with the observation sessions. It is
particularly important to explore a range of feelings between the child
and parents in those families where alienation or estrangement is
alleged.
Use of psychological testing in custody evaluations, though common,
is not mandatory. No psychological tests measure the quality of
parenting or coparenting, which are critical issues in child custody and
parenting evaluations. There are also no valid psychological tests
designed for use with the specific child custody population. Although
there have been efforts to develop some psychological instruments
relevant to child custody (e.g., Ackerman & Schoendorf, 1992;
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Bricklin, 1989, 1990a, 1990b), these instruments are of limited validity
(Otto, Edens, & Barcus, 2000). … Thus, no specific instruments can
directly assess the complex issues inherent in these evaluations.
The AFCC Model Standards direct child custody evaluators to “be
prepared to articulate the bases for selecting the specific instruments
used” (2006, p. 17) and to use assessment instruments “for the purpose
for which they have been validated” (p. 18). The Model Standards add
that “[c]aution should be exercised…when utilizing computergenerated interpretive reports and/or prescriptive texts” (Standard 6.6,
p. 18). According to the APA Guidelines for Child Custody
Evaluations, “Psychologists strive to interpret assessment data in a
manner consistent with the context of the evaluation” (2009, p. 15).
These Standards and Guidelines suggest that child custody and
parenting evaluators must be careful in choosing assessment
instruments, understand the research associated with custody litigants
and their scores on various measures (Bathurst, Gottfried, & Gottfried,
1997; McCann et al., 2001), and be careful when using computergenerated interpretive reports (Flens, 200). If a psychologist quotes
from a computer-generated interpretive report, he or she should
identify it as a quote and provide the citation. … Examiners should be
aware of the controversies and arguments on both sides of the issues
when choosing to use those particular instruments, as presented in
balanced reviews by Craig (2006), Dyer (2008), Erard (2005), and
Evans and Shutz (2008).
Finally, psychological test instruments should be used in a forensically
informed manner. Unlike the use of psychological tests in therapeutic
settings, where the goal is to aid in diagnosis and treatment, tests in
child custody and parenting evaluations should be “informed” by the
forensic questions that guide the evaluation. …The test data should be
used to develop hypotheses about the parents’ psychological and
behavioral functioning specifically in terms of how it relates to
parenting and abilities to implement a parenting plan.
It is also common to administer some type of parenting questionnaires
or instruments to gauge a parent’s stress (Parenting Stress Index-4,
Abidin, 2012), measure each parent’s self-report about his or her
relationship with the child (Parent Child Relationship Inventory;
Gerard, 1994), and gather structured information about the child
(Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist; Achenback, 1991). It is
important to recognize that these instruments are not definitive but
also may provide useful hypotheses about the parents and their
observations of their child.
Collateral information falls within two major categories. First, the
evaluator will review relevant pleadings, declarations, and other court
documents that the attorneys submit. Although these documents are
not intending to bring “truth” to the case (even though declarations are
signed under penalty of perjury), they do provide a framework from
which to understand each parent’s perspectives and concerns.
Evaluators must review all materials submitted, though the evaluator
can set a deadline as to when materials must be submitted so the
evaluation can be completed on time as required by the court.
The second type of collateral information comes from third parties
who have relevant information about one or more family members.
Collateral data can include information gathered from friends,
relatives, babysitters, teachers, pediatricians, psychotherapists, and
others. The child custody evaluator looks for convergent and divergent
data between collateral and other data to help in understanding the
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various allegations and assertions made by the parties. Collateral
information can be gathered verbally (over the telephone or in person)
as well as in writing, with the use of questionnaires and letters, or by a
review of affidavits or other written statements of the parties.
The benefits of gathering collateral information are listed next:
 Evaluators need to have a mind-set of disconfirmation rather
than confirmation. Reviewing collateral information and
talking with collateral sources allows for that.
 Parents in the midst of a custody dispute tend to present
themselves in the most favorable light and the other parent
more negatively. Collateral data can help balance this
defensiveness and positive impression management by the
parents.
 Collateral data may include information about parents and/or
children that cannot be obtained through clinical interview,
testing, and observation.
 Collateral data can help verify or refute claims made by the
parents or others.
The AFCC Model Standards (2006) provide specific direction for the
gathering of collateral data:
Evaluators shall be mindful of the importance of gathering information
from multiple sources in order to thoroughly explore alternative
hypotheses concerning issues pertinent to the evaluation. Evaluators
shall recognize the importance of securing information from collateral
sources who, in the judgment of the evaluators, are likely to have
access to salient and critical data. (Standard 11.1, p. 22)
When assessing the reports of participants in the evaluation, evaluators
shall seek from other sources information that may serve either to
confirm or disconfirm participant reports on any salient issue, unless
doing so is not feasible. (Standard 11.2, p. 22)
In utilizing collateral sources, evaluators shall seek information that
will facilitate the confirmation or disconfirmation of hypothesis under
consideration. (Standard 11.4, p. 23)
All collateral sources contacted shall be disclosed by the child custody
evaluator. (Standard 11.5, p. 23)
Typically, the court order appointing a child custody evaluator allows
the evaluator to speak with any third-party collateral sources chosen,
even without the expressed permission of either parent. Authorization
from parents is required before speaking with professional collateral
sources, such as teachers, therapists, and physicians. Evaluators must
obtain the consent of the collateral witness to be part of the evaluation
process and provide the same information about the limitations to
confidentiality to all third-party collaterals, some of whom may not
want to speak with an evaluator if they know that their comments are
going to be included in a report to the court and read by the parents.
The various documents just cited all provide guidance on the critical
issues involved in report writing. For example, California Rule of
Court 5.220 states:
In any presentation of findings, the evaluator must:
 Summarize the data-gathering procedures, information
sources, and time spent, and present all relevant information,
including information that does not support the conclusions
reached;
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Describe any limitations in the evaluation that result from
unobtainable information, failure of a party to cooperate, or
the circumstances of particular interviews;
 Only make the custody or visitation recommendation for a
party who has been evaluated. This requirement does not
preclude the evaluator from making an interim
recommendation that is in the best interest of the child; and
 Provide clear, detailed recommendations that are consistent
with the health, safety, welfare, and best interest of the child
if making any recommendations to the court regarding a
parenting plan. (p. 4)
Although this Rule is mandatory only for California child custody
evaluators, these suggestions are useful for evaluators in any
jurisdiction.
The Specialty Guidelines state:
Consistent with relevant law and rules of evidence, when providing
professional reports and other sworn statements or testimony, forensic
practitioners strive to offer a complete statement of all relevant
opinions that they formed within the scope of their work on the case,
the basis and reasoning underlying the opinions, the salient data or
other information that was considered in forming the opinions, and an
indication of any additional evidence that may be used in support of
the opinions to be offered. The specific substance of forensic reports is
determined by the type of psycholegal issue at hand as well as relevant
laws or rules in the jurisdiction in which the work is completed (APA,
2013, p. 17)
The Specialty Guidelines also instruct the forensic evaluator to
disclose data and information that is not supportive of or contrary to
the conclusions and recommendations offered by the evaluator.
Every report should have six complete sections, as discussed next:
1. Procedures
2. Each parent
3. Children
4. Collateral information
5. Analysis
6. Recommendations
This thorough description of procedures helps reduce the risk that
someone might perceive the evaluation and report as biased.
The evaluator must provide complete and relevant information about
each parent. … In addition, this section should include each parent’s
relevant details about any special issues.
The report should provide thorough and relevant information about
each child. The examiner must keep in mind that this is likely to be the
only opportunity the court will have to gain a truly objective
perspective of the children and their adjustment. Among other things,
the data should include information about each child’s:
 Developmental, social, psychological, academic, and social
functioning, including interests, friendships, temperament,
and typical mood.
 Relationship history with each parent.
 Thoughts about each parent.
 Feelings about a range of things, including the parents’
divorce and their behaviors as divorced parents.
 Exposure to parental conflicts, and/or the extent to which the
child feels alienated or justifiably estranged from one parent.
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Perspective of each parent’s caretaking and how each parent
disciplines the child.
 Opinion(s) about the parenting plan, if expressed.
A common complaint of parents is that the evaluator misrepresented
what collateral informants offered. For this reason, it may be useful to
review with the collateral informant the information to be included in
the report and/or include a statement from each collateral witness
confirming the information in the report.
The analysis section is the most important component of the report.
Rather than a review of information already described, the analysis
section should focus on those data that lead to the expert opinions. In
the analysis section, it is also important to show your work and explain
the bases for all conclusions. It is important to detail the basis for any
expert opinions reached. The analysis section should reflect that the
evaluator considered each parent’s concerns and responses to the other
parent’s concerns. It is important that those data are integrated with the
psycholegal issues of concern to the court.
Given that, in most evaluations, there is a range of custodial options, it
is important for the evaluator to provide a thorough risk-benefit
analysis of each custodial option and those data that support his or her
conclusions. … Finally, in all cases, the evaluator should explain the
risks and benefits of shared decision making as opposed to some other
plan that may give one parent decisions in certain areas of the child’s
life or perhaps even utilizing a parenting coordinator. In some cases, it
might be best to provide the court with detailed parenting plan. In such
a case, the evaluator should detail the risks and benefits of each
potential parenting plan in the report. Finally, and most important, it is
critical to present both the data that support the conclusions as well as
the data that do not support the conclusions (as described in California
Rule of Court 5.220 earlier in the chapter).
In recent years, there has been a renewed debate about whether
examiners should make recommendations about the ultimate issue in
child custody cases (Family Court Review, 2005; Stahl, 2005; Tippins
& Wittmann, 2005). Judges typically prefer recommendations, and
therefore it remains the custom of evaluators to provide them (M. J.
Ackerman, Ackerman, Steffen, & Kelley-Poulos, 2004). Nevertheless,
it is clearly the judge’s job to make orders based on all of the evidence
at trial rather than simply rubber-stamping the recommendations of a
child custody evaluator (Schepard, 2004). Family law judges use the
evaluator’s recommendations as a starting place, not an end point, and
they assess the usefulness of the evaluator’s recommendations based
on the consistency with other evidence presented at trial as well as the
forensic integrity and quality of the evaluator’s work product. Stahl
(2005) suggested that, when one or more best interests or protective
factors would suggest against the child’s relocation, the evaluator
should not weigh the various factors; this is the judge’s job. Instead, in
such situations, the evaluator should provide those conclusions to the
court and provide multiple recommendations, with the ultimate
decision based on the judge’s weighting of the various best interests,
risk, and protective factors.
In addition to the ultimate issue of parenting time, it is common in
child custody evaluations to make recommendations in these areas:
 Legal custody and/or decision making.
 Interventions, including counseling for either parent and/or
the children, identifying suggested goals for that counseling.
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Substance abuse or domestic violence related interventions, if
relevant.
 Alternative dispute resolution for ongoing issues (e.g.,
mediation or parenting coordinator).
 Any other recommendations relevant to the family that was
evaluated.
Child custody evaluations are complex and require integrating
disparate information gathered from a variety of participants and
information of various types with disparate characteristics. Like a
jigsaw puzzle, child custody evaluations require a persistent attitude of
gathering more information, not only to confirm but also to disconfirm
various hypotheses, until things fall into place. Evaluators need to
avoid acting like stenographers and maintain a style of curiosity,
always gathering additional relevant information until complex issues
are understood. To be an effective evaluator, one must develop a thick
skin, because one or both parents are likely to be upset with the
recommendations. In some jurisdictions, it is not uncommon for
parents to file licensing complaints alleging biases or unprofessional
behavior regardless of how thorough and professional the evaluation
is. Indeed, the child custody evaluator carries more risk for licensing
complaints than any other role played by the professional psychologist
(Kirkland & Kirkland, 2001). Finally, if a case goes to trial, it is
possible that one or both attorneys might hire a consultant or testifying
expert who might criticize some of the work.
In spite of the risks and difficulties, conducting child custody
evaluations can be professionally rewarding and satisfying. A child
custody evaluator provides a beneficial service for family law judges
that can help them understand the complexities of the most conflicted
families they serve. Child custody evaluations can provide guidance
for families who can settle their dispute and move forward following a
well-done evaluation. Because child custody evaluators work in an
interdisciplinary field, opportunities for ongoing learning and
professional development are ever present. Most important, child
custody evaluators keep the focus on the best interests of the children
and therefore help them and their parents to adjust to the change in
their lives as they develop healthier and more adaptive ways of
moving forward.

Chapter 10: Conducting Child Abuse and Neglect Evaluations
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Definitional issues remain a challenge, particularly because
maltreatment types often are defined by legal codes or social service
systems and because researchers have not reached consensus on some
of the nuances of definitions (see Condie, 2003; Marshall, 2012, for
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examples). There is, however, growing consensus over research
definitions and subtypes (Cicchetti, 2004; Runyan et al., 2005).
Researchers studying risk factors, protective factors, and intervention
methods have concluded that it is difficult to isolate one form of
maltreatment from another in order to adequately classify or study
factors that might be specific to one form of child maltreatment (i.e.,
physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional/psychological abuse, neglect).
Because different forms of child maltreatment tend to co-occur, pure
scientific analysis of contributing factors is difficult (Cicchetti, 2004;
Marshall, 2012). As a result, researchers have instead focused on
maltreatment typology overlap and comorbidity, the degree and nature
of maltreatment, and child protection policy analysis (Brandon, 2001;
Marshall, 2012). A second problem affecting the integrity of scientific
research is the degree to which social or legal definitions of child
abuse meaningfully correspond to real behavior. Classification entries
in state records of child maltreatment typically are recorded after
negotiation and consultation with families, representatives of the
justice system, and representatives of child protective systems (Bae,
Solomon, Gelles, & White, 2010; Putnam-Hornstein, Webster,
Needed, & Magruder, 2011). With the exception of large-scale funded
projects, research samples typically are drawn from small convenience
samples. Thus, there are a variety of challenges to research on the
etiology and impact of child maltreatment. They are briefly mentioned
here to alert evaluators to the inherent limitations in the state of the
science. Researchers studying child maltreatment acknowledge the
methodological difficulties; unfortunately, the difficulties are not
easily overcome (MacMillan, 2005).
Theories of child maltreatment (see Belsky, 1993; Condie, 2003)
include these models:
 Psychological (e.g., personality variables, emotional
variables, characteristics of perpetrators)
 Sociological (societal and contextual conditions giving rise to
child maltreatment)
 Criminological (social class variables, rational choice theory,
self-interest motives, communal relationships, strain theory)
 Interactional (dyadic parent-child goodness of fit, communal
relations)
 Genetic (epigenetics, gene/environment interactions and
correlations)
No model has emerged that fully explains child maltreatment or less
severe forms of problematic parenting (Belsky, 1993; Runyan et al.,
2005; Simon et al., 2012). Child maltreatment, in any of its forms, is
multiply influenced by a variety of determinants that coalesce through
transactional processes at various levels of analysis (life course,
immediate-situational, stressors-support, potentiating-protective,
historical-evolutionary) in the broad context of parent-child or other
caregiver-child relationships (MacMillan, 2005).
Similarly, there is no single or uniform solution to the problem of child
maltreatment. Interventions range from preventative to clinical, selfhelp to formal intervention, individual to macrosocial, and
psychological to legal. Policies within child protective service systems
range from emphasis on termination of parental rights to emphasis on
family preservation strategies, and sometimes those goals take place
concurrently. The targets of intervention might include a specific
parent, a set of parents with common struggles, a specific child or set
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of children from the same family, children from similar maltreatment
environments, or the neighborhood and social conditions contributing
to child maltreatment risk.
Risk factors are factors that increase the odds that child maltreatment
will occur. Because child maltreatment has a major economic and
social impact, early detection is of great importance. Researchers have
developed taxometric structures for predicting child maltreatment.
Risk variables and mediators of risk tend to fall under the categories of
developmental and psychological factors, social and community
variables, and contextual variables.
The foregoing analysis illustrates the main point that child
maltreatment is multiply determined by factors operating at multiple
levels of analysis that include evolutionary, developmental,
situational/contextual, individual, microsocial, macrosocial, and
demographic. Maltreatment is the final common outcome of multiple
pathways. In any individual child protective service investigation of
child maltreatment, it is possible to identify multiple etiological
correlates. A different set of correlates, with or without overlapping
variables, might not appear in the next investigation. Unique clusters
may recur across cases but not in a reliably predictable manner. The
multidetermined nature of child maltreatment must be considered by
both researchers and clinicians in order for them to better understand
and empirically substantiate the transactional process presumed to
contribute to child maltreatment (Belsky, 1993; Condie, 2003).
Researchers analyzing risk factors imperfectly distinguish between
different forms of maltreatment and the lack of distinctiveness of any
individual or cluster of predictors for any one form of maltreatment
(Condie, 2003). A point of emphasis for future research will be to
highlight features that distinguish levels of severity and chronicity of
child maltreatment. Two physically abusive or neglectful parents
might not be equally abusive or neglectful. Descriptive research is
needed to better understand what factors contribute to severity and
chronicity of child maltreatment and what factors contribute to
lessened or diminishing severity and desistance of maltreatment.
Not all abusive or neglectful parents are the same kind of person, and
researchers have begun examining the utility of classification schemes.
Researchers are beginning to describe typologies of maltreating
parents that include combinations of variables at different levels of
analysis. The multidetermined nature of child maltreatment may make
this undertaking difficult, at least from the perspective of intervention
planning. It is a challenge to design interventions that address the
needs of a diverse group of parents with diverse contributing
influences related to child maltreatment, particularly in the setting of a
relatively high rate of child poverty (Korbin et al., 1998). Not every
young parent, impoverished parent, single parent, or parent with
children having closely spaced births mistreats his or her children.
Thus, interventions must address more than impoverishment, fertility,
and social support. Program developers have begun to address parental
developmental histories, negative emotionality, emotional reactivity,
and insecure expectations, but with mixed results (Kohl et al., 2011).
Interventions must target multiple factors simultaneously, creating
incentives for adolescents to remain in school, reducing school truancy
and academic underachievement, addressing neighborhood quality,
and increasing school-based case management (Belsky, 1993).
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Methodology for evaluations depends on the nature of the referral
question. The use of consistent methodology and the use of
multimodal assessment procedures enhance the reliability and validity
of evaluation results. In child maltreatment cases, flexibility in
methodology across referral questions is needed to accommodate the
degrees of breadth and depth necessary to answer a given referral
question or set of questions. Care and protection evaluation
methodologies and reports range from brief consultations to
comprehensive descriptions of multiple family members and their
interrelationships (Condie, 2003). Although there is no single
methodology for care and protective evaluations, the prototypical
example includes:
 Obtaining informed consent
 Interviewing one or more parents or caregivers
 Observing the parents or caregivers with the child (when
indicated)
 Interviewing the children
 Gathering collateral information and relevant records
 Seeking releases for access to privileged and/or confidential
records
 Administration of psychological measures or tools when
indicated
Using a systematic approach, the caregiver portion of the evaluation
satisfies informed consent procedures, introduces the referral questions
and evaluation content, and reviews the anticipated scope of the
evaluation. The referral question(s) frame the evaluation methodology.
Multimodal assessment is conducted to enhance the reliability and
validity of the evaluation results. Good methodology allows for
flexibility to accommodate different degrees of breadth or
comprehensiveness of referral questions, caregiver variables, and
caregiver-child interaction variables.
The first step of any evaluation is to obtain informed consent in
keeping with prevailing regulations and practice standards. The
individual being interviewed must be informed of the limits of
confidentiality prior to being interviewed (American Psychological
Association [APA], 2013; APA Committee on Professional Practice
and Standards, 2011 [the Specialty Guidelines are reprinted as the
appendix to this volume with permission of the APA]). If the
individual does not comprehend the notification, steps should be taken
to determine whether the evaluation ought to proceed. Examples
include contacting the referring attorney or notifying the court in the
case of a court-ordered evaluation. The explanation should include:
 A clear explanation of the referral question
 The individuals who are a party to the evaluation
 Who will view the report
 The lack of confidentiality
 Who “owns” the report
 Provisions (or lack thereof due to judicial restrictions in some
jurisdictions) for the release of the report to individuals who
are not a party to the legal proceedings
 The difference between medical records and forensic records
as defined in state or federal statutes and regulations relevant
to both psychological record keeping and care and protection
proceedings (Condie, 2003)
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Social and cultural factors of victim blame and the reluctance of the
legal system to prosecute and punish offenders are hypothesized to
contribute to the disinhibition of offenders
The main goals in the initial appointment with a child are to set the
child at ease, develop an understanding of the child’s linguistic
abilities, and provide a notification of the limits of confidentiality
suitable to the child’s comprehension (Condie & Koocher, 2008). It is
helpful to begin with innocuous questions, but the questions should not
inadvertently confuse the child’s understanding of the purpose of the
evaluation. Similarly, the evaluator should not immediately launch
into discourse or questions that will raise the child’s anxiety about
loyalty bonds with parents. The evaluator must be alert to the
possibility that some children will have been notified in advance of the
evaluator’s role and evaluation goals, either with accurate information
or misinformation. Thus, gleaning information from the child about his
or her preconceived notions of the evaluation should take place at the
outset. Some children may hold clear goals of what they wish to
convey to the evaluator. An artful approach is required to determine if
information provided by a child has been unduly influenced by other
individuals due to recent contacts, gifts, promises, or other methods of
persuasion (Stahl, 1996).
A child-centered office environment helps set children at ease.
Children should feel comfortable without becoming distracted. They
should be allowed time to become accustomed to the evaluator and the
context. Respect should be given to personal space, boundaries, and
bodily integrity. Children should be encouraged to ask questions and
seek clarification. It is important to avoid emotionally or morally laden
phrases, such as “Bad things that happen to children.”
Developmentally, children are likely to blame themselves for “bad
things,” and they are unlikely to desire permanent separation from
parents even when those parents have maltreated them (Condie, 2003).
From their limited points of reference and experiences, “bad things”
might be interpreted quite differently by children, or may pale in
comparison to other events or qualities of individuals. There should be
an assumption that their egocentric interpretation sometimes precludes
comparisons and contrasts. Appropriate care should be used in
designing questions that will allow children to voice their concerns
without facing fear of moral or other approbations.
Specific standards have been developed in some jurisdictions for
audio- or video- recording interviews of children, particularly children
whose families are involved in criminal or care and protection
proceedings (Saywitz, 1994). Because of concern over the capacities
of evaluators to record complete information in written form (Lamb,
Orback, Sternberg, Hershkowitz, & Horowitz, 2000), it is good
practice to record interviews in some fashion, taking care to gather
special permission in the informed consent process. An explanation of
the use of the devices should be given in language the child
comprehends. A contingency plan should be available for children
who are intimidated by recording devices if it would compromise their
willingness to provide relevant information. Recording increases the
completeness of information, preserves information that might be used
as legal evidence of abuse, promotes the use of proper interview
techniques, records nonverbal facets of communication, and precludes
or minimizes the need for multiple interviews (Lamb et al., 2000;
Saywitz, 1994). Disadvantages include intrusiveness and possible
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compromises to children’s willingness to divulge information,
logistical and technological complications, loss of data through
equipment malfunctions, focus on technique at the expense of issues of
relevance, and release of recordings to inappropriate sources such as
the media (Berliner, 1992). In the absence of electronic recording,
detailed written documentation is needed.
Whether children should be asked to provide demographic data
depends on their age and level of linguistic development. The degree
to which narrative accounts of maltreatment or other family
interactions should be sought depends on their reporting capacities
(Saywitz, 1994). When children cannot credibly report data, other
sources of information must be relied on. When they can provide
narrative accounts, their accounts should be compared to other reports
and checked for consistency (Lamb et al., 2000). Inconsistency may
reflect dissimulation, but it can occur for more innocuous reasons,
such as a lack of appreciation by the child for salient details and
insufficient developmental readiness to report a temporally organized
narrative (Saywitz, 1994). Depending on the referral question, relevant
content for child interviews may include a description of the child’s
view of family structure and relationships, other relationships
important to the child, historical information (Usually relevant only for
preadolescents and adolescents), the child’s view of his or her
treatment needs and treatment progress, and the child’s comprehension
of the construct of trauma and its relevance or lack thereof to his or her
life. Children are unskilled at providing details related to symptoms
and behaviors of trauma reactions, chiefly because their lack of
comparative experience base and vocabulary for the terms and
behaviors of relevance. Even when provided with symptom checklists,
they may shy away from endorsing relevant items because they do not
wish to view themselves as impaired. Even the best-designed measures
for children contain terms that do not fall neatly within the linguistic
capabilities of children (Condie, 2003).
There is no entirely flawless method of determining a child’s capacity
to provide accurate reports of maltreatment. Evaluators strive to
minimize influences that might result in data that lack credibility, but
it is important to remember that even the highest professional
standards do not require an evaluator to be a good judge of a child’s
truth-telling capacity (APA Committee on Professional Practice and
Standards, 2011). That task is left to the fact finder, and it lies beyond
the scope of current scientific research and practice. When estimates of
a child’s capacity to report trauma are requested, they should be based
on the best available empirical data. Examples include:
 Examining the child’s account of maltreatment for the
development of context
 Use of idiosyncratic words or descriptive phrases
 Inclusion of peripheral or unnecessary information
 Explicit details
 Details that exceed the child’s developmental level
 A progression of “grooming” for maltreatment (seduction,
isolation, escalation of threats and aggression)
 Other engagement processes
 Strategies designed to discourage the child from reporting
maltreatment (secrecy, threats, coercion, pressure, bribes,
rewards)
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Affective responses or details congruent with the reported
maltreatment
 Consistency of salient details
 A narrative clearly emanating from a child’s perspective
rather than a rehearsed litany
 Details of attempts to resist or avoid the maltreatment
(Heiman, 1992)
There are no pathognomonic signs of maltreatment, nor is there
evidence that a particular type of interview response or set of tools or
measures will yield data establishing that a child has been maltreated.
Referral questions that go directly to this point should be rephrased in
a professional consultation and negotiation process before the
evaluation proceeds (Condie, 2003). Neither maltreatment nor the
identity of a perpetrator can be confirmed solely by the presence or
absence of psychological symptoms or patterns of behavior.
When the child’s psychological functioning is part of the referral
question, interview data should focus on symptoms and behaviors of
relevance to diagnostic criteria for child behavior disorders and trauma
reactions (George & Solomon, 1999; Heiman, 1992). Because of the
difficulty children have self-reporting data of relevance, it is important
to include other sources of observation and information (Condie, 2003;
Heiman, 1992). Measuring the impact of child maltreatment does not
involve merely rendering a diagnosis. Descriptive information is
needed about the impact of trauma on a particular child, the link
between maltreatment and the child’s reactions (if any), and the child’s
existing vulnerabilities (Everson & Faller, 2012).
When the child’s view of parents, other caregivers, adaptation to
placement, and substitute caregivers is central to a referral question,
examiners must avoid any attempts to elicit abstract descriptions of
relationships. Even when children have the capacities to respond
meaningfully to questions about their relationships, their responses
might be influenced by loyalty bonds, recent visitation with particular
caregivers, and developmental limitations in making comparisons or
appreciating potential alternatives to their own experiences (George &
Solomon, 1999; Stahl, 1994). Evaluators should be prepared for some
inconsistencies because of children’s tendency to respond to recent
events or points of contact, children’s concerns about threats to their
stability, distress reactions, conflicted views and ambivalence, and
limitations in appreciation of temporal events or the passage of time
(“a long time” to a child might be 5 minutes). Sometimes eagerness to
reunify with a parent is merely a reflection of a child’s indiscriminate
attachment behavior (George & Solomon, 1999) or a desire to reunite
with school friends (Stahl, 1994).
As with adults, assessment measures to be used in the evaluation of
children should center on (1) the referral question, (2) the relevance of
global and specific indices to the question, (3) theoretically and
empirically derived hypotheses, (4) the validity of the measures in the
specific assessment context, and (5) whether the data would add
meaningful utility to the evaluation process (Ayoub & Kinscherff,
2006; Barnum, 1997). The developmental readiness of a child for
assessment participation is an added consideration. Even when
measures are designed for specific age ranges, children sometimes
may not be developmentally, cognitively, or linguistically prepared for
the process (Condie, 2003). Assessment measures do sometimes yield
useful data on the child’s capacity to report information of relevance,
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to benefit from relevant treatment, or to tolerate a foster placement
(Everson & Faller, 2012). If adequate pretreatment data are available,
it is sometimes possible to measure treatment progress using
psychological assessment measures. Assessment measures can
highlight these issues in a child:
 Strengths and weakness
 Approach to relationships
 Level of trust in individuals in roles of authority
 Willingness to engage in treatment
 Linguistic capacity to proved a narrative
 Mental health functioning
 Views of helping sources and friendships
Measures sometimes illustrate why a child has had a poor or failed
response to a particular treatment approach, why a child might distort
reports of relationships or events, or why a child might show a relative
lack of resilience in the recovery process (Condie, 2003). As with the
evaluation of parents, specific measures relevant to a child’s view of
parent-child interactions, attachments to parents, and other specific
factors should be used and interpreted conservatively unless specific
norms are available for the population of interest.
During any phase of a child protection proceeding, a psychologist may
be asked to evaluate different parties for different purposes. As
evaluators, psychologists frequently are asked to address these and
other issues:
 The impact of child maltreatment
 The risk that it might recur
 How seriously the child’s well-being has been affected
 What therapeutic or intervention strategies would be
recommended to assist the child and/or family
 Whether parents or other caregivers can be rehabilitated such
that the risk of maltreatment is reduced
 What the psychological effect on the child would be if the
child were returned to parents or other caregivers
 What the psychological effect on the child would be if
parental rights were terminated
To understand risk of maltreatment, it is important to understand
research on a variety of factors contributing to risk and mediation of
risk. Psychologists seek to gather information on:
 Family history
 Personality functioning
 Social and other contextual circumstances
 Developmental needs of the child
 Nature and quality of the parent-child relationship
 Reactions to trauma
 A variety of factors contributing to risk of child maltreatment
They seek to understand risk in the context of sociocultural factors,
physical disability, and other extenuating factors of relevance.
Evaluation methodology, data interpretation, and procedures for
reaching recommendations are derived from codes of ethics, standards
of practice, and relevant research literature. Multimodal assessment is
the primary buffer against data misinterpretation, overinterpretation, or
underinterpretation. Interpreting interview and assessment data may
occur in actuarial methods or the context of the examinee’s history.
Both approaches facilitate meaningful data interpretation. Risk
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assessment matrices should include factors identified in empirical
studies of risk assessment that are relevant to samples of parents
involved in the care and protection system. Analysis of child
maltreatment risk should acknowledge appropriate caveats. Further
research is needed to better understand the degree of concordance or
possible discordance in risk studies relevant to other samples of
individuals and those involving risk of child maltreatment.
Although many existing measures and methods are designed to assess
the nature and quality of the parent-child relationships, parent-child
attachment, and parent-child interactions, their applicability to care
and protection cases depends on the availability of relevant
supplementary norms. Data interpretation and recommendations made
via multimethod approaches that incorporate specific parenting
measures should include appropriate cautionary procedures and
comments. Similarly, global measures of functioning should be used
when judged to be appropriate based on the referral question and other
relevant considerations related to reliability and validity of application
to care and protection samples. Dissimulation is an issue that is
potentially endemic to care and protection evaluations, but methods
for detecting dissimulation that are specific to care and protection
samples have not been developed. Evaluators should make reasonable
efforts to detect dissimulation but without overreliance on measurespecific methods that have no demonstrated validity or reliability in
care and protection samples. Methods for minimizing the influence of
children’s suggestibility and other impediments to reliability and
validity should be used when indicated. Many care and protection
cases involve children with cognitive limitations, mental health issues,
and other special needs. Assessment methods and procedures should
be developed on a case-by-case basis. Appropriate modifications
should be made when needed. Novel procedures should not be used in
forensic cases unless they reflect converging professional consensus,
research, and scientifically based judgment. The breadth and depth of
interview content and indications for the use of forensic assessment
measures are drawn from the referral question.
Key approaches to data integration and organization of presentation
include (1) providing a specific answer to referral questions (when
results are inconclusive, it is best to say so directly), (2) using theory
as a template to guide data integration and interpretation, (3)
interpreting data in light of the examinee’s history, and (4) describing
the strengths and limitations of the data. Relevant risk factors should
be described in terms of their static and dynamic nature. Mediators and
protective factors should be included in any risk analysis. Some risk
factors relevant to child maltreatment may vary, depending on the type
of child maltreatment. Most risk factors are nonspecific. In studies of
risk factors, it is difficult to control for concurrent types of
maltreatment and their influence on research results.
Recommendations for service plan interventions and modifications
sometimes must take statutory provisions about availability of services
into account. The statutorily defined need to provide only those
services that are available poses a challenge for evaluators asked to
make recommendations for optimal intervention approaches. Specific
recommendations tend to be more useful than general
recommendations. For example, a recommendation for a specific form
of intervention for a parent with a specific set of circumstances,
symptoms, or problematic behaviors is more useful than a broad
recommendation for mental health treatment. Recommendations
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concerning parental or caregiver amenability to rehabilitation often
must be given with statutory time frames for service provision in
mind. Statutory time limits for successful rehabilitation pose a
challenge for parents who learn at a slow pace, who have
transportation or other financial limitations, or who face other
challenges to rapid treatment progress. Interpretations and
recommendations for children should be made in the context of their
levels of developmental maturity, their capacities to benefit from
recommended interventions, and any special needs they might have.
Chapter 18: Evaluating Eyewitness Testimony of Children
561
[Chapter
…[I]n sexual abuse cases where the offense typically is committed in
18:
secrecy (Bala, Lee, & McNamara, 2001), and often there is no visible injury
Evaluating or physical evidence, so that the children’s eyewitness memory accounts
Eyewitness take center stage (Keeney, Amacher, & Kastanakis, 1992; Myers, 1993a).
Testimony However, children experience many other crimes as well, such as domestic
of
violence, homicide, war atrocities, school shootings, and kidnappings.
Children
Intro]
561[Chapter
When adults do not believe a child’s accurate testimony, and can have
562
18:
devastating consequences. If child victims are not believed, a perpetrator is
Evaluating free to commit other crimes, and the victims may be placed in further danger
Eyewitness due to retaliation against them by the perpetrator. … However, when
Testimony children’s accounts are inaccurate, believing them can also lead to injustices
of
that include conviction of the innocent.
Children
Intro]
562
[Chapter
Such real-world cases illustrate why children’s eyewitness abilities are of
18:
paramount interest for legal professionals and researchers. Children’s
Evaluating reports are the linchpins in many proceedings, especially when physical
Eyewitness evidence is absent. Research on the abilities of child eyewitnesses may be
Testimony particularly important in assisting investigators when children’s reports are
of
the only piece of evidence, as is often the circumstance in child sexual abuse
Children
cases. In this chapter, we discuss factors that may influence the accuracy
Intro]
and perception of children’s reports. This review is not exhaustive, but we
hope to draw attention to areas of consensus and foster dialogue about areas
of controversy that will assist in building theoretical understanding and
optimal legal application concerning children’s eyewitness reports.
562Memory
Before delving into research and theory on children’s eyewitness abilities, it
563
Developm is important to have a basic understanding of age trends in memory
ent
development. Children undergo marked changes in encoding, knowledge
base, and retrieval with age (Howe, 2011). Although memory development
continues into adolescence and adulthood, a qualitative jump occurs after
the early preschool years. On eyewitness memory tasks, it is particularly
challenging to obtain complete and accurate information from young
preschoolers (e.g. Goodman & Reed, 1986). Compared to other children and
adults, younger children recall less information in response to free recall
questions and open-ended questions (e.g., “What happened?”), and they
make more errors in response to direct questions, such as yes/no queries
(e.g., “Was his shirt red?” “Did he shut the door?” “Did he kiss you?”),
option-posing queries (“Did he have a knife or a gun?” “Was his hair
straight, curly, or braided?”), and misleading questions (e.g., “He took your
pants off first, didn’t he?” when in fact, he did not; Dent & Stephenson,
1979; Goodman, Bottoms, Schwartz-Kenney, & Rudy, 1991; but see Ceci,
Papierno, & Kulkofsky, 2007). Postevent misinformation that is stated as a
presumption (e.g., “How fast was the car going when it passed the barn on
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the country road?” when in fact there was no barn) is also more likely to
contaminate young children’s memory reports than those of older children
and adults (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987; Schwartz-Kenney & Goodman,
1999), although adults can also be susceptible to such false information
(Loftus, 1979). Although by about the age of 5 or 6 years, children often can
identify a culprit as accurately as adults when presented with photo lineups
that contain the perpetrator (Goodman, Hirschman, Hepps, & Rudy, 1991),
younger children are also more likely than older children and adults to
falsely identify an innocent person in photo lineups that do not include the
offender (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998). There are, however, marked individual
differences at any age; for example, some children as young as 2 or 3 years
can be highly accurate and resistant to false suggestions (Harris, Goodman,
Augusti, Chae & Alley, 2009).
Children are likely to have weaker memory traces than adults and to have
greater difficulty with source monitoring (Howe, 2011; Johnson & Foley,
1984). This then naturally leads to questions, such as whether children can
maintain accuracy of their memory reports as tie goes on and as memory
traces become weaker or source monitoring becomes more difficult. Such
questions have obvious legal relevance because some crimes are not readily
reported; children may need to recall a forensically relevant event that
occurred days, months, or even years earlier. Recently, Peterson (2011)
suggested that children’s reports about personally salient, stressful events
remained accurate even with the passage of years. Yet how researchers
assess the accuracy of these reports affects whether one concludes that
accuracy is maintained or declines over time.
Overall, memory performance tends to improve across childhood and into
adulthood, including on eyewitness memory tasks. However, the research
base mainly concerns children’s memory for unfamiliar people and briefly
witnessed events. Situations about which children testify often involve
familiar people and events that are traumatic or stressful.
Many criminal events are traumatic for children to witness or experience or,
because of their potential for violence, cause child witnesses to experience
considerable distress and anxiety. Thus, research investigating the impact of
violence and stress on memory is of crucial importance to understanding
children’s eyewitness testimony. The extent to which children can
remember and accurately report personally traumatic and stressful events is
a topic of active research. Many children can, under a variety of
circumstances, provide forensically relevant, accurate information about
highly traumatic events they have witnessed or experienced (e.g., D.P.H.
Jones & Krugman, 1986; McWilliams, Narr, Goodman, Ruiz, & Mendoza,
2013). In both children and adults such events typically are recalled more
accurately and for a longer period of time relative to benign or ordinary
events (e.g. Peterson, 2012). Highly distressing events can also be recalled
with error and are not immune to forgetting and distortion, including false
memory, in adults and children (e.g. Hirst et al., 2009; Neisser & Nicole,
1992; Terr, 1983).
In particular, questions arise concerning the external validity of laboratory
research (e.g., how well laboaratory research sufficiently mimics the levels
of distress induced by criminal events) and the internal validity of field
research (e.g., how well field researchers can pin down cause-effect
relations). Ideally, findings from laboratory and field research lead to the
same conclusions, but this is not always so.
In any case, it is clear that many factors play a role in children’s memory for
traumatic and stressful events—too many to review in this chapter. Here we
first consider some of the theoretical issues involved in memory for stressful
and traumatic experiences. We then turn to a subset of the factors that affect
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children’s memory for stressful events, such as age when events occurred,
language and parental factors, centrality of the to-be-remembered
information, whether the individual is a participant or bystander witness,
and whether events are repeated or single occurrences. Additionally, we
review research on physiological stress responses—research that is
furthering our knowledge about how stress affects children’s memory of
traumatic and stressful events. Clearly, a complex multivariate model of
children’s memory for stressful events is needed to integrate disparate
findings.
There has been considerably theoretical debate as to whether memory is
diminished or enhanced for highly stressful experiences (e.g. Christianson,
1992; Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004).
In any case, it is clear that, despite relatively strong retention, memories of
highly stressful and traumatic events still may be subject to distortion and
forgetting in children and adults (Otgaar & Smeets, 2010). … [A]lthough
memory in general is often particularly accurate and enduring for central
details of events relevant to survival (Christianson, 1992), defensive
processes may inhibit encoding, storage, and/or retrieval of memories of
such experiences, leading to memory deficits or distortions in some
individuals (Deffenbacher et al., 2004).
Several studies uncovered links between parents’ attachment-insecurities
and children’s memory for and suggestibility regarding stressful
experiences. For example, children of parents who score relatively high on
measures of attachment avoidance provide less accurate memory reports and
display heightened suggestibility regarding highly stressful medical
procedures (e.g., Goodman, Quas, Batterman-Faunce, Riddlesberger, &
Kuhn, 1997). Moreover, parental attachment insecurities are among the few
individual difference variables that consistently predict children’s
suggestibility.
While theoretical issues continue to be debated and researched, empirical
evidence of children’s memory for stressful events continues to mount and
likely will constrain theory as the field moves forward. In the meantime, a
number of factors have been found to affect children’s memory for stressful
events, some of which we turn to next.
Age at time of a stressful or traumatic event can affect how well it is
remembered later on. … In any case, children’s ability to remember and
accurately report events continues to improve with age.
Also related to children’s memory are language and parent/child
communication factors. Some research has shown that children who
remember an event up to 14 months after it occurred do not use language in
their descriptions that was not in their vocabularies when it occurred (Hayne
& Simcock, 2009). Although such findings suggest that preverbal memories
cannot be recalled verbally, more recent research indicates that some
children can, at times, recall information for which they did not have those
specific words earlier (Morris & Baker-Ward, 2007). These findings have
fascinating legal implications, given the fact that children’s competence to
testify is assessed at the time of testimony rather than at the time of the
alleged offence (Lyon, 2011).
These findings suggest that discussions parents have with their children
about traumatic events can assist with the encoding and storage processes
necessary for memory retrieval (Chae, Ogle, & Goodman, 2009).
Another parental factor related to children’s memory for traumatic and
stressful events is parenting style.
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An important factor that plays a role in memory for events in general is the
centrality of the information (i.e., how central or peripheral the details are
that need to be remembered). For traumatic events, however, a “tunnel
effect” can occur in memory, with heightened memory for central details
and diminished memory for peripheral details (Christianson, 1992).
Typically (albeit not always), in criminal investigations, central details are
of most importance. As a general rule, crime witnesses are most likely to
encode and remember central aspects of the crome better than more
peripheral details.
Of interest, the classification of a to-be-remembered detail as a central or
peripheral event may differ depending on how relevant that detail is to an
individual’s goals. For example, an individual whose goal is to suppress
emotion may remember an emotional event less well than an individual not
so motivated (Levine & Edelstein, 2009). Contradictory findings about
memory for central and peripheral details may result in part from a lack of
consideration of individual goals as well as from differences in how
centrality id defined across studies (Paz-Alonso, Goodman & Ibabe, in
press).
Even if children remember fewer peripheral compared to central details or
remember peripheral details incorrectly, memory for central details still can
be quite accurate. However, heightened memory for central versus
peripheral details is not consistently found as a function of age across
studies. … These contrasting findings may reflect not only differences in
how researchers operationalize centrality distinctions but also differences in
what children of various ages consider to be central versus peripheral to the
main stressor.
Many child eyewitness memory studies concern bystander witnesses—for
example, children who view others performing actions. However, there is
evidence to suggest that children who actively participate in events, more as
a victim might, remember the event better than do bystander witnesses (e.g.
Rudy & Goodman, 1991). … Another important factor in the participantover-bystander memory advantage may be activation of self-schema. That
is, when self-schema are activated, a richly elaborated memory structure
may help maintain storage of the memory. Although self-schema may also
be activated when watching an event unfold, which could then support
accurate memory (Baker-Ward, Hess & Flannagan, 1990; Howe & Otgaar,
2013), perhaps especially when the event has high personal relevance to a
child’s life (McWilliams et al., 2013).
How frequently events are experienced is another factor likely to affect how
well a stressful event is remembered. Unfortunately, little rigorous scientific
research has examined children’s memory for single versus repeated
stressful or nonstressful events that were highly stressful. … Children may
confuse details across events yet still may report the gist accurately (Pipe et
al., 2004). More research is needed, however, on children’s memory for
repeated stressful events.
Researchers are just beginning to evaluate children’s physiological distress
in relation to children’s memory for stressful events.
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Because attention is limited, people cannot encode everything about real-life
events, particularly those as complex as most crimes. We have reviewed
some of the factors that are related to how well children remember traumatic
and stressful events. A complex multivariate model may be needed to create
a clearer picture of children’s memory for such experiences.
[Just noting that this section is here, but does not contain any instructions to
evaluators, so not including excerpts in the compendium at this time.]
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Children’s suggestibility and false memory are crucial issues in the study of
children’s eyewitness testimony. The devastating consequences of children
making false accusations were demonstrated during the 1980s in the
McMartin child sexual abuse trial.

Generally speaking, age is the strongest predictor of suggestibility and false
memory reports; younger children are typically more suggestible and more
prone to false memory reports than older children, adolescents, and adults
(e.g. Goodman, Bottoms, Rudy, Davis, & Schwartz-Kenney, 2001; Malloy
& Quas, 2009). That said, there are important individual differences in
suggestibility and misinformation effects within any age-group. Although it
is difficult to predict such individual differences, child forensic interviewers
should be knowledgeable about the possibility that children may incorporate
interviewer suggestions or misinformation and should have appropriate
expectaions for children relevant to the children’s ages (Lamb, Malloy, &
La Rooy, 2011; Malloy & Quas, 2009). It is important for investigators and
interviewers to consider how children’s suggestibility can influence their
reports.
Suggestibility has been defined as “the degree to which encoding, storage,
retrieval, and reporting of events can be influenced by a range of social and
psychological factors” (Ceci & Bruck, 1993, p. 404). In the McMartin case,
it is largely agreed within the scientific community that the police
investigators and parents suggestively questioned the children, which
ultimately may have implanted, through misinformation, abuse details in the
children’s memories or at least in the children’s reports. This form of
suggestibility—that of incorporating misinformation into one’s own
memory—not only has crucial legal consequences but it also has important
theoretical implications for developmental and cognitive psychology (Ceci
& Bruck, 2006; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Loftus, 1975;
Pezdek & Roe, 1995).
Several theories have been proposed to account for the mechanisms
associated with the form of suggestibility that can lead to memory report
errors. Memory factors have been emphasized in most of these theoretical
accounts. … Although memory factors undoubtedly play a vital role, social
factors (e.g. demand characteristics) are also important in producing
misinformation effects (Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2011). Cognitive and
psychosocial mechanisms that develop throughout childhood bolster one’s
abilities to resist suggestion or misinformation. Cognitive and
developmental theories assist in identifying the mechanisms that may be
associated with suggestibility’s influence on children’s memory reports
(Chae et al., 2011; McWilliams, Bederian-Gardner, Hobbs, Bakanosky, &
Goodman, 2012).
From a memory trace theoretical perspective, memories are preserved as
traces, a consolidation of current features or attributes related to the person
and event. When activated, these traces assist in recalling the details
associated with that memory. Pezdek and Roe (1995) asserted that when
memory traces are strong (i.e., they contain elaborative details, such as of
time, place, individuals involved in the event) and are preserved during
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memory storage, they will be most resistant to suggestion. Children who
have strong memory traces or representations can dismiss externally
generated suggestions because they can directly compare information being
suggested back to the trace that was recovered and conclude that the two
accounts do not match.
However, when traces are weak, children may incorporate suggestions or
misinformation because they can no longer counter with their own
representations.
This idea of strong versus weak traces is also relevant to Brainerd and
Reyna’s fuzzy-trace theory (FTT, 2002), which stipulates a dual process
model for memory encoding and retrieval processes. Memories are
represented as either verbatim traces, which hold specific details about the
memory, or gist traces, which hold the general meaning of the memory. …
As verbatim traces hold more details that cannot be maintained for every
memory experienced, these traces decay more quickly, often leaving only
the gist trace behind. Gist traces are more susceptible to suggestion and
misinformation as the original record of the event (i.e., verbatim trace)
cannot be recovered to counter the suggestion. This effect is strongest when
the suggestion is more similar to the gist trace and cannot be temporally
discriminated from the original trace (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004; Reyna &
Brainerd, 2011). … Therefore, older children, who have stronger verbatim
traces, should be less suggestible than younger children, according to FTT,
although adults may be more subject to certain false memories than
children, if the false memories are supported by gist traces (Brainerd,
Reyna, & Ceci, 2008).
Source monitoring (SM) theory (Johnson et al., 1993) has also been used to
account for children’s suggestibility and misinformation effects. According
to SM theory, details for memories are discriminated against one another via
a decision process in which one attributes the source of these details using
perceptual processes (i.e., perceiving a cue) and cognitive processes (e.g.,
retrieval strategies). During retrieval, individuals engaged in decision
processes regarding source information (where, when, what, and with whom
details of events). Cues that are retrieved are evaluated with reality
monitoring (i.e., deciding if the detail actually occurred in reality or if it
only were thought about), and external monitoring (i.e., deciding if details
were from this event or another event) processes. The SM theoretical
framework assumes that certain cognitive abilities are in place to assist
retrieval during more difficult monitoring times (e.g., decision making,
metamemory strategies). Such abilities change and improve in children as
they develop (e.g., Bjorklund, Dukes, & Douglas-Brown, 2008; Ghetti,
2008; D.S. Lindsay, 2002).
[The Mr. Science study (Poole & Lindsay, 1995)] is often cited as an
indication that children can be led into false reports through source
monitoring errors. In this study and others, according to SM theory, younger
children likely did not have the cognitive abilities to monitor the source of
the information experienced in the event versus suggested by their parents
(or the interviewer) well enough to answer the questions correctly.
However, it is important to note that even young children, despite making
more errors than older children, appropriately reject many of the false event
details in most of these studies (e.g., Goodman et al., 2001).
False memories of entire events also can be formed based on suggestibility.
False memory formation has been explained by theories previously
mentioned. Like suggestibility, the ease with which false memories can be
implanted tends to decline as children age and acwuire more cognitive
abilities that allow them to create lasting memories and monitor intrusions
(e.g., Ghetti, 2008; Otgaar & Candel, 2011). However, older children and
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adults succumb to false memory paradigms that parallel eyewitness abilities
(see Otgaar & Candel, 2011), false memories are more frequently observed
in younger children compared to older children (but see articles on the
Deese-Roediger-McDerott (DRM) false memory illusion; Brainerd, Reyna
& Zember, 2011). It is likely that older children’s experiences and
improvements in cognitive abilities permit them to evaluate the plausibility
of suggested events.
So far, we have mainly discussed suggestibility and false memory trends as
they relate to theoretical issues. However, it is important to review empirical
evidence concerning misleading questions and repeated interviews
specifically, because these topics are of considerable legal concern. Our
discussion is not exhaustive of all the factors that affect children’s memory,
suggestibility, and false memory formation (for review, see Blandon, Gitlin
& Pezdek, 2009; Bruck & Melnyk, 2004; Malloy, Johnson, & Goodman,
2013; Malloy & Quas, 2009).
Since the mid-19980s, children’s suggestibility has been examined in
relation to interviewer question type, specifically using interviews that
include misleading questions about the event the child is recalling. In these
paradigms, researchers have children (often preschool age) participate in
controlled events and, after a specific period of delay, interview them
suggestively. That is, questions asked by the interviewers presuppose or
introduce false information about the event to examine whether children
acquiesce to these suggestions or appropriately deny them (e.g., the
question, “Did you see the man knock over and break the lamp?” presumes
that the man did knock over and break a lamp). Children’s suggestibility is
then scored or characterized by the likelihood or frequency of acquiescence
to interviewer suggestions. Typical age trends emerge under this
experimental paradigm; older children are less suggestible than younger
children, as older children acquiesce less frequently, regardless of whether
the event is distressing (e.g., Goodman et al., 1997; Peterson, 2011) or
commonplace (e.g., Quas et al., 2007). However, it should be noted that
children are often less suggestible about personally significant negative
events (e.g., being hit, being naked, having their private parts touched) than
about more mundane or positive experiences (Rudy & Goodman, 1991;
Schaaf, Alexander, & Goodman, 2008). In some studies, even 4-year-old
children’s rates of false affirmation to abuse-related questions were
extremely low (Rudy & Goodman, 1991).
Although these data indicate that children succumb to suggestion when
misleading questions are asked, it is difficult to know whether the memory
of the event has changed or whether the report of the memory has changed.
That is, when children incorporate suggestions in their reports, does this
occur because they are experiencing pressure from the interviewer or
because their memory of the event has been distorted? This can be a crucial
legal issue.
In a similar vein, do these studies accurately portray interviewer-interviewee
conversational nuances that characterize forensic interviews with children?
Gilstrap and Ceci (2005) addressed this concern by highlighting that most of
the laboratory studies assessing children’s suggestibility do so by way of
structured interviews in which all the questions are predetermined by the
researchers; these interviews are imposed to ensure the scientific merit (i.e.,
internal validity) of the research. Results from studies that use structured
interviews may not apply to forensic interviews wherein interviewers
typically are not supplied with a standardized set of questions. Rather these
interviews are driven not only by the interviewer’s agenda but also by the
child’s report.
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In contrast to children succumbing or agreeing with a forensic interviewer
suggestion as found in several studies (e.g., Leichtman & Ceci, 1995; Poole
& Lindsay, 1995), children in the Gilstrap and Ceci (2005) study were more
likely to respond to misleading questions with denial. Instead of interviewer
bias predicting children’s acquiescence, the children’s own behavior
preceding the misleading question was more strongly predictive of whether
they succumbed to suggestion. These findings were obtained by a novel
approach of analyzing children’s reports, as they occurred in a transactional
exchange throughout the interview, rather than considering only the
immediate antecedent (i.e., interviewer’s misleading question) of a child’s
error. Such statistical designs appear to be particularly ecologically valid as
applied to forensic interviews, although more research is needed to validate
these findings and tease apart additional effects that children’s reports may
have on the type of questions interviewers ask.
It would be an error to assume that empirical studies using structured
interviews are flawed. Researchers should embrace multiple approaches to
fully understand conditions that minimize or exacerbate children’s
suggestibility. And there may be multiple suggestive influences on children.
Garven and colleagues contended that it is not only misleading questions
that influence adults’ and children’s’ suggestibility but the additive factors
of reinforcement, social pressure, and imagery (Garven, Wood, & Malpass,
2000).
As researchers attempt to replicate real-world circumstances, some have
acknowledged that the person to whom children most often disclose certain
crimes (e.g., child sexual abuse) is a nonoffending parent, typically mothers.
Few parents have training in interviewing child eyewitnesses, yet their
collection of their children’s statements holds forensic significance for
whether children’s reports will be seen as believable. Therefore, researchers
should study the veracity of eyewitnesses statements when children disclose
to a familiar person, such as a parent.
These findings suggest that children, when comfortable and familiar with
the interviewer, correct errors and resist suggestion more easily than with a
stranger. These findings offer further support for the importance of rapport
building between the interviewer and child eyewitness as well as researchers
examining the full range of ecologically valid factors that my influence
children’s suggestibility: Research on the effects of misleading questions
should address not only what is asked but also how and by whom.
In the forensic context, children are often interviewed repeatedly. For
example, first responders, police detectives, social workers, prosecuting and
defense attorneys, clinicians, and judges may all need to question child
eyewitnesses. It is therefore important to determine whether repetition has
deleterious, harmless, or positive effects on the accuracy of children’s
reports. … There are several reasons to suspect that repeated interviews may
increase errors in children’s reports, especially if misinformation is included
in the interviews. … In contrast, however, others argue that repeated
interviews (even those with misleading questions) do not necessarily have
negative effects on children’s reports and, under certain conditions, that they
actually may assist children in denying new false information by solidifying
accurate memories reported previously (e.g., Goodman & Quas, 2008).
This finding suggests that suggestibility effects are more problematic when
children’s initial memories are weak. Researchers should therefore avoid
overgeneralized assumptions that repeated interviews compromise
children’s memory accuracy; instead, these findings should enlighten
debates on the complexity of factors influencing children’s reports and their
interactive or culminating effects (delay since the event, number of previous
interviews, exposure to misinformation, etc.).
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Considerable attention has been paid to individual difference predictors,
aside from age, of children’s memory and suggestibility. In legal cases, the
question is typically whether the child witness before the court is likely to
be accurate, not whether children of a certain age in general tend to be
accurate. Thus, being able to determine whether a particular child is accurate
is of considerable legal interest. Unfortunately, in research studies, even
when significant correlations are uncovered, the predictors account for
relatively little variability in performance and thus are not particularly
informative for the courts in evaluating a specific child’s accuracy.
As a possible individual difference that might be related to the accuracy of
children’s eyewitness memory, intelligence has captured empirical attention,
although the findings are somewhat mixed. … Thus, intelligence appears to
be somewhat predictive of the accuracy of children’s reports, but primarily
when studies include developmentally delayed individuals compared to
individuals scoring in the normal ranges of intelligence. … Individuals with
particularly lower intelligence may be more suggestible; however,
intelligence is unrelated to suggestibility in persons of average to aboveaverage intelligence.
Although age is linked with verbal abilities, there are wide variations in
verbal abilities even when controlling for age statistically or comparing
children who are the same age. One might expect that because reporting of
past events and responding to interviewer questions in the forensic context
are, in effect, verbal conversations, children who have a better
understanding of communicative nuances, receptive and expressive
language skills, and bigger vocabularies may be better able to articulate their
experiences than children who have more limited verbal abilities.
Generally, research reveals that children’s proficiencies in communication
assist them in being more accurate in recalling past experiences and more
resistant to suggestions from others. … These results imply that children
with greater verbal skills were more accurate and less suggestible than their
peers.
However, in other studies, no significant associations emerged between
verbal skill and suggestibility (e.g., Bright-Paul & Jarrold, 2009; Quas &
Lench, 2007), and the opposite effect has even been reported, with verbal
skills being positively associated with children’s increased suggestibility
(e.g., Kulkofsky & Klemfuss, 2008).
This inconsistency could in part be due to methodological differences in
how the type of verbal ability (e.g., vocabulary, receptive language,
narrative quality) was assessed.
In the following section, we discuss various factors associated with
disclosure. These include reasons children may delay or avoid disclosing
abuse, types of emotions children typically express during disclosure, and
possible determinants of lying during disclosure.
Children often delay disclosing sexual abuse (London, Bruck, Ceci, &
Shuman, 2005). In fact, in an analysis of 10 retrospective studies on the
topic, London et al. (2005) reported that an average of only 39% of adults
who reported being sexually abused indicated they had disclosed during
childhood.
There are apparently numerous misunderstandings among laypeople about
how children disclose sexual abuse. For example, demeanor during
disclosure often is used to assess the credibility of child victims (Myers,
Redlich, Goodman, Prizmich, & Imwinkelreid, 1999; Regan & Baker,
1998). Yet research indicates that, during forensic interviews, children
appear less upset than might be expected. … The overall picture indicates
that, during abuse interviews, children show less emotion than possibly
expected. However, they do, on average, show some negative emotions, and
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their displays of emotion vary over the course of the interviews and as a
function of abuse severity.
When a child discloses information to authorities, concerns may be raised
about the child’s honesty. There are many legal situations in which children
may be motivated to lie (e.g., if coached not to reveal a parental
transgression). An antisocial like is specifically meant to protect oneself
from harm or to provide oneself with personal gain (Talwar & Lee, 2008a).
Although children’s’ antisocial lies can certainly play a role in legal cases
(e.g., when the child is accused of delinquent acts), when the child is a
witness or a victim, concerns usually center on the child being coached to
knowingly make a false allegation (e.g., in a custody case, to accuse the
father of sexual abuse so that the child can stay with the mother) or protect a
culprit who has asked the child to lie or keep a secret.
Lying appears to develop through three main stages: (1) beginning to make
untrue statements at around 2 to 3 years of age, (2) lying to conceal one’s
own transgressions at 3 to 4 years of age, and (3) being able to maintain lies
at 7 to 8 years of age (Talwar & Lee, 2008a). The development of children’s
lie-telling is related to Theory of Mind ability (Talwar, Gordon, & Lee,
2007) and executive functioning (Talwar & Lee, 2008b). Of interest, most
research has not shown a relation between understanding of lying and actual
lying to conceal a transgression (London & Nuñez, 2002; Talwar, Lee, Bala
& Lindsay, 2002).
A forensically relevant question with respect to children’s lying is whether
the lie is to conceal a transgression committed by someone emotionally
close to the children. Children may be unlikely to lie to conceal the
transgression of a relative stranger, although younger children are more
likely to do so than older children (Pipe & Wilson, 1994). … Although such
findings provide important insight about children’s lying behavior, it should
be noted that the transgressions in these studies were quite mild (e.g.,
breaking a toy). The dynamics could well change for lies about more serious
acts, such as child maltreatment and other types of violent crime.
Children can and do lie to protect themselves and protect others. When
children are lying in such a manner, can these lies be detected? Most studies
indicate that adults are not accurate at detecting children’s lies (Crossman &
Lewis, 2006; Goodman et al., 2006) and that they are no better at detecting
children’s lies than adults’ lies (Goodman et al., 2006). Coached likes by
older children may be particularly difficult to detect (K.L. Warren, Dodd,
Raynor & Peterson, 2012). However, Nysse-Carris, Bottoms, and Salerno
(2011) found that adults could detect 3-to-6-year-old children’s likes about
their parents’ transgressions at above chance levels. A goal for future
research is to better explain the difficulty in detecting children’s lying.
Eyewitness identifications are crucial in the forensic context. Legal
authorities need to know who committed the crime in question. Often when
children are victims of or bystanders to crime, they may be presented with a
photo lineup or a live lineup and asked to identify the culprit. Considerable
research has examined factors that affect children’s eyewitness
identification accuracy.
Before discussing how research can inform police lineup procedures for
child witnesses, we first briefly explain the theoretical underpinnings and
mechanisms for face processing and face recognition in children and adults,
which can affect crucial cognitive processes involved in picking out a
suspect from a lineup.
As is true for memory generally, facial recognition improves as children age
(Lawrence et al., 2008). … This age effect remained even after controlling
for intelligence, which was also related to face identification accuracy. …
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With age, cross-racial face identification becomes less accurate than samerace facial identification.
For the child eyewitness, these results suggest that, for older children and
perhaps younger ones as well, race effects may influence eyewitness
testimony if the victim and perpetrator are of different races and the victim
has not been meaningfully and sufficiently exposed to members of the
perpetrator’s race. Similar influences are also at play for identification of
faces representing different genders and ages from the eyewitnesses (Scherf
& Scott, 2012).
In face identification studies, where theoretical issues are tested, children
and adults typically are briefly exposed to photographs of faces both at
study and at test. However, in reality, eyewitnesses observe actual people
live and over extended periods of time, which likely affects encoding and
memory. It has therefore been important to examine eyewitness
identification in more realistic studies. Such research reveals that, by the age
of about 5 or 6, children are often as accurate as adults in identifying people
with whom they have interacted when presented with target-present lineups
(i.e. lineups that include the target person—the “culprit”). However, when
the actual culprit is not in the lineup (i.e., “target-absent” lineups), even
older children (e.g. 10-year-olds) are more likely than adults to falsely
identify an individual and less likely to report that the target person is not
included in the lineup (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1999). … Some individuals may
have a tendency to guess. This is a serious concern for criminal
investigators, as children and adults may assume that the task is to identify
one of the choices rather than to judge whether the perpetrator is present at
all (Beresford & Blades, 2006; Humphries, Holliday, & Flowe, 2012).
Eyewitness identification procedures have received heavy criticism for
improper or suggestive methods that could taint an eyewitness’s memory
(e.g., Wells & Loftus, 2003; Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). Research has
identified several factors that promote the fairness of lineups, such as foils
appearing similar to the suspect, clear pre-lineup instructions (e.g., “The
perpetrator may or may not appear here”), and avoiding use of authority
approval or confirmation (Wells & Loftus, 2003). Given children’s greater
suggestibility compared to adults, such factors may be particularly important
when children are subjected to lineup procedures.
This research has also revealed that simultaneous lineups, wherein the
suspect is viewed simultaneously among other foils, have the potential to be
suggestive. … Instead of simultaneous lineups, it is suggested that
investigators show eyewitnesses a sequential lineup, with the eyewitness
making a yes/no judgment for each person.
Researchers should address such discrepancies to identify the most effective
means of administering lineups to children. Moreover, instructions to
improve lineup performance in young preschoolers (e.g., 3-year-olds) still
are sorely needed.

When children testify in court at jury trials, judges and jurors have the
difficult task of assessing the accuracy of the children’s testimony.
Characteristics of children and of the jurors themselves may affect whether
children are believed or not. IN some types of cases, such as in child sexual
abuse trials, jurors claim they consider child-victim characteristics to be the
most important evidence (Myers et al., 1999). It is thus important to
understand legal decision makers’ reactions to child witnesses. Much of the
research in this area has focused on child victim-witnesses in sexual abuse
trials. This is in part because, at least in the United States, children are most
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likely to testify in criminal proceedings when they are victims of sexual
abuse (Goodman, Quas, Bulkley, & Shapiro, 1999). … In mock jury
research, two of the most widely studied victim characteristics have been
age and gender of the victim. The effects of victim age on jury decisions
differ depending on whether witness competence or witness honesty is
emphasized (Bottoms, Golding, Stevenson, Wiley, & Yozwiak, 2007).
In real trials, child victim gender has not been consistently found to be as
influential on jury decision making as child age (Myers, 1999). …
[R]egarding juror gender, numerous studies reveal that female mock jurors
are more empathetic to child victims overall and more likely to believe them
in child sexual abuse cases (Bottoms et al., 2007).
A common stereotype of minorities is of increased sexual promiscuity and
experience (Alley, 2012). As a result, jurors may view sexual abuse of
minority children as less heinous and might hos the victim more responsible.
There have been few studies examining these questions directly, but
evidence so far has shown that mock jurors hold Caucasian victims
compared to African American or Hispanic American victims as less
responsible for their abuse (Bottoms, Davis, & Epstein, 2004).
Victim demeanor is especially important in jurors’ impressions of witnesses,
including children. It is considered so relevant by the courts that jury
instructions frequently direct jurors to consider facial expressions when
judging the credibility of a witness (A.J. Williams, 2008). Adults who had
just served jury duty in child abuse trials rated facial expressions and
demeanor as being important in forming impressions regarding the child
victims’ believability when providing testimony (Myers et al., 1999).
Overall research on emotions in legal contexts indicates that adult
expectations of children’s emotional displays influence how children are
judged. … Most studies of jury decision making involve mock jurors, and,
as such, methodological issues limit the generalizability of the findings. …
The methodological limitations of jury decision-making research should
temper the interpretations of the results and their extrapolations to the real
world. However, this line of research has been invaluable in both identifying
the factors that are most likely to influence actual jurors and the areas in
which juror expectations contrast with actual child behaviors.
Under certain conditions, psychologists and other professionals may be
asked to provide testimony in child witness cases (Myers, 1993b). There is
growing consensus that expert witnesses can help jurors evaluate the
accuracy of children’s testimony (e.g., Bottoms et al., 2007; Quas,
Thompson, & Clarke-Stewart, 2005). Nonetheless, it is still a matter of
controversy as to the conditions under which expert witnesses significantly
affect jurors’ decision making and verdicts (e.g., Lyon, 2002).
Most of the studies on expert testimony that we discuss here concern child
sexual abuse cases or “repressed memory” cases involving allegations of
past child sexual abuse. These studies typically present undergraduate
students with vignettes of trials. However, in a few cases, the researcher
analyzed actual legal cases (e.g., Read, Connolly, & Welsh, 2006).
There are numerous additional ways that expert witnesses might influence
jurors’ decision making. …Thus jurors may need more than one reason to
alter their verdict behavior.
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Expert testimony could also counteract jurors’ misunderstanding of
children’s memory and suggestibility. Quas, Thompson, et al. (2005)
examined whether expert witnesses are needed to educate jury-eligible
adults or if such adults already have adequate knowledge about children’s
memory and suggestibility. Participants did not recognize the powerful
influence of stereotypic inductions on children’s accuracy as eyewitnesses.
It may be that, even if individuals are knowledgeable and skeptical about
some aspects of children’s suggestibility, they are less aware of adverse
effects of subtle but still-influential interview manipulations. There was
considerable variability in individuals’ knowledge about children’s
eyewitness abilities; individuals had both inaccurate and accurate beliefs,
which could indicate that expert testimony is potentially important (Quas,
Thompson, et al., 2005).
These findings suggest that expert testimony on interview methods may help
laypeople make more informed decisions about the reliability of children’s
reports. … Finally, although expert testimony might influence the outcomes
of trials involving child witnesses, the effects seem to fluctuate depending
on the party that uses the testimony and the facts of the case at hand: defense
alone, prosecutor alone, or concurrent opposing experts.
Concern about child witnesses experiencing secondary trauma while
testifying has resulted in the development of court modifications and system
interventions to reduce such trauma (Hall & Sales, 2008). Protective
services and legal interventions to ameliorate child witness trauma alleviate
children’s emotional distress, promote the well-being of child victims, and
support children in providing reliable testimony (Malloy, Mitchell, Block,
Quas, & Goodman, 2006; Troxel et al., 2009).
Like adults, children experience both pre- and posttestimony anxiety,
especially if they have to give testimony in front of defendants in open court
in criminal actions (e.g., Goodman et al., 1992). To help alleviate potential
trauma for child witnesses, statements made outside of the courtroom (e.g.,
through interviews with third parties such as forensic interviews, video
recordings, or CCTV) are sometimes permitted. Hearsay testimony allows
children’s out-of-court statements (e.g., to their mothers or other family
members) to be considered evidence in court proceedings on behalf of child
victims, at least under certain conditions. In some cases, forensic interviews
with child witnesses may be video recorded and presented as hearsay
evidence to the court. CCTV allows a child to give evidence outside the
courtroom in front of a camera, with the image and sound immediately
relayed to the courtroom for viewing while the child undergoes direct and
cross-examination.
Related concerns center on several assumptions about the value and
significance of defendants’ abilities to confront witnesses, including (a) the
stress of testifying on the stand and facing the accused improves the
accuracy of witness testimony; (b) the jury’s ability to detect deception is
impeded unless the witness testifies live in court; and (c) the introduction of
out-of-court statements may negatively bias the jury’s perception of the
defendant and adversely affect case outcome. Using mock trial and juror
interview studies, researchers continue to examine these issues in attempts
to find a reasonable balance between the rights of child witnesses and the
accused (e.g., Landstrom, Granhang, & Hartwig, 2007; McAuliff & Kovera,
2012).
The assumption that jurors can best detect the truthfulness or deceptiveness
of a witness when a witness is testifying live in front of them is not
supported by the prevailing research literature.
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The format or mode of testimony may be an important determinant of
perceived child witness credibility and truthfulness as children who testify
live are generally seen more positively or truthful than children who testify
outside of court (Landstrom et al., 2007). … These findings support
previous research where children testifying live, or more proximal to adult
observers, were seen more positively and given greater credibility than
children testifying out of court in more distal locations (Goodman et al.,
2006; Landstrom et al., 2007).
For hearsay testimony, Warren, Nunez, Keeney, Buck, and Smith (2002)
found that adults who appear in court to repeat children’s statements were
viewed as more accurate than children giving firsthand, live testimony. In
that regard, the hearsay testimony effectiveness may depend on the status of
perceived credibility of the adult (e.g., doctor, law enforcement officer) who
testifies about the child’s out-of-court statements (Ross, Lindsay, & Marsil,
1999). Further research is warranted to determine the impact of hearsay
evidence on judicial processes as well as on the well-being of child
witnesses.
The use of out-of court testimony for child witnesses is widely accepted and
established in a number of countries. In Australia, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom, a two-way closed circuit television (CCTV) approach is
employed, allowing interactive testimony between attorneys and the judge
while a child witness is outside of court in a separate room. In the United
Kingdom, the videotaped forensic interview serves as direct examination in
court, and CCTV is used for cross-examination purposes. In other countries,
such as Finland, Norway, and Sweden, child witnesses are video-recorded
during preliminary police interviews, and those recording serve as direct and
cross-examination. One-way CCTV is employed at times in the United
States although it remains controversial as some argue that it violates the 6 th
and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which provide defendants
the right to confront their accusers during criminal trials and to due process,
respectively (Hall & Sales, 2008). Following a landmark case in which the
U.S. Supreme Court decided in favor of the use of one-way CCTV in child
sexual abuse cases under certain conditions (Maryland v. Craig, 1990),
courts in the United States are being asked to rule on the use of one-way
CCTV.
Although the ability to confront a witness is believed to produce more
accurate testimony, research has not supported this belief.
One concern about child witnesses testifying through CCTV is the
perception of less emotional impact compared to live court testimony
(McAuliff & Kovera, 2012). The emotional impact appears to be eve less
with video-recorded child testimony (Landstrom, 2008). Orcutt et al. (2001)
reported that children testifying via CCTV were seen as less accurate, less
believable, less consistent, less confident, less attractive, and less intelligent
than children who testified in open court.
The child advocacy center (CAC) multidisciplinary approach to child
forensic interviews is designed to reduce secondary victimization in children
by (a) facilitating collaboration between relevant agencies (e.g., child
protective services, law enforcement, prosecution, mental health, and
medicine), (b) providing child-sensitive interview settings, and (c) limiting
the number of interviews a child victim experiences. By providng
supportive services to child witnesses, CACs aim to reduce trauma
associated with the investigative and legal processes.
Evaluations of CACs are promising and suggest they decrease delays
between law enforcement reports and indictment dates (Walsh, Lippert,
Cross, Maurice, & Davison, 2008), increase access to medical examinations,
improve the experience of nonoffending parents during the investigation
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process, and decrease the level of fear experienced by children during
interviews (L.M. Jones, Cross, Walsh, & Simone, 2007). … Data are still
emerging relevant to the efficacy of CACs, but the accumulating research
suggests CACs are likely to be helpful to child witnesses and families
involved in criminal proceedings.
Children pose many dilemmas for the legal system. Yet to protect children
and others from harm and ensure justice, society has little choice but to
include child witnesses in legal cases, especially when other evidence is
lacking or when the children’s testimony plays a key role in a prosecution.
… It is clear that many countries in the world are—or soon will be—
struggling with how and when to listen to child witnesses in the legal
context. Fortunately, psychological science is in an excellent position to
make a meaningful and important contribution to this effort.
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Chapter 15: Child Abuse and Neglect
494
The Nature of
State action in cases of child maltreatment represents a direct conflict
Abuse and
with family privacy and parental liberty; as such, it is an area of the
Neglect
law in which the complex and sometimes confusing mixture of
Proceedings;
interests among child, family, and state is starkly presented. For
Philosophical
example, the state has an interest in the socialization of the child to be
Dilemmas
a productive citizen, but it also has an interest in the preservation of
the family as a basic social institution and a buffer between the state
and the individual. Similarly, parents are usually assumed to act on
behalf of the child, but their interests may be demonstrably in conflict
with, or at least different from, the child’s. The child has an interest
in preserving his or her care and relationships (and therefore in
parental autonomy), but he or she may also have independent
interests in liberty and privacy. … The attempt to balance the state’s
interest in protecting children with the parents’ interest in family
privacy is especially troublesome because of questions about the
state’s ability to fulfill its interest. The documented lack of stability in
foster care in most jurisdictions frames the balancing of interest in
terms of a dreadful dilemma: Are children worse off in the are of
abusing and neglecting parents or in that of the state? Although there
are no clear answers from that question yet, the fact that it is seriously
posed indicates both the depth of controversy about policies
concerning child maltreatment and the widespread skepticism about
the ability of social service and mental health professionals to
evaluate possible maltreatment validity and to treat parents and
children successfully.
494Stages of the
[abuse-reporting statues that now exist in every state] usually require
495
Legal Process
certain categories of professionals, most prominently mental health
professionals, to report any case in which they have reasonable cause
to suspect that child abuse or neglect has occurred. Therefore, initial
state intervention, in the form of investigation and any emergency
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action, often takes place on the basis of an assessment by a
professional. This process has been subject to numerous criticisms.
There is an adjudication of whether the allegation is valid—that is,
whether there is a legally sufficient basis for the state to assume
jurisdiction over the child and family. It is at this phase that
definitional problems and questions of the proper balance between
state and parental authority are most directly presented.
Both kinds of questions demand difficult predictions of future
parental behavior and the efficacy of treatment, and both again
present issues concerning the proper reach of the state and the proper
deference to parents.
The general problem of balancing state and parental interests, and the
corollary problem of the proper level of involvement of mental health
professionals, arise at several points in the process. There is no
consensus on these questions, and different answers may be given for
different stages of the proceedings.
The fact that the Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect have never
been adopted as policy by the American Bar Association (unlike
almost every other volume of the Juvenile Justice Standards) is
illustrative of the deep and long-standing divisions about child
protection policy. Nonetheless, the Standards remain important
authority for the advocates of limited state intervention in cases of
child maltreatment.

Child protection policy thus rest on a complex set of normative and
empirical assumptions, many of which remain unsettled.
Development of a coherent policy is further complicated by often
competing policy goals. For example, policy and practice in regard to
spouse abuse—a context that is in many ways analogous to child
maltreatment—have been guided in recent years by the belief that
these cases involve a clear perpetrator and an obvious victim, and that
the perpetrator must be controlled through, for example, protective
orders prohibiting the perpetrator from access to the family. Although
this model is sometimes applicable in cases of child maltreatment
(notably when a family member is sexually exploitative), the more
common situation is that there is not a clear “bad guy.” Others may
view particular parents as inept, unmotivated, or cruel (indeed so
cruel that retribution may be justifiable), but the child’s welfare may
still demand that attention be given to strengthening the parent-child
relationship.
The historic perspectives on child protection policy have focused for
the most part on the coercive application of state power to prevent
harm to individual children. Accordingly, policy debate has rested
largely on questions about the circumstances justifying such
intrusion, the scope of mandated reporting, and the adequacy of the
investigations triggered by such reports. All too often, public
attention has been directed to exposes of tragedies purportedly
resulting from the incompetence or sloth of workers in Child
Protective Services (CPS)…
Although it is clear that the Zeitgeist has been shifting in the field of
child protection, it is also clear that there still is no consensus among
authorities about even the overall framework that should guide legal
policies on child maltreatment. There is basic disagreement—in
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combination with conceptual unclarity among mental health
professionals about the nature and etiology of child maltreatment—
has led to often vague and disparate standards for the types of
“abuse” and “neglect” that can lead to state intervention.
In view of the ubiquity of corporal punishment as a disciplinary
technique in American families, and the perception that it is relatively
more common in particular sociocultural groups, there is the
possibility of arbitrariness and the probability of unreliability in the
application of broad standards.
It reflects the judgment that even in cases of physical injury, unless
the actual or potential injury is serious, the detriment from coercive
intervention is likely to be greater than the benefit.
Most problematic, however, are those statutes that expressly call for a
value judgment about the limits of acceptable physical punishment
independent of its actual or probably harm. Some states include
“excessive corporal punishment” in the definition of abuse. Courts
are divided as to whether such standards are so vague as to be
violative of due process.
Although some states do define the term in their criminal statutes,
others do not, and some of the states that specifically include sexual
abuse in their civil child abuse statutes do not define it there or in any
other law.
Emotional abuse—also known as “psychological maltreatment”—is
the most controversial aspect of child protection jurisdiction,
probably because it is so difficult to define. … Another problem is
that establishing the basis for emotional harm presents difficult
problems of proof. How does one really know whether a child’s
maladjustment is the result of parental practices? It is clear in this
regard that many children develop appropriately in spite of growing
up with parents who are relatively unresponsive or who have what
may be mistaken ideas about children’s needs. Moreover, given the
myriad parental behaviors that may adversely affect child
development, do we really want to expand jurisdiction to the range of
situations that may be psychologically unhealthy? If not, what is to be
the decision rule for determining whether an unwise practice is also
an abusive practice that warrants state interventions to protect the
child?
Clearly there is great diversity in statutory definitions of abuse and
neglect. Also, there is often sufficient vagueness in state statutes to
raise constitutional questions. Vague or value-laden definitions
unfortunately do often result in arbitrary application. There is solid
empirical evidens of gross unreliability with the groups most likely to
be involved in the initial investigations (i.e. social workers and the
police) being those that tend to have the most expansive concepts of
child abuse and neglect. Even within the social work profession,
though, there is substantial variation in understanding of the
definition of child maltreatment, as a result of differences in the
setting in which social workers are employed and in their theoretical
orientation.
Although the risk to their heath and welfare is substantial, they
typically live in families with multiple complex and serious
problems. Solving those problems is a substantially more difficult
matter than “just” ensuring that they are safe from a brutal parent.
Meanwhile, as already noted, a “backlash” has arisen in which many
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critics argue that the child protection system is prone to overreaching,
sometimes with life-shattering results. … The identification of child
maltreatment as a clinical entity, however, is relatively new. We do
not wish to minimize the realities of the abuse of children, but it is
important to recognize that child abuse and neglect are social
constructs that have entered the behavioral sciences only in the past
half-century.
Historically, definitions of child maltreatment used by social
scientists have tended to be substantially broader than those in law, at
least in the more carefully drafted statutes, and even more diverse. …
The broad and inconsistent definitions used by social scientists are
problematic not only because of the difficulty in applying vague
definitions. They are troublesome also because of their potential
influence on helping professionals, who may apply even broader
standards than the law permits. Inconsistent definitions also make
comparisons across studies difficult, and overly broad definitions
render research questionably applicable to legal policy.
Practitioners and policymakers are still likely to view child
maltreatment from one of these perspectives. The evidence is now
clear, however, that child maltreatment is multiply determined. There
is a need to understand the social factors in interaction with
individual differences in psychological traits. Ecological theories
offer such a complex perspective.
To say that unemployment—or poor impulse control—is the cuase of
child maltreatment is to oversimplify a complex social phenomenon.
Assessment of only one level or aspect of the situation will be shortsighted, and intervention directed at only one level or aspect is
unlikely to have substantial effects.
Abusive and neglecting parents have often been shown to be low in
empathy and in understanding and acceptance of the nuances of
behavior. Even this conclusion, however, must be qualified. The
evidence that maltreating parents have inappropriate expectations—at
least in terms of expectations for their children—is equivocal.
At least in part, this dismal record is the product of insufficient
attention to the complexity and severity of needs of families in which
child maltreatment occurs. Traditional parent-focused casework,
including psychodynamic treatment, is largely ineffective. In
contrast, better success has been obtained in programs that have
incorporated material supports (e.g. emergency cash) and featured
intensive multifaceted interventions.
Lacking a substantial body of knowledge about treatment of older
abused and neglected children, therapists are left to develop treatment
plans and methods that are theoretically grounded.
Child protection bears some resemblance to a civil commitment in
that a forensic clinician may assume the role of decision maker and
even initiator (i.e. mandated reporter) of the process in its early
phases, but then may return to the role of neutral expert at the
adjudication and disposition.
The potential role confusion is even more likely to be present,
however, because of the nature of the questions posed in child
protection cases. After a report is made, state authorities—most often
CPS workers—have two kinds of questions that they are legally
obligated to answer. First, did child maltreatment occur This question
actually is in two forms: Did child abuse or neglect, as defined in the
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criminal and the family codes, occur? Second, if child maltreatment
did occur, what disposition would alleviate the danger? The latter
question potentially involves immediate (emergency), short-term, and
long-term predications and decisions. Note that a positive answer to
the first question necessarily triggers an inquiry in regard to the
second—in effect, an exploration of the coercive steps that the stat
might take to ensure the child’s safety. Even when CPS fails to
substantiate that legally cognizable abuse or neglect has occurred,
however, the state may pose the second question (or an even broader
question about a plan to meet the needs of the child and family) in
regard to voluntary services.
Unfortunately, the former question (What happened?) so dominates
the inquiry in most states that the latter question (What can we do
about it?) often is addressed minimally if at all. Even when
maltreatment is substantiated, often no services at all are delivered; as
noted in the preceding section, children’s own needs for services are
especially unlikely to be addressed.
Such differentiation is likely to reduce the role confusion—and
related ethical problems—of mental health professionals. The
determination of whether abuse or neglect occurred is a judgment
requiring common sense and legal acumen, but it is outside the
specialized knowledge of mental health professionals. On the other
hand, dispositional planning is well within the province of clinicians.
Even on the latter issue, however, clinicians should avoid giving
ultimate-issue opinions about dispositions (e.g. whether the risk to a
child’s safety is so egregious that it warrants placement of the child in
foster care).
These attempts to increase the clarity of various professionals’ roles
in child protection cases are laudable. But clarity in concept does not
necessarily translate into clarity in practice. Three points are
noteworthy here. First, clinicians must remain mindful that although
dispositional issues are conceptually within their province, their
expertise on such issues may still be limited. In particular, the
scientific foundation for risk assessment and treatment planning in
cases of child maltreatment is quite weak.
Second, as this last point implies, determination of the circumstances
in which maltreatment has occurred may be highly relevant in
assessing the risk to the child and developing a plan to mitigate it.
Therefore, drawing a bright line between “investigation” and
“assessment” may be quite difficult.
Third, states increasingly are establishing multi-disciplinary teams for
investigation, assessment, and intervention. Thus responsibility for
decisionmaking about civil child protection petitions, corollary
dispositional matters, and even the filing of criminal charges may be
diffused across the justice, health, mental health, and social service
systems, including mental health professionals practicing in any of
these settings. Although the clinicians’ roles may primarily be to plan
and implement treatment, they are also likely to be involved as team
members in at least an advisory capacity in decisionmaking about the
pursuit of legal matters. In that connection, the clinicians’ role may
be especially ambiguous, because they may be regarded as the
team’s experts in interviewing children. In such capacity, they
may substitute not only for CPS workers, but also for police
officers in conducting part of the investigation. In such a
circumstance, the clinicians could in theory remain information
gatherers without becoming decisionmakers. Nonetheless, when
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clinicians have an explicit role of eliciting information that maybe
used in a prosecution, the possibilities for confusion—not only of
the clinicians themselves but also of the individuals whom they
are interviewing—are obvious.
In most states, the authority for taking a child into emergency custody
rests with CPS, the local law enforcement agency, or both. Under
such a statutory structure, a mental health professional may become
involved in decisionmaking as a consultant assisting the CPS worker
in analyzing the level of imminent risk to the child and considering
steps that might be taken to mitigate that risk. Alternatively, in the
course of tan evaluation or treatment, the mental health professional
may become alarmed at the apparent level of risk and may
recommend—and thereby precipitate—emergency action to protect
the child. In some states, clinicians may also act directly to initiate
emergency protective action.
In the 1980s, as reporting and criminal prosecution of sexual abuse
cases began to increase dramatically, legislators and courts began to
be more concerned about removing barriers to children’s testimony
(given the common lack of eyewitnesses and corroborative physical
evidence in sexual abuse cases) and diminishing the emotional
trauma that many believed the legal process inflicted on child
witnesses. Accordingly, most states adopted statutes and court rules
that changed the procedural and evidentiary rules governing
children’s testimony, at least in abuse cases. Typically, these legal
rules limit the defendant’s confrontation of the child (e.g. through
closed-circuit TV) minimize public assess to the child’s testimony
(e.g., through courtroom closure), and change the way in which the
jury hears the child’s evidence. Although the specific issues vary, the
post-1980 rules typically raise questions about attenuation of the
defendant’s rights to confrontation and a fair, public jury trial, and as
well as of the public’s right (through the press) to access to the trial
process.
Apparently because of prosecutors’ preference for live testimony by
the witnesses they call, their reluctance to open doors to appeal of
convictions, and concern over costs, the special procedures are
applied in relatively few cases in most jurisdictions. Nonetheless, the
number of sexual abuse cases reaching the courts is now so vast and
the issues regarding special procedures so controversial that appellate
courts decide questions of law in thousands of sexual abuse cases
each year.
Though a state-by-state, law-by-law review of the status of special
procedures in child abuse cases is beyond the scope of this book, the
overarching principle of federal constitutional law governing
testimony by child witnesses in abuse cases can be described. …
Specifically, the Court held that although access to evidence and
protection of children’s welfare are compelling state interests
sometimes justifying intrusions on the rights of defendants and to the
public, states cannot establish blanket rules to infringe on such rights
in cases involving child victims. Relying heavily on amicus briefs
filed by the American Psychological Association, the Court
emphasized the need for case-by-case determination of the need for
special procedures.
The Supreme Court also held, however, that such findings could be
made without the trial judge’s direct observation of how the child
behaves in the presence of the defendant: “The trial court in this case,
for example, could well have found, on the basis of expert testimony

228

Recommend
(not
instructions)

Individual
vs. universal
rights
Need (x2)

511

Adjudication;
procedural
issues

511

Adjudication;
procedural
issues

511

Adjudication;
procedural
issues

511512

Adjudication;
procedural
issues

before it, that testimony by the child witnesses in the courtroom in
the defendant’s presence “will result in [each] child suffering serious
emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably
communicate.”
Craig opened the door to testimony by mental health professionals in
hearings to determine whether there is a necessity for special
procedures to protect particular child witnesses. The Maryland statute
and others like it appear on their face to require a type of evaluation
that will be familiar to forensic mental health professionals
specialized in work with children. As one commentator stated, “the
Maryland procedures seem to require a focus on expectable
cognitive-linguistic-social performance when faced with a particular
stressor. This focus is not unlike that of an evaluation of competency
to testify, one element of which is a child’s ability to relate a story
accurately.”
In contrast, in states that base their use of special procedures on their
desire to protect children from psychological harm, “the focus is on
the potential injury to the child of testimony in front of the defendant,
regardless of whether the child can communicate sufficiently to offer
useful testimony.” Thus the type of evaluation demanded in these
jurisdictions, whether involving use of special procedures in a
criminal court or a family court, may overlap with a dispositional
evaluation in child protection proceedings in the family court. It is
narrower than that type of evaluation, however, in the sense that it
requires consideration of the emotional consequences of the child’s
interaction with a particular adult in a specific context.
Although the nature of the inquiry may be familiar under either type
of statute, the information needed to make the necessary predictions
is sparse, and it is unlikely that the necessary scientific foundation
will be available soon. A working group of the American
Psychological Association concluded: “Although there are reasons to
believe that some children need special procedures in order to avoid
trauma and provide full and accurate testimony, identification of
these children is complicated by the infrequent use of such
procedures. The sample sizes for testimony under different conditions
are so small that it is unlikely that an actuarial risk-benefit assessment
soon will be available for determination of the particular cases
requiring procedural modification.”
The knowledge that is now available provides additional foundation
for the need for caution in such evaluations. Although research on the
emotional sequelae of child victims’ testimony in criminal
proceedings “lends credence to the case-by-case approach, it also
suggests the difficulty of implementing it”: “Interestingly, the
children who most want to have their day in court are those who are
in some of the most negative circumstances (e.g. who have a history
of previous abuse; whose caretaker is poorly adjusted) and thus are at
high risk for negative effects of testimony. This finding has important
policy implications. First, it suggests the need for special procedures
in some cases so that children who, in a sense, have the most to tell
are able to do so without undue risk. Second, when combined with
other findings, it indicates the complexity of determining who is most
at risk. Bright-line rules (e.g., age) will not validly discriminate
children at high risk of negative effects of testimony. Assessments of
overall clinical risk will be overboard because some children who
may be in especially difficult circumstances will benefit from the
opportunity to testify. In either instance, assessment of probable
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effects of testimony may not be informative about probable effects of
testimony under special procedures [the question posed by Craig and
the preceding cases].
Thus, although research and theory on the dynamics of child abuse
and the nature of children’s experience in the legal process may be
helpful in suggesting the possible effects of alternative procedures,
there is little research direction on the point, and that which is
available gives more reason for caution in predictions. Amid such
uncertainty, there is special significance in our usual injunctions to
avoid the ultimate issue (in this instance, in regard to whether there is
a necessity for use of a particular procedure) and to illuminate the
level of uncertainty in the foundation for one’s opinions.
In their zeal to minimize child victims direct confrontation of
defendants and to preserve evidence that inculpates defendants,
prosecutors frequently desire to admit statements that children made
out of court. Moreover, many state legislatures have adopted special
hearsay exceptions for use in cases involving child abuse. While the
various grounds for admission of children’s hearsay statements are
diverse, the important point for present purposes is that because such
statements by their nature affect a defendant’s right to confront the
witness, the proffer of such hearsay statements in a criminal child
abuse case implicates the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause.
By declining to define the term “testimonial,” the Crawford decision
generated a good deal of speculation as to the admissibility of various
out-of-court statements, particularly in the context of child abuse
cases.
Prior to Crawford, such courts applying the Roberts test allowed
mental health professionals to testify both to the overall reliability
and the truthfulness of children’s out-of-court statements. After
Crawford, such testimony will undoubtedly be limited, given that
children’s “testimonial” statements—whatever that term involves—
are no longer admissible based solely on reliability. Clinicians may
still be asked, however, to determine the trustworthiness of children’s
nontestimonial hearsay statements.
In responding to requests for such determinations, clinicians should
consider two points. First, it is not self-evident that the historic
assumptions about the circumstances of trustworthiness apply to
children, and research on such points is essentially nonexistent. For
example, do children being subjected to medical exams as part of a
sexual abuse evaluation uniformly regard physicians as beneficent
individuals solely concerned with guarding children’s health and
planning their treatment? If so, is such a belief by a child sufficient to
prevent the child from lying about whether abuse has occurred, and if
it occurred, about the circumstances of the offense? Second, the
factors that courts frequently consider in determining the
trustworthiness of a child’s statement are largely matters of common
sense.
Given these facts, there is good reason to doubt whether mental
health professionals bear specialized knowledge justifying
admission of their opinions about the reliability of a child’s
hearsay statements, although there may be some specific factors
about which psychological knowledge is relevant (e.g. the
sophistication of vocabulary and grammar that is common
among children of a given age and the specific child whose
statement is in question; the range of emotion that children may
display when they initially disclose abuse). Even in these
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instances, however, there clearly is no foundation in
psychological research for the ultimate conclusion about whether
a child’s statement is trustworthy.
Children are competent to testify when they have the capacity to
observe and remember events and to communicate about them, when
they can distinguish reality from fantasy, and when they understand
the obligation to tell the truth. The majority of states now presume
children to be competent witnesses, whether in general or in child
abuse cases specifically. Although the presumption is typically
rebuttable, there are questions about whether the inquiry in regard to
competency to testify should remain at all, given that time will be
consumed in any event by a competency hearing and that juries are
probably capable of assessing the reliability of most testimony.
The clinician who is invited to evaluate a child’s competency to
testify should be aware of the large body of research on children’s
skills as witnesses [see 7.07(b)]. Much of this research may actually
speak more to the child’s credibility than to his or her competency as
a witness. Credibility is a continuum; competency is a dichotomy. As
long as the competency threshold is passed, developmental
differences in children’s cognitive, linguistic, or social skills or their
moral judgment are irrelevant to the latter determination. As
indicated in the preceding paragraph, that threshold can be quite low;
in any event, it is based at least as much on juror’s competency in
weighing children’s testimony as it is on children’s skill in
presenting it.
One last point has to do with the distinction between competency to
testify and the confrontation issue addressed in the preceding section.
As Myers has pointed out, the reliability determination involved in
hearsay confrontation analysis is different from the ability-tocommunicate determination involved in competency-to-testify
analysis. Interviewers conducting investigations or dispositional
assessments should be mindful of the need to document children’s
ability to relate facts in different contexts (e.g. to social workers vs.
jurors).
The most controversial uses of clinicians; testimony in child
maltreatment cases relate to the questions “What happened?” and
“Who did it?” There may be no other context in which evidentiary
and professional issues of the sort discussed in Chapter 1 are as
frequently and acutely raised. When, if at all, may group data be used
as evidence about whether a particular individual perpetrated or
experienced abuse or neglect? What level of inference should mental
health professionals be permitted to reach in their opinion testimony?
Use of mental health professionals’ testimony to prove elements of
the prosecution’s case in chief—whether in a family court
adjudication or a criminal trial—is a relatively new and highly
debated phenomenon. It is possible to identify several different kinds
of questions that clinicians might be asked and that are directly
germane to proof of elements of the offense.
Admission of a Child’s Statements through a Mental Health
Professional. In one scenario, the clinician’s opinions are not at issue;
rather, the clinician is asked to testify as a voice for the child—a
reporter of statements made by the child about the maltreatment that
he or she experienced. As noted earlier, because of a child’s
unavailability, a desire to avoid the necessity of his or her testimony,
or simply a wish to corroborate testimony that is given, attorneys
often wish to admit statements made by the child outside of the

231

Should (not
instructions)

Instructions
Should

Instructions
Should
Need

Should (not
instructions)

514515

The Case in
Chief: Proving
Injury and
Abuse

514515

The Case in
Chief: Proving
Injury and
Abuse

515

The Case in
Chief: Proving
Injury and
Abuse

515

The Case in
Chief: Proving
Injury and
Abuse

515

The Case in
Chief: Proving
Injury and
Abuse

515

Expert
Testimony
about Whether
Abuse or

courtroom. One potential source of such hearsay evidence is a health
professional (possibly a mental health clinician) to whom the child
confided about maltreatment. Attempts to follow this avenue have
met with mixed results.
In a somewhat similar case, a federal court of appeals refused to
allow the admission of a videotaped interview conducted by a social
worker with a child victim, on the ground that there was insufficient
evidence of the trustworthiness of the statements. The tape was not
prepared as part of the medical exam of the child and so was not
admissible under that exception. In addition, the court found that
the spontaneity of the child’s statements had been compromised
by repeated prior questioning.
In short, mental health professionals’ descriptions of out-of-court
statements by children are not admissible under the medicaldiagnosis exception unless made for the purpose of treatment
planning. As discussed earlier, under Crawford nontestimonial
statements may still be admissible if sufficiently trustworthy, but this
outcome requires overcoming judicial skepticism about the
circumstances under which such statements often are made, doubts
about their spontaneity, and concerns about the possible suggestive
effects of prior and leading questions. Furthermore, many statements
made to clinicians during the investigative phase are likely to be seen
as testimonial and therefore inadmissible under Crawford.
Expert Testimony about Whether an Injury Has Occurred. The most
common use of a mental health professional’s testimony is not simply
to repeat statements made by a child, but to testify as an expert—an
approach that may also permit admission of the child’s statements,
but as foundation for the expert’s opinions rather than for their
factual value. This type of testimony is much more controversial.
Perhaps least controversial, testimony by a mental health professional
may be sought when the child protection statute requires proof of
harm as an element of abuse or neglect [see 15.02]. In such a case,
the clinician will usually be asked to determine whether a “mental
injury” has resulted from maltreatment of the child. Thus the
evaluation and testimony will be focused on the child’s mental status,
and if significant disturbance is present, on whether it may have been
caused by abuse or neglect. The nature of the inquiry in this context
is similar to that in tort cases in which mental injury is alleged [see
12.05(c) and (d)]. The problem for mental health professionals is
most likely to be the question of causation.
In that regard, it is important to remember that child maltreatment
commonly occurs in a context in which children face may
psychosocial challenges [see 15.03], each of which might cause
disturbance. Moreover, at the time that a clinician is asked to evaluate
a child believed to have been maltreated, the child is likely to be
experiencing stress as a result of the child protection proceedings
themselves. If the child has been placed in foster care as a protective
measure prior to adjudication, the child also may be experiencing
trauma as a result of separation from the family of origin, placement
with strangers, a change of schools, and disruption of other daily
routines
Another instance in which clinicians may be asked to testify about
the particular alleged victim is when they are asked to address
whether a child has been abused (as opposed to harmed by
acknowledged abuse). When this question is framed in terms of the
child’s truthfulness (“I believed her, because…”) or of the

232

Require

Require (not
instructions)

Instructions
to
contextualiz
e
Important

Should (x2,
borderline)

Neglect Has
Occurred.

515516

516

516

Expert
Testimony
about Whether
Abuse or
Neglect Has
Occurred.

Expert
Testimony
about Whether
Abuse or
Neglect Has
Occurred.
Expert
Testimony
about
Characteristic
s of Maltreated
Children.

truthfulness of abused children in general (“Children don’t lie about
sexual abuse”), courts and commentators are virtually unanimous in
their view that such opinions usurp the role of the trier of fact and
should not be admitted. Some appellate courts have been vociferous
in their rejection of such testimony. For example, the Oregon
Supreme Court wrote: “We have said before, and we will say it again,
but this time with emphasis—we really mean it—no psychotherapist
may render an opinion on whether a witness is credible in any trial
conducted in this state. The assessment of credibility is for the trier of
fact and not for psychotherapists.” Also bemoaning the intrusion on
the factfinder’s role, a Texas appellate court observed that “experts
on child abuse are not human lie detectors. Nor are they clairvoyant.
Nothing in this literature suggests that experts can or should replace
the jury as the ultimate arbiters of credibility.”
Some commentators distinguish the admissibility of an opinion about
whether a purportedly abused child is believable from that of a
“diagnosis” of a child as abused. In our view (and that of most
appellate courts), this is a distinction without a difference. Many
clinicians are convinced that assessment of whether abuse has
occurred is a matter in which they are skilled and about which they
should be permitted to testify. Such a belief is understandable when
the law not only permits but requires a clinician’s report of his or her
mere suspicion that a child has been abused or neglected, although
the point should not be lost that this duty extends in most
jurisdictions to many more people than those who have professional
training in the mental health disciplines. There is no reason to
believe that clinicians’ skill in determining whether a child has
been abused is the product of specialized knowledge. The
conclusions to be drawn from a child’s graphic description of a
sexual encounter, for example, are a matter of common sense, not
scientific knowledge or even clinical acumen.
Because testimony as an expert involves an implicit representation
that the opinions presented are grounded in specialized knowledge, a
mental health professional should decline on ethical grounds to
offer an opinion about whether a child told the truth or has been
“abused.” By the same token, under the rules of evidence, such as
opinion should never be admitted.
The question is harder, and the case law is divided, about the
admissibility of a mental health professional’s opinion concerning the
typical characteristics of abused or neglected children (as opposed to
whether a particular child is abused). If such an opinion is grounded
in hard data, its careful presentation does not violate professional
ethics. We are leery of such testimony, however, as substantive
evidence. In the current state of knowledge, such testimony is likely
to be so misleading and prejudicial that it will not assist the trier of
fact.
Too often, clinical impressions about child abuse “syndromes” are
presented without regard to the lack of a systematic empirical
foundation for such opinions. Although clinical intuition may be
useful in guiding treatment planning, it is insufficient as a basis for
determining whether maltreatment may have occurred. Furthermore,
when statistical data are available, they provide acute evidence of a
serious base-rate problem. One consensus conference concluded: “No
specific behavioral syndromes characterize victims of sexual abuse.
Sexual abuse involves a wide range of possible behaviors which
appear to have widely varying effects on its victims. Many sexually
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abused children show no symptoms at all, and most of the symptoms
that are disproportionately common among sexually abused children
are quite common among children in general. The probability is that
children showing behavior said to be indicative of sexual abuse—
even those that most strikingly differentiate sexually abused
children—have not been abused.
Of course, these issues apply in both directions. One cannot assume,
for example, that a purported victim without obvious emotional
distress lacks credibility. Presentation of scientific rebuttal evidence
thus may assist the trier of fact to weigh the evidence without
prejudicing the factfinder toward conviction. Accordingly, courts that
have been skeptical about admission of syndrome evidence in the
case in chief still often have permitted use of such evidence for
rebuttal purposes.
… We have no quarrel with the result in Loebach—a result
unanimously reached by the courts that considered the same issue
subsequently. The review in the literature in 15.03(d)(1) shows that
the scientific basis for the battering-parent syndrome is very weak.
When used in combination with medical evidence as to the cause of
physical injuries, it is likely to be highly prejudicial and misleading.
… However, the Loebach court’s ultimate reliance on scientific
invalidity may have been a ruse. The court apparently did not review
the scientific evidence on the battering-parent syndrome, and it
avoided the more basic and harder question of when group data
should be used in individual cases.
The critical point, however, is that a description of the general
characteristics of many abusive adults is only tangentially relevant to
the question of whether a particular defendant abused a child. It is
fundamentally unfair to require the defendant, in effect, to disprove
that he or she is a battering parent in the absence of the parent’s
having abused the child. Defendants should be convicted and
respondents’ parental rights should be infringed on the basis of what
they did, not who they are.
In the unlikely event that behavioral scientists are called to testify
about the characteristics of abusive parents, they would certainly
be ethically obligated to indicate the limitations of the literature
and the overlap among populations. To prevent misuse of the
evidence, they also should make clear to the factfinder the
difficulties in drawing inferences about individual events on the
basis of group data.
For the clinician, the second point made above is probably the most
important. Regardless of the specific point in the process, mental
health professionals are apt to be most helpful to the court and other
decisionmakers (e.g. CPS workers and foster care review boards) by
conducting and reporting clinical assessments focused on prevention
of further maltreatment and alleviation of the psychological harm that
may already have occurred. Drawing from research and theory about
the nature, causes, and sequelae of child abuse and neglect [see
15.03], clinicians may be able to ask the “right” questions to identify
the precipitants of abuse and neglect, the particular needs of the
family as a whole and as individuals, and the nature of relationships
within the family.
The sentencing analogy is also an apt reminder of the problems with
such assessments. Although the existence of mandatory reporting and
central registries potentially provides the foundation for actuarial
determination of risk, the data analyses that would enable empirically
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based predictions have not been performed. Moreover, the research
on the effectiveness of various dispositional alternatives is woefully
thin [see 15.03(e)]. … Therefore, even when experts are involved in
the relatively uncontroversial context of dispositional
decisionmaking, they should have great humility in making
predictions and offering other opinions.
Moreover, because many of the determinations that courts make in
the dispositional phases of child maltreatment cases are similar to the
judgments that mental health professionals make in treatment
planning, we repeat that clinicians need to exercise special care in
avoiding ultimate-issue opinions [see 1.04]. The level of risk to
children that society should and will tolerate, the question of whether
children should be removed from their home against their parents’
will, and the circumstances justifying involuntary family treatment
are not “clinical” or “scientific” matters. Although clinicians may
guide courts in identifying dispositional options, mental health
professionals do not have specialized knowledge about the embedded
legal and moral issues.
Termination of parental rights may be one of the most difficult
decisions a court is required to make. On the one hand, permanent
severance of family ties is recognized as an especially grave step,
perahaps even more severe than imprisonment. On the other hand,
authorities are increasingly mindful of the history of “legal abuse” of
children by bouncing them among foster homes because the children
are unavailable for adoption. Amid this profound conflict, there is
concern about the high risk of error, in view of both vagueness of
standards and unreliability of assessment. This risk is compounded by
the fact that mental health and social service evaluations are usually
crucial evidence in termination proceedings. The deck is usually
stacked against the parents in that regard, in that they typically have
substantially less access to these professionals than the state has.
In 15.02, we noted the common problems of vagueness of standards
for abuse and neglect and reliance in the standards on individual
value judgments as to proper childrearing practices. These problems
are often compounded at the termination phase.
Under the Juvenile Court Judges’ model statute and the statutes
prevailing in most jurisdictions, the nature of questions posed to
mental health professionals in a termination proceeding is also likely
to be similar to that in any dispositional review. The focus of the
inquiry is likely to be slightly different, however, in that the
prognosis for successful treatment of the parent is the key question.
The mental health professional might also be asked to evaluate the
adequacy of efforts to treat the parent and the nature of the child’s
relationship with the foster parents.
In light of these developments, three points are noteworthy. First, the
audience for information generated in dispositional evaluations is
increasingly likely to be a nonjudicial decisionmaker. Second, as the
emphasis on voluntary dispositions (including dispositions involving
private parties outside the family) increases, the range of possibilities
to consider expands. Third, clinicians must guard against
inadvertently being drawn into a decisionmaker or advocate role
when they have represented themselves as investigators or
evaluators.
In the meantime, the problem of support for parents with serious
mental illness and their families deserves greater attention
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Clearly, however, there is a need for research on parenting by
individuals with mental illness in families living in the community
and containing children of various ages. Similarly, as
psychopharmacological advances permit greater independence of
adults with serious mental illness, there is a need for parallel
development of supports for them as parents and for their children.
Absent an extensive literature on such programs, clinicians
conducting dispositional evaluations are left to their general
knowledge of social support and mental health services in suggesting
alternatives that might enable families of parents with serious mental
illness to live together with safety for the children. In the meantime,
neither clinicians nor legal authorities should infer from a diagnosis
that a parent is unfit. To guard against such inferences, clinicians
should make clear in their reports and testimony that conclusions as
to parental difficulties based on the presence of a mental illness per se
are at present scientifically unsupportable.
This fact also means that a heightened review of the competence of
parents with mental retardation is in effect a heightened review of
parental competence of lower-income persons. The risk of
capriciousness in application of the policy is obvious.
That being said, mental retardation is often one of the many
challenges faced by the neglectful families that now predominate
in the child protection system, and that fact needs to be
considered in the design of dispositional plans.
There is limited research from which to draw conclusions about the
risks incurred by children of alcoholic parents…Most of the studies
on the effects of mothers with alcoholism on their children have
looked at toxic effects on drinking during pregnancy, not the
adequacy of childrearing. The childrearing outcome literature that
does exist gives reason for caution in assuming that alcoholism in a
parent is often related to poor socialization of a child. … There is,
however, no family pattern that is unique to families with alcoholic
parents; similar problems are experienced in families facing other
challenges.
Although parental alcoholism is undoubtedly a factor that should be
considered when one is designing dispositional plans, there again is
good reason not to jump from a diagnosis of alcoholism to a
conclusion about parental unfitness. One specific dynamic that ought
to be considered in dispositional planning, however, is the sense of
isolation commonly experienced by families of alcoholic parents,
especially when the parents are “wet” (in an episode of active
drinking). In view of the relation of this variable to child
maltreatment [see 15.03(d)(2)], there is special reason to make
enhancement of social support an element of dispositional plans
when parental alcoholism is an issue. Research also suggests a
particular need to consider mechanisms to monitor child supervision,
especially when both parents have alcohol problems.
Although the ongoing debate on this issue has focused in large part
on prenatal exposure and related policy responses, research thus far
suggests that the bigger issue concerns parental behavior per se.
Thus the primary focus should be on the care that children receive
from drug-abusing parents.
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Drug abuse commonly occurs in a context in which there are other
impulsive and antisocial behaviors, as well as a panoply of social and
economic problems. Similarly, child maltreatment, especially neglect,
typically occurs in a complex situation in which there are many
serious problems. Accordingly, in cases of parental drug use, like
other instances of child maltreatment, an integrated multifaceted
dispositional plan is usually needed.
A final note is that although the challenge should not be minimized, it
should not be assumed that the fact of parental drug use necessarily
means that the situation cannot be made safe for the child or that the
parent cannot recover.
In short, the desire to respond to the societal problem of intimate
partner violence can clash with the need to plan a disposition gauged
to an individual family’s concerns, and thus can impede efforts to
find a practical solution to the needs of children in a volatile
situation.
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It is easy to see that pitfalls may await experts called to help to
illuminate such a complex, possibly dangerous, emotionally and even
politically charged set of circumstances.

The problems that children and their families face in instances of
intimate partner violence are serious and frequent enough that they
merit careful attention by policymakers and child protection
authorities. The interests at stake and the clinical phenomenon itself
are sufficiently complex, however, that then assumption that wellintentioned action will be benign at worst in its effects on children is
not one that should be made lightly.
Caution is especially warranted about relying on assumptions for
which the evidence is little more than “Everybody knows…” The
information that is available from small, single-site studies gives
ample additional reason for modesty in making ideologically
grounded assumptions, at least until large-scale, more representative
studies are available.
In short, clinicians would be wrong (at least in part) if they started
from the assumption (1) that men who are abusive toward women
generally pose threats to their young children; (2) that relationships
with fathers are nearly always important to children; or (3) that
women in abusive relationships are often too preoccupied with their
own situations to provide adequate care for their children.
Nonetheless, all of these ideas have been at the root of some policy
responses to children exposed to intimate partner violence. These
errors should serve as warnings to clinicians who would
confidently make predictions about the likely effects of various
visitation arrangements for children in such situations.
Clinicians and lawyers should nonetheless by aware that states may
avoid the ASFA time limit and thus refrain from filing a petition to
termination if there are “compelling reasons” to do so.
In light of these facts, a clinician who is asked to evaluate whether
compelling reasons exist to extend the ASFA guidelines should
examine the parent’s efforts to maintain a relationship with the child
despite the limited opportunities available, as well as the extent to
which the parent has taken advantage of existing programs. The

237

should

Should
Important
(not
instructions)

Should
Should (x2)

528

(g)
Biologically
Related Foster
Parents

528

(g)
Biologically
Related Foster
Parents

528529

(g)
Biologically
Related Foster
Parents

529

(g)
Biologically
Related Foster
Parents

530

530

15.06 The
Technique of
Abuse/Neglect
Evaluations (a)
Content of the
Evaluation

15.06 The
Technique of
Abuse/Neglect
Evaluations (a)
Content of the
Evaluation

clinicians also should interview the parent and child and gather any
other indicators of the strength of their emotional bond.
Evaluators may be asked to address not only what might be done to
increase safety for a child, but also who might do it. A particularly
common question concerns the optimal involvement of relatives,
particularly whether they might provide appropriate supplementary or
substitute care ….
Specifically, Congress required states to “consider” giving preference
to an adult relative over nonrelative caregivers when a child is placed
outside the home, provided that the relative meets relevant state
standards. … These concerns are heightened by the fact that licensing
and supervision for relative caregivers are typically less stringent
than for nonrelative foster parents.
Though research on kinship care is in its infancy, a number of clear
facts have emerged from the work thus far. First, clearly there is
more stability in kinship care than in other foster care. … Second,
children in kinship care tend to have needs at least as great as those
of children in nonrelative foster care. … Third, kinship care
providers typically do not have the same level of resources available
to them that nonrelative foster parents do. … Fourth, although
kinship care providers often have grave doubts about the parental
ability or motivation of the biological parents, they are more likely
than nonrelative caregivers to facilitate a continuing relationship
between the children and the parents, as well as other family
members. … Fifth, perhaps reflecting cultural norms of care by
extended families, kinship care is much more often the disposition in
cases arising in African American families than in other ethnic
groups.
In short, kinship care shows promise as a way of meeting foster
children’s right to a family environment, but questions remain about
its implementation. … Thus evaluators need to be aware of
presumptions in many states in favor of kinship care, and they should
consider the support that may be available to the family (with or
without a change of residence for the children) from within the kin
network. At the same time, as with other living arrangements,
clinicians conducting dispositional evaluations should consider the
nature of the supports that will best facilitate healing, safety, and
healthy development for the child.
Two points should be given special attention in planning
dispositional evaluations in child protection cases. First, such an
evaluation should be functional. It should focus on the parent’s
competence as a parent, as well as the ways in which the child’s
safety can be enhanced. Conclusions about adequacy as a parent
should not be based on general mental status evaluations; diagnosis
tells little about an individual’s parental abilities, motivation, and
practices. Indeed, ultimately the questions should shift from parental
competence as a personal characteristic, because the critical problem
is one of relationships.
Second, given what is known about the multiplicity of factors
involved in child maltreatment [see 15.03], the evaluation should be
wide-ranging. Of course, both the parent(s) and the child(ren) should
be interviewed. Whenever possible, the child and the parent should
be observed together [see 19.11 (a) for an illustrative report],
preferably in natural settings. But the evaluation should go beyond
this dyad and beyond psychology. There should be assessment of
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relationships outside the immediate family that might be used,
perhaps with some enhancement by professionals, to ensure social
support (sometimes including monitoring) for the family. In
considering such alternatives, thought should be given to ways that
the potency of social support could be maximized by making it
reciprocal (e.g. between families). Similarly, attention should be
given to the family’s need for material support and steps that might
be taken to resolve the family’s practical problems.
Collection of records of the family’s involvement with helping
agencies is especially important in dispositional evaluations. At a
dispositional review, the degree of improvement in the situation, the
adjustment of the child, and the adequacy of services are typically all
at issue, and agency records (often followed by interviews of service
providers) will usually be necessary to address these issues fully. Of
course, knowledge of past treatment and its outcome is helpful in
developing recommendations about possible interventions and
reaching conclusions about prognosis. Social service and police
reports, in combination with interviews of the parent, may also be
useful in identifying possible precipitants of maltreatment—
information that is often helpful for both designing interventions and
determining prognosis.
Although clinicians should take a broad approach to dispositional
assessment in child protection cases, they should do so humbly. As
the review in 15.03 indicated, the scientific foundation is weak for
predictions about threats to the child’s safety as well as the likely
efficacy of various interventions, alone and in combination. Although
enough is known about the factors that cause and maintain child
maltreatment to provide the foundation for thoughtful dispositional
planning (at least in regard to issues that should be addressed), it
must be acknowledged that the selection of interventions is more art
than science. There is little basis for confidence. Predictions, whether
implicitly or explicitly made, should be framed accordingly.
With some ambivalence, we are including a section on interviewing
the child. As discussed in 15.04(a) and 15.06(a), we believe that the
increasing reliance on mental health professionals as investigative
interviewers (in effect, as law enforcement agents) in child protection
cases is unfortunate. We are including a brief discussion of the
subject, however, both because of the interest in it (clinicians may
reasonably act as consultants to investigative interviewers even if the
clinicians do not assume such a role themselves) and because of the
need for child interviews as part of dispositional assessments. Even if
the clinician does not assume the job of determining whether a
violation of law occurred, finding out the child’s perception of events
may be quite useful in determining precipitants for incidents of abuse
and assessing the nature and strength of the child’s relationships. Of
course, the interview of the child is also important for assessment of
the child’s individual needs for treatment and social support.
In that regard, it is important not simply to assume what the child
must feel and what he or she has experienced. As we observed
earlier, the field of child protection has been rampant over the years
with unstudied assumptions about what “everybody knows” that
ultimately have proven to be distorted or simply incorrect. Notably,
the “trauma” approach to sexual abuse and related legal involvement
simply cannot be taken for granted. For example, the fact that the
average severity of demonstrable harm resulting from sexual abuse is
less than that resulting from some other forms of maltreatment that
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rarely elicit criminal prosecution negates neither the wrongfulness of
such violations of personal integrity nor the severe harm experienced
by some sexually abused children. Similarly, there is evidence that
conventional clinical wisdom about the way that disclosure of sexual
abuse typically unfolds is incorrect.
We turn then to some general comments about interviewing children
in child protection cases. Since the mid-1980s, there has been
extraordinary attention by researchers to issues related to children’s
ability as witnesses, especially their suggestibility [see 7.07(b)(2)]. In
our view, this concern has been overblown. Research shows that most
children are resistant to suggestion for salient events, although the
risk of inaccurate reports in response to direct questions is highest
among very young children (e.g., three-year-olds).
Furthermore, much of what is known about ways to minimize
distortions in children’s memory (as in that of adults) and to
maximize the quantity and accuracy of information reported borders
on common sense. …
Although adults who know better still often use difficult vocabulary
and complex grammar in questions to children, such linguistic lapses
may be the most common inhibitors of effective communication
between interviewers and children. Linguistic complexity lowers the
accuracy of statements and testimony by witnesses of all ages, but it
especially does so in communication with children. Good practical
guides are available, however, to prompt adults to avoid such
miscommunication. A particularly useful brief manual, including a
model voir dire for determination of a child’s competency to testify,
has been prepared by Anne Graffam Walker, a forensic linguist.
Specific techniques to enhance communication also are becoming
available. The most extensively studied may be the “cognitive
interview,” which relies on mnemonic principles to increase the
amount of information provided. A summary of the procedures
follows:
First, have the child reconstruct the circumstances of the crime by
encouraging her to put herself in the place and time that the abuse
occurred—e.g. “picture it as if you were there right now.” To ensure
the child focuses on actual events, do not use the words “imagine,”
“pretend” or “story.” Second, report everything the child says. Ask
her to tell you as much information as possible, even seemingly
unimportant details. After the child finishes her narrative description,
follow with questions to clarify what was said. Third, go through the
incident from beginning to end, then reverse the order and go through
it again. Finally, encourage the child to recount events from different
perspectives—e.g., “if you were sitting in the corner of the room,
what would you have seen?”
Designed originally for use in interviews of adult witnesses, the
cognitive interview increases elementary-school-age children’s recall
of facts without a decrease in accuracy, especially when the children
have an opportunity to practice the technique. Again, however,
children’s level of performance depends on adults’ skill in
communication. In the above-described study, for instance, problems
were observed with interviewers’ (in that instance, sheriff’s
deputies’) adherence to the protocol.
Other techniques that have been shown to improve elementaryschool-age children’s recall include training in comprehension
monitoring and narrative elaboration (i.e., thinking about the
elements of a story—the participants, the setting, the action, and the
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conversation by and feelings of the participants). Encouraging
elementary-school-age children to indicate when they don’t know the
answer to an adult’s questions also increases resistance to leading
questions, but sometimes at the cost of overcaution in reporting
information that the children do know.
On occasion, specialized instruments for assessment of parental
competence, parental attitudes, and family relations may help suggest
dispositional issues in child protection cases. Detailed attention to the
merits of such instruments has been given in reviews by Otto and
Edens and by Budd and Holdsworth. There are a number of
structured instruments for assessment of parental competence,
parental attitudes, and family relationships. These instruments may be
helpful in clinical evaluation, but the fact that most have not been
validated for use in child protection dispositions should make
clinicians cautious in interpreting observations drawn from them.
There are also several instruments for assessment of an adult’s “abuse
potential,” of which the best validated is the Child Abuse Potential
(CAP) Inventory. … Nonetheless, we do not recommend the CAP for
clinical use in screening CPS cases; rather, it shows most promise as
a research instrument. … the success of the CAP in identifying
individuals with past abuse came largely in validation samples in
which half of the participants were known to have physically abused
their children—a base rate that is obviously far higher than in the
general population. CAP scores also tend to be elevated among
parents of children with disabilities, especially when other stressors
or possible support deficits (e.g., single parenthood) are present.
Therefore, incorrect inferences can be drawn from CAP scores when
parents are in situations in which they have especially difficult
problem of child care. Perhaps most seriously, the false-positive rate
rises to unacceptably high levels when the CAP is used predictively.
Also, we remain concerned that judges and CPS workers will
misinterpret CAP validation data to indicate the odds that a parent
actually abused his or her child.
Undoubtedly, the most controversial evaluation technique is the use
of anatomically detailed dolls. … Apart from our general
recommendation, professional authorities are united in their view that
play with anatomically detailed dolls cannot be used as a test to
determine whether child maltreatment has occurred.
The question remains whether the dolls are so suggestive that they
should not be used even as demonstration aids to clarify a child’s
statements.
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In a similar fashion, a working group on doll use established by the
American Psychological Association urged caution in “interpreting
the results of children ages 4 years and under, at least so far as when
affirmations to leading questions about ‘being touched’ are concerned
and when repeated misleading questioning has been used.” The
working group also noted, however, that “using AD [anatomically
detailed] dolls in evaluations does not inherently distress or
overstimulate children,” that “using the dolls can clearly assist in
identifying children’s preferred or idiosyncratic names for body parts,
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and that “using AD dolls often results in increased verbal productions
during standardized research interviews.”
Because of the desire to “save” maltreated children and to preserve
the family relationships of clients, there may be special pulls, both
psychologically and socially, on mental health professionals to reach
beyond their specialized knowledge in child protection proceedings
and to act as advocates rather than neutral experts.
Moreover, the mixed civil-criminal system heightens the possibilities
of mental health professionals’ becoming de facto law enforcement
agents, sometimes without realizing that they are assuming such a
role. Statements made in a civil child protection proceeding and a
corollary treatment program might ultimately be used in a criminal
proceeding or, of course, a civil hearing to infringe parental rights.
Perhaps most acutely, the child protection system as presently
structured invites conflicts between “doing justice” and “doing
good.” As we discussed in 15.04(a), mental health professionals are
increasingly being used as investigators charged with gathering
evidence about whether maltreatment has occurred. We are troubled
by this development for three reasons. First, it encourages clinicians
to reach conclusions outside of their expertise. Second, it promotes
confusion about the mental health professional’s purpose in the
minds of both the clinician and the interviewee, and thus raises
ethical problems in regard to fidelity to role—a variant of the “white
coat” phenomenon in forensic mental health [see 3.02(a)]. Indeed, it
is increasingly common to link treatment services for abused children
directly to the prosecutor’s office. Third, it may exacerbate the
already pronounced tendency to sacrifice prevention and treatment of
child maltreatment in the name of investigation.
There is good reason to believe that clinicians’ involvement as
investigators will directly and indirectly impede the provision of
treatment. The framing of child protection services as adjunctive to
investigation and prosecution inevitably leads to conflicts between
the mental health professions’ emphasis (on behalf of their clients) on
confidentiality and the prosecution’s need for inculpatory evidence—
conflicts that may prevent the treatment programs’ further
development. Apart from role conflicts the need for mental health
professionals to deal with legal issues; to prepare reports for
attorneys, courts and to probation officers; and to interrupt clinical
practices for court dates may distract clinicians from providing the
scarce treatment services now available and may deter or distract
them from serving maltreated children and their families.
Moreover, although there is little direct evidence about public
perceptions of mental health professionals’ involvement in child
maltreatment cases, it is possible that increasing involvement in
contested cases (or at least the perception of increasing involvement)
will diminish public confidence in the mental health professions.
Certainly high-publicity forensic work has had such an effect before.
Indeed, the phenomenon has already occurred in sexual abuse cases
as clinicians appear on nationally televised talk shows to debate falsememory syndrome (an issue discussed below).
Note that although more traditional forensic child protection work
(i.e., conducting postinvestigation assessment as a step toward
development of a treatment plan) does not completely obviate such
issues, it presents them much less acutely. In dispositional assessment
(especially when the court is not necessarily looming in the
background), the inquiry is oriented toward development of help for
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the child and the family, and the clinician’s mind is in fact likely to
be focused on service provision.
The other set of “adult” issues in abuse and neglect is actually a
problem of child maltreatment: legal and clinical issues that arise
when a history of child maltreatment is identified in adulthood. There
has been a pointed and sometimes heated controversy about the
recollection of child abuse in adulthood, complete with establishment
of a foundation for studying cases of false-memory syndrome.
Building on the belief that children are sometimes so traumatized
and/or dependent that child abuse is not remembered and disclosed
until many years later, many state legislatures have explicitly made
the delayed discovery rule applicable in such instnaces. “Delayed
discovery” is a common-law principle in tort law that enables a
victim of tortious conduct to be compensated past expiration of the
statute of limitations (the maximum time in law between a violation
of law and the initiation of legal action) when the victimization was
not promptly discovered. … By establishing a special exception to
the statute of limitations for child abuse cases, legislatures have
established an assumption in law that victims of child abuse
sometimes are unable to disclose the abuse before they reach
adulthood.
As in Briere and Conte’s research, the women in Williams’s study
who were least likely to recall their childhood victimization were
those whom clinical theory would suggest were most traumatized and
those who were most likely to have been pressured into silence. …
Skeptics about the validity of repression or other forgetting among a
high proportion of victims of child sexual abuse have made three
primary counterarguments. First, they have argued that the purported
frequency is an artifact of study designs. For example, Loftus
criticized Briere and Conte’s question asking research participants
about any “time when you could not remember the forced sexual
experience,” because it could be interpreted to mean a time when one
consciously (rather than unconsciously) suppressed the terrible
memory. Second, critics have pointed to experiments and anecdotes
about circumstances in which demonstrably false memories for
childhood traumatic events have been induced. Third, they have
argued that adult reports of child sexual abuse are often the products
(at least in part) of therapist’s suggestive interviewing.
Such evidence does not negate the possibility—indeed, probability—
that studies such as those by Briere and Conte and by Williams and
related clinical observations reflect instances in which valid
memories of child abuse are first revealed in adulthood because of
the combination of repression or other forgetting and of real or
perceived pressure not to tell. To a large extent, the academic
debate about repressed memory for sexual abuse is about its
frequency and mechanism, not its reality.
Indeed, given the vociferousness of the debate, the level of agreement
between the skeptical memory researchers and the not-so-skeptical
clinical psychologists in the American Psychological Association
Working Group on Investigation of Memories of Childhood Abuse
was remarkable. The Working Group itself noted five “key points” of
consensus:
1. Controversies regarding adult recollections should not be
allowed to obscure the fact that child sexual abuse is a
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complex and pervasive problem in America that has
historically gone unacknowledged.
2. Most people who were sexually abused as children
remember all or part of what happened to them.
3. It is possible for memories of abuse that have been forgotten
for a long time to be remembered.
4. It is also possible to construct convincing pseudomemories
for events that never occurred.
5. There are gaps in our knowledge about the processes that
lead to accurate and inaccurate recollections of childhood
abuse.
Several other critical points of agreement can be found in the text of
the Working Group report:
 Many possible errors in working with adult survivors or
with clients who present as recovering memories of
childhood abuse could be avoided if the therapist were well
grounded in developmental psychology…, cognitive
psychology…, and research on trauma….
 Clients who seek hypnosis as a means of retrieving or
confirming their recollections should be advised that it is not
an appropriate procedure for this goal because of the serious
risk that pseudomemories may be created in trance states
and of the related risk due to increased confidence in those
memories.
 … [D]enials by alleged perpetrators also should not be taken
as evidence that the client is experiencing other than an
accurate recollection.
 …[A]lthough there are no statistics available on its
prevalence, it is know that, on occaision, adults who report
recovering memories will lie, particularly when the
constellation of motives (e.g., fear, embarrassment, desire to
protect loved ones, desire for revenge) outweighs the
incentives to tell the truth.
 Therapists need to eschew the roles of advocate, detective,
or ultimate arbiter of reality. … Forensic psychologists …
should avoid attempting to speak to the ultimate issue (i.e.,
guilt or innocence) in a case, because they are not usually in
a position to know the truth.
 …[W]henever possible, therapists should avoid serving as
expert forensic witnesses in the cases involving clients
whom they are treating.
In any event, the repressed-memory debate need not be resolved in a
book on forensic assessment, because the assessment of truthfulness
and validity of memory is not a matter for clinical opinion in the
courtroom. Regardless of whether one accepts Loftus’s assertions
that many adult memories of child abuse may be distorted, it is
difficult to argue with her conclusions about the stance that mental
health professionals should take: “What should therapists do…? As a
first step, it is worth recognizing that we do not yet have the tools for
reliably distinguishing the signal of true repressed memories from the
noise of false ones. … Zealous conviction is a dangerous substitute
for an open mind. Psychotherapists, counselors, social service
agencies, and law enforcement personnel would be wise to be careful
how they probe for horrors on the other side of some presumed
amnesic barrier. They need to be circumspect regarding

244

Need
Advise (not
instruction)

Need (one
not
instruction,
one
instruction)
Must (not
instructions)

537538

(b) Adult
Survivors of
Child Abuse
and Neglect

uncorroborated repressed memories that return. Techniques that are
less potentially dangerous would involve clarification, compassion,
and gentle confrontation along with a demonstration of empathy for
the painful struggles these patients must endure as they come to terms
with their personal truths.
It is further noteworthy that even this advice really is aimed at
therapists, not at forensic evaluators. In that regard, in adult as well as
child cases, mental health professionals should resist attempts to
induce them to assume the role of human lie detector. Nothing in the
professional preparation of clinicians uniquely qualifies them to
discern the validity of memories and the truthfulness of allegations
that result.

Chapter 16: Child Custody in Divorce
539
16.01 The
…[O]ne might assume that clinicians not only are, but should be,
Scope of
frequently involved in resolution of custody disputes.
Clinicians’
However, it is our contention that both of these assumptions are
Involvement in mistaken. First, at present, mental health professionals are directly
Custody
involved in only a small fraction of custody cases in most
Disputes
jurisdictions. …This lack of mental health involvement is perhaps
(a) Current
less surprising when one recognizes that in most jurisdictions divorce
Involvement
cases are heard in general jurisdiction courts, unlike cases of
delinquency and child maltreatment, which are heard in separate
juvenile or family courts where there is a strong tradition of mental
health or social services involvement.
53916.01 The
Second, mental health professionals may have little expertise that is
540
Scope of
directly relevant to custody disputes. Thus there are probably
Clinicians’
substantive as well as structural impediments to mental health
Involvement in involvement. Some of the considerations most relevant to a
Custody
determination of the child’s best interests in law (e.g., parental
Disputes
“responsibility” and moral guidance) are ones that are arguably well
(a) Current
within the province of the factfinder and about which clinicians have
Involvement
no special expertise. Moreover, there is a limited scientific basis for
opinions about the kinds of questions that the courts must decide in
divorce cases when children are involved. Although much is known
about the effects of divorce on children [see 16.03(a)], there has been
remarkably little research meeting minimal standards of
methodological rigor about the effects of various custody
arrangements on children and families of different characteristics.
Furthermore, it may be impossible to generate such data at a level
that would be very helpful in determination of best interests in
individual cases.
540
16.01 The
The superficial relevance of everyday clinical practice to custody
Scope of
disputes; the shifting boundaries and allegiances within families (and
Clinicians’
the resulting pulls on clinicians); and even the related gender politics
Involvement in [see 16.05] may sometimes seduce mental health professionals indo
Custody
reaching unwarranted opinions.
Disputes
It is noteworthy that legal practitioners generally are quite skeptical
(a) Current
about the usefulness of mental health involvement in child custody
Involvement
cases.
540(b) Some
Although we began this chapter by emphasizing the serious
541
Possible Roles reservations that we—and apparently most attorneys and judges—
(1) Evaluator
have about mental health professionals’ present and potential
and
involvement in custody disputes, we do not wish to imply that
Investigator
clinicians have no proper role at all. There are probably times when
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conventional clinical speculation about family dynamics will provide
judges with some (albeit limited) assistance in making decisions
about child custody. … Certainly, it is conceivable that research will
develop that will provide a basis beyond mere speculation for links
between pre- and postdivorce behavior.
[M]ental health professionals are primarily helpful as investigators in
custody disputes, particularly if they are sure to perform a thorough,
wide-ranging evaluation of the type we recommend. … clinicians (at
least those specialized in child or family practice) are trained in, and
used to, talking with children and families under stress and gathering
information from diverse sources about the life of the family.
Therefore, child and family clinicians are likely to be efficient and
effective gatherers of facts for the court, even when they are not able
to add opinions based on specialized knowledge about the
implications of those facts.
Because only the parents have standing, evidence about the child’s
best interests may not be presented unless it is clearly helpful to the
case of one of the divorcing spouses. Even appointment of a guardian
ad litem to represent the child’s interests may not ensure development
of this type of evidence, in part because of the ambiguities of the role.
… Mental health professionals (and other behavioral scientists) may
also assist the court by pointing out what is not known about the
psychological effects of various custody arrangements. This honesty
about the limits of knowledge serves dual purposes. It assists the
factfinder in determining the degree of confidence to attach to any
speculations about the import of psychological factors, and it deters
the court from “psychologizing” and thus obscuring value
preferences in the law.
Mental health professionals often may be useful as adjuncts to the
negotiation process in clarifying points of agreement and
disagreement. … Divorce lawyers often perceive their role to be one
of moderating their clients’ wishes; thus referrals for “evaluation”
may actually be thinly disguised requests for information that might
illuminate the foundation for a settlement or even for mediation,
involving direct assistance by the clinician in bringing the parties to
agreement.
Two important caveats about mediation should be remembered. First,
when a clinician is employed as an evaluator, he or she should be
careful not to slip into the role of intervenor unless the parties or the
court so requests. Although the report might help clarify topics for
potential negotiation (and, indeed, as already noted, one or both
attorneys might request a report for just such a purpose), it would be
presumptuous of a clinician as an evaluator to attempt to force a
settlement. There are also potential ethical pitfalls associated with
competence issues when clinicians begin skirting—or crossing—the
bounds of legal practice. Although mental health professionals may
be sensitive to the emotional fallout of separation and divorce, they
are more often than not ignorant of property issues and related
matters. Analogous concerns are obviously present when attorneys
begin acting like therapists. Even for those mental health
professionals who are also trained as lawyers, there are serious
problems of dual practice and dual representation.
But even some proponents of mediation, noting the diversity in
auspices, length, voluntariness, and scope of mediation programs,
have indicated a lack of surprise at research showing that mediation
does not consistently produce results superior to litigation. Although
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the majority of studies on particular hypothesized benefits of
mediation have confirmed hypotheses, research to the contrary is also
available on virtually every point.
Consequently, whether the service is framed as an intervention (e.g.,
mediation) or an evaluation, clinicians working in the public system
and dealing with the vast number of divorces involving children will
find themselves increasingly in a position in which they must educate
parents about what is to come not only in their family life per se, but
also in the pending dispute resolution proceeding. The problems
presented often are thorny ones that are both clinically and ethically
challenging.
Starting from the premise that the child’s needs must be paramount,
the American Psychological Association’s Guidelines advise
clinicians (as do we) to undertake a functional assessment of the
skills and values of the parents and their match to the needs of the
child: In custody evaluation, “[p]sychopathology [of the parents] may
be relevant … insofar as it has impact on the child or the ability to
parent, but it is not the primary focus.” This functional inquiry, the
Guidelines state, necessarily requires a wide-ranging assessment
using multiple sources of information and methods of data gathering
(i.e., the investigator role we advocate). Recognizing that the multiple
lenses through which family members embroiled in a high-conflict
divorce are apt to be clouded by emotion, and that the scientific
foundation for prediction of postdivorce behavior is thin, the
American Psychological Association also admonishes clinicians to
interpret clinical information “cautiously and conservatively, seeking
convergent validity.”
The American Psychological Association’s Guidelines further
recognize that child custody evaluators are often pulled in conflicting
direction by their concerns for the various individuals involved [see
16.04(a), 16.05]. They note that the psychologist’s role is “that of a
professional expert who strives to maintain an objective, impartial
stance.
As noted in the discussion of the best-interests standard, the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act considers the child’s wishes as a
determinant in best-interests analysis, but it does not indicate the
weight to be given to the child’s preference. Some states have
provided statutory guidelines based on age, reasoning ability, or both.
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Nonetheless, there is little research to guide evaluators or judges in
determining a child’s competence to participate in decisionmaking
about divorce. The one quantitative study directly on this point found
that even elementary-school-age children gave adult-like reasons, in
response to hypothetical situations, for preferring a particular custody
arrangement.

There is also little research directly testing whether querying children
about their preferences is psychologically harmful because of the
bind in which it places them. On the other hand there is a general
literature in social psychology, including developmental social
psychology, indicating the positive effects of being permitted to have
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some control over one’s fate and of reducing ambiguity about a
strange situation through direct discussion of it. Finally, there is no
research on the effects of the procedure for involving a child (e.g.
whether interviewing should take place in chambers or be carried out
by a social worker). In sum, the psychological impact of involving
children in custody proceedings has not yet been explored in any
detail.
Although in some quarters the direct involvement of children in
matters pertaining to their family remains controversial, the
conventional legal wisdom now seems to be that children’s voices
ought to be heard, at least when the child is beyond the infant stage.
For instance, in one jurisdiction which there was no legal obligation
to elicit children’s opinions, most judges indicated that they
nonetheless did so in cases not involving preschoolers…
Whatever the judges’ motivation, however, and notwithstanding the
dearth of research on the effects of children’s direct involvement in
divorce proceedings, there is clearly ample opportunity for mental
health professionals to assist lawyers and judges in structuring
interviews of children who are the subjects of custody and visitation
disputes. … A separate question is whether a child ought to be given
a more formal voice, through a lawyer.
Indeed, the relative infrequency with which guardians ad litem are
appointed in divorce cases may mean that some of the educative role
normally assigned children’s attorneys will fall on clinical evaluators,
who are ethically obligated to inform their interviewees about the
context for the evaluation. In such a situation, the clinician may even
be tempted to act as advocate for the child—a difficult role discussed
in the next section. When children do have their own attorneys,
however, the clinician’s role is more likely to consist of generating
and communicating information that will assist the attorney in
“developmentally appropriate” representation. Thus, in this context
as in many others, forensic clinicians are likely to find themselves
used as consultants as much as evaluators, in the narrow sense of the
latter term.
In other contexts (e.g. criminal evaluations), we have defended the
practice of having the parties employ their own experts [see
4.03(b)(1)]. In an adversary system, justice normally is served by
giving each side the chance to put its best case forward. However, we
do not recommend this procedure in custody evaluations. First, it is
the child’s interests, not the parties’ (i.e., the parents’) interests, that
are theoretically paramount; accordingly, some of the usual reasons
for protecting the interests of the parties do not so readily apply. That
is, there may be substantial reason for the court to seek its own
evidence as to the interests of a third party (i.e., the child). Second, as
a practical matter, it is difficult to do a credible custody evaluations
without access to both parents. Yet, under a pure adversarial
approach, the clinician is asked to address only the effects that might
occur if custody is granted to the employing party, he or she is
hampered by not hearing the other parent’s side of things, because the
family history and family process are likely to be perceived
differently by each party. Accordingly, as a general rule, we suggest
that clinicians seek to enter custody disputes as an expert for the court
or the guardian ad litem, although there may be some rare
circumstances in which it is sufficient to have access to only one
parent.
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A clinician who already has an ongoing therapeutic relationship with
one or both of the spouses should be especially careful to avoid
giving opinions without adequate foundation. Opinions as to parental
competence or parent-child relationships should never be offered
unless there has been specific focus on these topics. As indicated
earlier, an interview with the child, with the parent and child together,
or both kinds of interviews will generally be necessary if there is to
be any substantial basis for an opinion on custody issues. Thus
reliance on therapeutic encounters as the sole basis for evaluation and
testimony is appropriate.
Indeed, it may be that any opinion about custody given by the
therapist of one or both parents is inappropriate [see generally
4.05(c)(2)] We have already noted [see 16.01(c)] the American
Psychological Association’s recommendation that a therapist refrain
from offering custody opinions as an expert (as opposed to acting as a
“fact” witness who recounts observations). The reasons for this
position are numerous. There is often a temptation when an adult
client is involved in a custody dispute to act to protect the client.
After all, if the client is heavily invested in being a parent, an adverse
ruling will be likely to take a substantial psychological toll. Even
when a clinician is treating both parents, as in marriage counseling,
there may be pulls to take sides. One parent may feed information
damaging to the other. And even if the clinician could maintain
perfect objectivity, evaluation and testimony are likely to create an
acute sense of betrayal on the part of one or both parents. There are
similar issues when a clinician hired as a mediator begins to act like
an evaluator [see 16.01(b)(2)].
The applicability of psychotherapist privilege in custody cases is
unclear and is highly variable across jurisdictions. … Clinicians
involved in marital or family therapy should seek legal advice as to
the limits of privilege in their jurisdiction [see generally 4.04(c)]. In
the meantime, the therapist should be aware that material from
family, child, or marital treatment is often not protected by privilege
in a custody case, even in jurisdictions recognizing a general
psychotherapist privilege and even when a person involved in the
treatment objects to the admission of evidence based on it.
In the past two decades, a number of books describing clinical
assessment procedures in child custody cases have been published.
As they indicate, potential approaches to assessment in custody
evaluations include (1) comprehensive observation and interviewing
of the parents and children, and gathering of interview and archival
information from third-party sources; (2) the administration of
traditional psychological tests; and (3) the administration of
specialized tests. Our position is strongly in favor of the first of these
approaches. For reasons discussed below, we recommend only a
limited role for the use of traditional tests, and we caution against the
use of the commercially available specialized tests for child custody
assessments.
Investigative interviewing is the predominant model in custody
assessments. In view of both the breadth of the best-interest concept
and the multiplicity of factors potentially affecting the outcome of
various custody and visitation arrangements, a child custody
evaluation can be best summarized as comprehensive [see, e.g., the
Gonz-Jones report, 19.12(a), and Table 16.1]. Parents, stepparents,
and children should all be interviewed as to their perceptions of
relationships in the family (past, present, and future), their
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preferences about custody, and any special needs of the children.
Because of the significance of interparental conflict in the literature
on effects of divorce, special attention should be given to the parents’
capacity for cooperation, the nature and intensity of disagreements
about the children, and points of possible compromise. As a means of
observing parent-child relationships in a realistic environment, home
visits may be advisable as well.
Nor should the evaluation stop with interviews of the immediate
family. Contact with extended family, teachers, social service
agencies, and even babysitters can illuminate potential sources of
support (or lack thereof) under various custody arrangements (e.g.,
switching between parental homes). Sources outside the nuclear
family may also five important, relatively objective glimpses of
children’s responses to arrangements developed during separations
and under temporary custody orders. In that regard, the existing and
previous custody arrangements can be conceptualized as natural
experiments of a sort. The clinic should be sure to elicit information
as to the parties’ attitudes and behavioral responses to those
arrangements.
However, even these directly relevant data may have limited
usefulness in predicting children’s long-term responses to custody
dispositions. The California and Virginia studies have made it clear
that these responses shift substantially over time. We remind
readers of the point that we have made throughout this chapter:
Careful attention must be paid to the limits of expertise in
custody evaluations.
Research on the practices of mental health professionals in custody
assessments is both sparse and almost exclusively based on selfreported practices. The few data that do exist suggest that the use of
conventional tests is routine.
It is our contention that psychological tests assessing clinical
constructs (e.g., intelligence, depression, personality, academic
achievement) are frequently unnecessary and often used
inappropriately. Tests of intellectual capacity, achievement,
personality style, and psychopathology assess constructs that are
linked only indirectly, at best, to the key issues concerning custody
and visitation.
Thus, apparent practices notwithstanding, we recommend the use of
traditional psychological tests only when specific problems or issues
that these tests were designed to measure appear salient in the case.
Unfortunately, as detailed in the next section, tests that purport to
assess constructs directly relevant to custody have their own
theoretical and psychometric limitations.
In our view, however, these measures suffer from serious conceptual
flaws and inadequate psychometric construction. Pending the
development of an adequate empirical research base for their use, we
advise against including them in custody evaluations.
In summary, we join with other reviewers who recommend caution in
the use of these commercially available “child custody” measures.
Although some of these measures may facilitate gathering useful
responses regarding parents’ attitudes, knowledge, or values with
respect to raising their children, the lack of adequate reliability and
validity studies counsels against use of the formal indices they yield.
Certainly these indices do not identify “scientifically” the parent of
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choice or indicate other dispositional conclusions—matters that are
properly reserved for the court.
We conclude this chapter as we began it—with caveats. Throughout
this chapter, we have noted that the relevant empirical knowledge is
especially limited and that the prevailing legal standards are
especially problematic. Making this combination of legal and clinical
conundrums even more problematic is the fact that forensic clinicians
involved in divorce cases work against a politically charged
backdrop.
The politics of divorce is not simply a matter of gender. Generational
conflicts also are in the backdrop. … [C]hild advocates are disturbed
that children’s lack of standing in cases involving their own custody
often means that their interests receive the least attention in divorce.
Following similar logic, concern about the effects of divorce on
children has led some commentators to argue that divorce has
become too easy, even if more stringent standards and onerous
procedures would have troubling effects on the parents themselves.
Although the issues typically are subtle, mental health professionals
conducting custody evaluations should take special care to examine
ways in which their own experiences and attitudes color their views
about childrearing and “proper” roles—especially gender roles—of
family members. They also need to be especially sensitive to ways
that clinicians can be unwittingly drawn into taking sides with a
family member.

Chapter 7, section 7.07: Competency to Testify
179
7.07
Based on the principle that only evidence that has some probative
Competency to value is admissible, courts have long held that people who are
Testify
incapable of remembering or reporting what they have observed, or
have no ability to grasp the importance of accurately doing so, may
not testify as witnesses. Thus testimonial competency is still another
competency issue that a forensic clinician might be asked to address.
… [T]estimonial capacity arises in civil as well as criminal trials. It is
discussed here because it most often arises in criminal trials,
particularly in abuse cases involving children.
179
7.07
Also discussed here is the closely related issue of expert evaluation of
Competency to and testimony about a witness’s credibility. Increasingly, mental
Testify
health professionals have been involved in assessing and commenting
upon the truth of testimony offered by witnesses who are competent
to testify, but whose mental condition raises questions about their
veracity. The fourth subsection below examines this complex area.
179
(a) Legal
Until the 1970s, the law of most states presumed that children under a
Requirements
certain age (e.g., 10 or 14) were incompetent to testify, meaning that
for
the party tendering the witness had to prove competency. Although
Testimonial
there was typically no similar presumption about those with mental
Competency
disability, courts routinely barred persons with significant
impairments from testifying. Today, in contrast, the law in most
states presumes that everyone is competent to testify. In 1975, the
Federal Rules of Evidence added Rule 601, which simply states that
“[e]very person is competent to be a witness: unless their testimony is
irrelevant or likely to mislead the factfinder, or the person is unable
or unwilling to promise to testify truthfully. … Although a few states
still set a presumptive age for incompetency, most states have since
followed the federal lead or at most set out guidelines for determining
whether a witness is competent.
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In many jurisdictions, moreover, a witness who claims to be a victim
of abuse and is testifying against the alleged abuser is irrebuttably
presumed to be competent—a rule that has withstood constitutional
challenge. These “automatic competency” statutes are principally the
result of the same campaign that gave rise to child abuse reporting
laws [see 15.01(c)]. But they are also justifiable on grounds
elucidated by the noted evidence authority Dean Wigmore many
years ago: “A rational view of the peculiarities of child-nature, and of
the daily course of justice in our courts, must lead to the conclusion
that the effort to measure a priori the degrees of trustworthiness in
children’s statements, and to distinguish the point at which they cease
to be totally incredible and acquire some degree of credibility, is
futile and unprofitable…. Recognizing on the one hand the childish
disposition to weave romances and to treat imagination for veracity,
and on the other the rotted ingeniousness of children and their
tendency to speak straightforwardly what is in their minds, it must be
concluded that the sensible way is to put the child upon the stand and
let the story come out for what it may be worth.”
It is important to note, however, that except in those jurisdictions
requiring the admission of testimony from alleged child abuse
victims, modern law merely makes testimony by children and those
with mental disability more likely than under the common law; it
does not prevent a judge from barring testimony on competency
grounds. Just as the common-law presumption of incompetency for
children was rebuttable, the modern presumption that everyone is
competent may be overcome with sufficient evidence showing that a
person’s mental incapacity will render his or her testimony irrelevant,
misleading, or incredible.
The precise criteria the judge apples at such a hearing vary from state
to state, but, as summarized by Myers, they focus on five capacities:
(1) the ability to observe the event, (2) the ability to remember it, (3)
the ability to communicate that memory, (4) the ability to tell the
difference between truth and falsity, and (5) the ability to understand
the obligation to tell the truth in court. Given the language of Rule
601 and its state counterparts, presumably only minimal capacity in
each of these areas is necessary. Nonetheless, courts and parties have
occasionally sought assistance from the behavioral sciences in
making competency determinations.
As the previous discussion suggests, the four categories of
individuals most likely to trigger testimonial capacity concerns are
children, people with mental retardation, people with mental illness,
and those who have abused substances. Because the literature is most
robust in connection with children, this review focuses on what is
known about their testimonial capacities. However a few references
to the research on the capacities of those with mental retardation are
noted as well.
Unless a child or a person with a mental disability has some visual or
aural defect, his or her capacity to sense events will usually be
sufficient to meet the first prong of testimonial capacity. It is
possible, however, that some very young children or people with
mental retardation may not have the ability to process all types of
events. … Children may also have difficulty grasping the meaning of
sophisticated conversations. At the same time, children still seem to
be able to register an event even if they do not understand it.
Moreover, children who are called on to testify will typically be
asked to describe relatively concrete actions by people they know; if
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so, little question about their capacity to observe events should exist.
A separate issue is their ability to conceptualize and describe what
has been observed—a topic discussed in connection with ability to
communicate.
Because legal proceedings often occur months or even years after the
legally relevant event, the capacity to remember what was observed
is as important as the capacity to observe. Furthermore, the capacity
to remember events accurately is virtually inseparable from one’s
capacity to resist suggestion from other sources. Thus research on
both memory and suggestibility is important in evaluating this
competency criterion.
Most of the research in this area has been conducted in connection
with children. The bottom line appears to be that children are
somewhat less likely than adults to retain memory of what they hear
or observe, but that all but the youngest children probably have good
enough memories to pass the minimal requirements for testimonial
capacity. On the closely related issue of the extent to which memory
may be affected by outside influences, most studies indicate that
young children are more suggestible than adults. Again, however, this
finding alone probably should not render a child incompetent to
testify; the better approach will normally be to make known the
opportunities for suggestion to the factfinder, which can then assess
the credibility of the witness.
In assessing memory retention capacity, two different types of
memory should be noted: “recognition memory,” where a person is
asked whether he or she recognizes a person or a place, and “recall
memory,” where a person is asked to describe an event, person, or
place. Even children as young as three and four appear to perform as
well as adults on some recognition memory tasks. For instance, a
child who is asked to identify previously seen pictures or faces
should be able to do almost as well as an adult, as long as no
intervening suggestions have taken hold. Research also indicates that
even when a previously unfamiliar perpetrator is present in a lineup,
five- an six-year-olds’ identifications are as accurate as adults’.
However, when the child has had only brief exposure to the
perpetrator or is very young, accuracy decreases. Furthermore, when
the suspect is not present in the lineup, children as old as nine tend to
make more errors than adults, and there is some evidence that young
children may sometimes place familiar people at an event who were
not actually there.
Recall memory requires more sophisticated cognitive processes than
recognition memory. Accordingly, a child who is asked to describe a
past event, such as an assault, will find the task relatively more
difficult than an adult. The difference between the recall memory of
children and adults depends primarily on the two variables: time and
the extent to which other versions of the event have been suggested
by third parties (the “suggestibility” issue).
When the time interval between the event and the attempt at memory
recall is short, children apparently do not do appreciably worse than
adults. … As the time interval between event and recall lengthens,
however, children do not do as well as adults in recalling events. …
Finally, infantile amnesia can obscure memories of very early
childhood if enough time elapses. More research needs to be done,
however, on whether children’s memory fades more quickly than
adults’ when a particularly negative event is involved.
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Presumably, one way of alleviating the effects of memory decay
would be to obtain an early account of the legally relevant event.
Indeed, several students have found that “events that are personally
significant, emotion-laden, and rehearsed are less likely to be lost
from memory” (emphasis added). As Poole and White suggest, a
postevent interview may act as a “memory consolidator” for children.
However, they also conclude that it will have this effect only if it
occurs less than a week after the event, and only if it avoids specific
(i.e., yes-no) questions. Unfortunately, neither of these conditions is
easily met in legal contexts such as abuse cases. Allegations of abuse
may not arise until some time after the alleged event. More
important, use of open-ended questions, which is generally a good
idea in any forensic interview, may not be as productive where
children are involved. As suggested by the Marin et al. study
described earlier, and as Poole and White themselves note, “it is
exceptionally difficult to get children to volunteer information with
general questions.” In short, young children require direct cues, such
as specific, direct questions, to stimulate recall.
These various observations bring to the fore the suggestibility issue,
which many courts have recognized as an important component of
competency analysis. Although specific questions may be the best
method for obtaining information from children, they are also most
likely to contain cues as to how to answer. Hence the “memory”
recounted by a child may be suggested inadvertently (or advertently)
as an adult helps the child to make sense of the experience.
Here again the research is relatively clear. Although adults as well as
children are prone to fill in perceptual and memory gaps with
stereotypical information and postevent suggestion, most studies find
that young children are more likely to accede to such suggestions,
especially when they are made by authority figures who act in an
intimidating fashion. According to Ceci, children over 10 or 11 years
of age tend to show adult levels of resistance to leading questions.
But children under 6 may acquiesce fairly frequently, especially
when questions are “highly leading, detailed, incriminating, and
repeated over multiple interviews,” with children in between showing
varying levels of vulnerability. Vulnerability to suggestions may be
particularly high when, as is often the case with child witnesses in
criminal and civil cases, the adult proffering the suggestions is
someone who saw the event.
This correlation between age and suggestibility can be explained in a
number of ways, none of them mutually exclusive. It is likely due in
part to children’s weaker memory over time, discussed previously. It
is also likely due to young children’s greater respect for authority—a
hypothesis bolstered by simple learning theory, which suggests that
children’s behavior will be shaped by their perceptions of adults’
expectations. Finally, it may have something to do with children’s
moral development. As Fodor discovered, children who yield to the
suggestions of an adult interviewer tend to score lower on
assessments of level of moral judgment (according to Kohlberg’s
criteria) than children who resist such suggestions.
Although the research is not as extensive, studies examining the
capacities of persons with mental retardation yield results similar to
those obtained with children. As with children, the method that is
most likely to garner information from those with mental retardation
is also the method most likely to taint it. Because of their cognitive
deficiencies, individuals with mental retardation are more likely to
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reveal what they know in response to a yes-no question format; free
recall is likely to produce less, if not inaccurate, information. Yet,
because of their desire to please, these people are also more likely
than others to acquiesce in suggestions by authority figures.
In light of the fact that by the time of the typical trial, a witness has
been interviewed several times by government officials and lawyers,
and perhaps been confronted by the alleged perpetrator as well, what
are the legal implications of these findings about suggestibility?
Myers states that people “are not rendered incompetent to serve as
witnesses simply because they are sometimes misled by suggestion,”
and implies that generally heightened suggestibility should not be a
bar to testimony. Christiansen is less sanguine, stating that, “when
pretrial procedures have falsified a child’s memory, the child is not
competent to testify to the contents of that memory.” He goes on to
suggest how the law should respond when suggestive procedures
have been used: “When a child has been the subject of potentially
suggestive pretrial procedures the child’s competence as a witness
cannot be determined unless these procedures have been taken into
account and any effects they may have had on the child’s memory
have been weighed. Competency hearing voir dire of the child alone
does not satisfy this requirement. The child may not be able to
separate out the various interviews she has been through or to
respond meaningfully to questions about them. The child may not
have been at all aware of more subtle forms of suggestion, such as the
phrasing and repetition of questions. … Accordingly, competency
determinations in such cases must rely upon extrinsic evidence of the
pretrial procedures as well, including, but not limited to, the
testimony and records of those who conducted the pretrial interviews
and other procedures. … In some cases, it might also be appropriate
to present expert testimony independent of the testimony of
interviewers, to show why the procedures might or might not have
affected the child’s memory.”
At the least, the research recounted earlier suggests that interviewing
and evaluation of young children and those with mental retardation
must proceed cautiously.
If an event cannot be communicated in a coherent, meaningful way, a
witness’s observation and memory of it are useless to the factfinder.
Consequently, a person’s ability to conceptualize complex events and
to order them in space and time are of major importance.
Furthermore, particular kinds of testimony may require further
specific competencies. Most notably, testimony about child sexual
abuse may require verification of the child’s comprehension of the
meaning of sexual terms and behavior.
Shaffer has stated that “by age 5, children not only understand most
of the grammatical rules of their native tongue but are also
constructing remarkably complex, adultlike sentences. But children
below that age, and indeed some children above it, may not be able to
communicate their observations effectively. For example, to Piaget,
the well-known theorist of child development, it was a truism that
“preoperational” children, often up to age seven, are unable to
“decenter” from the most obvious attitude of a stimulus and make use
of all relevant information. To cite a classic example, young children
who observe a clay string rolled into a ball and then rolled back into a
string believe that there is more clay present when it is in a ball,
which looks more massive. Children may also have difficulty in
understanding time independent of distance and speed (e.g., many
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believe that the object that travels the furthest has traveled for the
longest period of time), and thus may have difficulty in describing the
chronology of events. Furthermore, Piaget asserted, the basic
egocentrism of young children may make it difficult for them to
interpret the actions of others outside a limited frame of reference.
All this may affect a child’s ability to recite facts accurately.
Some critics of Piagetian theory have suggested that on many tasks,
preschoolers are less illogical and egocentric in their thinking than
Piaget believed. Siegel has argued that the classical finding of young
children’s inability to pass “conservation” tasks (e.g., the ball of clay)
is often a manifestation of linguistic deficits. That is, young children
may not understand the words “more,” “bigger,” and the like, but
they may be able to demonstrate understanding of the concepts
nonverbally. Furthermore, Brainerd, Trabasso, and others have
demonstrated that preschoolers can be trained in conversation skills,
contrary to the Piagetian hypothesis that the necessary cognitive
structures would not be expected to have developed adequately. With
respect to the egocentrism claim, Borke has found that children three
to four years old have the capacity to take the perspective of another,
provided that the specific task is a simple one and involves little use
of language.
These studies do not moot the point, however, that young children are
likely to have difficulty in conceptualizing complex events. Borke,
for example, has admitted that some of Piaget’s tasks are “cognitively
too difficult” for children below the age of five. And although the
work of Brainerd and others indicates that children’s capacities can
be enhanced with training, such training is not always available or
feasible. Given the realities of the courtroom situation, cognitivedevelopmental factors are an important consideration in evaluating
the testimony of children who are younger than seven. They should
also be taken into account when interviewing such children; several
age-sensitive techniques have been suggested.
Nonetheless, young children’s immaturity of conceptualization may
ultimately have little impact on their competency to testify, for at
least two reasons. First, modern courts do not seem overly concerned
with these problems. According to most courts, the fact that children
use language differently, are occasionally inconsistent, make factual
mistakes, have difficulty conceptualizing time, or resort to nonverbal
methods are not bars per se to a competency finding. The ultimate
question is whether children’s testimony is so unreliable that jurors
would be “unduly” influenced by it. Thus, as long as he court thinks a
jury (or in a bench trial, the judge) can accurately perceive the
objective reality of a child, the child’s cognitive immaturity is of little
significance.
Second steps can be taken to increase the likelihood that the child’s
testimony will be understandable. In the typical abuse case, children
will appear incompetent if the examiner uses technical vocabulary
rather than slang or dolls or drawings. Monge et al. found that even
ninth graders are often unfamiliar with “proper” terms for sexual
anatomy and physiology. On the other hand, there is evidence that by
age four most children are aware of sex differences and willing to
speak freely about them, provided that questions are direct and in
language familiar to a child. Furthermore, several courts have
permitted a child witness to have an “interpreter” (e.g., a parent or
child psychologist) when it appears that a child cannot express himor herself in a nonidiosyncratic manner.
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If a witness can relate his or her experiences adequately, the principal
concern is whether he or she will do so truthfully. Indeed, under the
common law, a witness’s ability to abide by the “oath” was the focal
point of the competency assessment; courts would routinely ask child
witnesses, for instance, if they believed in God and knew the
consequences of telling a lie in court, and would base their
competency decision on the answers. Even today, the courts tend to
gloss over observation, memory, and communication capacities and
place primary emphasis on the witness’s ability to differentiate truth
from falsehood, to comprehend the duty to tell the truth, and to
understand the consequences of not fulfilling this duty. However, in
contrast to the common-law test, the modern witnesses need not
confirm a belief in God. Most jurisdictions now give the witness the
choice of the oath (e.g., swearing to tell the truth “so help me God”)
or an affirmation that the witness will tell the truth. Several states
even allow a child to testify without taking an oath if, in the court’s
discretion, the child does not understand it but is still likely to give
probative testimony.
When it comes to children, the courts’ obsession with truthtelling
seems overblown. There is in fact little correlation between age
and truthtelling; in other words, children are not more prone to
lie than adults or to misunderstand the concept of truth. …
However, consistent with the research on suggestibility, these
researchers did caution that “there may be a small percentage of
children whose definition of the truth may be influenced by parental
direction or its helpfulness to a friend.” Similar general findings have
been made with respect to those with mental retardation.
A more likely developmental differentiation is in the reasons people
give to justify behavior. For instance, as children grow older, they
become more sociocentric and oriented toward respect for persons
individually or collectively; in contrast, younger children are likely to
say that the oath is important on more “primitive” grounds involving
reification of rules and avoidance of punishment. This difference is
unlikely to be relevant in this context, however. Justice will be served
if witnesses tell the truth, regardless of the reasons for doing so, and
most courts today recognize that fact. If there is some reason to
ascertain a child’s conceptualization of the duty to tell the truth,
however, the yes-no and definition questions traditionally used in
common law voir dire of witnesses are inadequate measures. One of
the philosophical underpinnings of current cognitive-developmental
theories of moral development is that a given behavior may be
motivated by vastly different levels of moral reasoning. Thus asking
a child to explain the meaning of “truth,” “oath,” or “God” probably
tells us more about the child’s intellectual development than about his
or her propensity to tell the truth.
Although there are some gaps in the relevant literature, the available
research suggests that preteen children as young as five have the
capacity to observe events, remember them accurately for moderately
long periods (as long as authority figures do not suggest alternative
facts to them), and communicate about them with the understanding
that a truthful report is important. Children under the age of five are
likely to have more difficulty with long-term memory, resisting
suggestions, and effectively communicating their observations, but
with assistance even some three-year-olds may have the capacity to
report their observations accurately and understand the difference
between a lie and the truth. The analogues with people who have
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mental retardation are not precise, but the correlations between
testimonial capacity and IQ is probably similar to that between
testimonial capacity and age.
A possible caveat to these conclusions is that very little of the
research on children’s testimonial accuracy has replicated the stress
likely to be associated with the courtroom setting. Research on this
issue is mixed, although the evidence points to the conclusion that
conventional legal procedures are somewhat more likely to be stressinducing than informal environments, and that testimony is somewhat
more likely to be incomplete in traditional courtrooms. Concern over
these effects has led some states to construct elaborate procedures for
taking juvenile testimony in abuse cases, including use of screens and
television monitors to distance the witness from the defendant and the
trappings of the courtroom. Yet these procedures are seldom used,
apparently because prosecutors perceive live testimony to be more
influential, fear creating appealable issues, and lack the necessary
financial resources. In those (predominantly foreign) settings in
which the procedures are more commonly used, their efficacy is
unclear, although it does appear that having the option of such a
procedure (whether or not it is chosen) alleviates stress.
In any event, stress impairment at trial will normally not reach a level
requiring a declaration of incompetency. In view of the small
percentage of cases that reach the courtroom, much more important
from the standpoint of obtaining the “facts” is avoiding stress,
suggestiveness, and other accuracy-reducing aspects of the
investigation process—a subject covered in more detail below.
Although litigants can be said to have placed their mental state at
issue by raising or defending a particular claim, witnesses are often
“innocent bystanders” in the quarrel. Thus courts have exhibited
some reluctance about ordering psychological evaluations of
witnesses, primarily on privacy grounds [see 7.07(d)(2) for
elaboration of this point].
Another preliminary issue clinicians must address is whether they
have anything to add to what a trial judge will be able to discern with
respect to observational, memory, communication, and moral
capacities. At least on commentator has stated that “the trial judge is
nearly always capable of reaching a reasoned decision on competence
without [a psychiatric] evaluation.” Furthermore, as indicated earlier,
the clinician should remember that multiple interviews with witnesses
like children may tend to distort the ultimate testimony. On the other
hand, mental health professionals may well have something useful to
say about testimonial competency in selected cases, particularly
involving very young children and individuals with mental
retardation or severe mental illness.
If an evaluation is undertaken, it should focus on the four factors
described above. The witness’s observational skills can be directly
assessed, although if the event in question took place some time
previously when the witness was very young, information about such
skills at the time of the event may have to be obtained from parents or
other significant others. Memory for events other than the one in
question can be tested by asking simple questions about both recent
and long-ago events. Communication skills can also be ascertained
by having the witness recount an event known to have happened and
ascertaining his or her capacity to describe correctly spatial,
temporal, and other aspects of the event. Finally, the witness’s
understanding and commitment to truthtelling can be assessed by
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asking in the abstract what it means to tell the truth and then asking
for examples. IF more concrete information is needed, the witness
can be asked whether a statement such as :I am wearing glasses: is
true or false, and then asked why it is one or the other. In general, the
techniques developed for children, noted earlier, should be
transferable to evaluations of other individuals of suspect testimonial
capacity.
Although such an assessment would cover the basic criteria of
testimonial competency, to be useful an evaluation probably should
not stop at the point. A court would generally also benefit from insigh
into whether the witness’s memory of the legally relevant event is
“genuine” and is being accurately recounted, or instead is the product
of suggestion or fantasy. As already indicated, the difficulty is that by
the time the question of competency is raised, the potential witness is
likely to have been asked about the alleged offense numerous times.
If it was perceived as a traumatic event or if a family member is the
defendant, the witness may also have been bombarded with diverging
interpretations of the event. Moreover, especially with a child, when
the event in question was one previously outside the witness’s
experience or one that he or she had not previously identified as
deviant, the witness may be dependent upon others to provide
meaning to the experience.
Determining with certainty the origins of a witness’s memories in
such situations may not be possible. But it will obviously be useful in
this regard to determine as precisely as one can when and with whom
the child has talked and the content and process of these discussions.
If depositions have already been taken, they should be reviewed and
compared with the interview notes. As Christiansen stated in the
expert above, a “child’s competence as a witness cannot be
determined unless these procedures have been taken into account and
any effects they may have had on the child’s memory have been
weighed.”
The clinician must also try to avoid “creating” memories. One should
avoid asking about the event entirely, instead simply carrying out the
third-party investigation described above. The problem with this
approach is that there may be no current version of the story with
which to compare earlier versions; furthermore, useful information
about communication skills may be obtainable only by having the
witness recount the event once again. If such an account is viewed as
necessary, Yuille et al. have described the following several-stage
process as a way of maximizing information while minimizing
suggestion: building rapport; asking for a free narrative account; and,
only if the latter appears ineffective, proceeding to open-ended
questions, specific yet nonleading questions, and finally leading
questions.
Although the fact-gathering and evaluation process just described can
probably be accomplished by a competent nonprofessional (and
indeed is often carried out by judges an lawyers without clinical
assistance), there are other ways in which a clinician might be
particularly helpful to the legal system in this context. First, when it
is necessary to correct any misconceptions about typical behavior of
children at a given age, the clinician might present research of the
type described in the previous discussion. In this guise, the clinician
or research psychologist is providing assistance similar to that
provided by a psychologist who describes general problems with
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eyewitness observation—what Monahan and Walker refer to as
“social framework evidence,” or context for determining past facts.
Second, the clinician can consult with the attorneys seeking—or
challenging—the prospective witness’s testimony. In the former
instance, the clinician may be helpful in preparing the witness for
testimony, both by desensitizing him or her to the court process and
by providing the attorney with advice on ways of interviewing the
witness (or, as may be allowed in some courts, conducting the
questioning him- or herself). As a consultant to the challenging
attorney, the clinician may point out factors likely to affect the
reliability of the witness’s testimony and ways of highlighting these
factors on voir dire.
Third, and most controversial, the clinician might, at the behest of the
lawyers or the court, attempt to solidify a vulnerable witness’s
memory. Saywitz tentatively suggests three methods designed to
improve “memory performance”: (1) “narrative elaboration,” in
which the witnesses “learn to organize the elements of an event into
five forensically relevant, theoretically driven categories
(participants, setting, actions, conversations/affect, and
consequences)”; (2) “strategy training to resist misleading questions,
including practice, feedback, [and] self-monitoring”; and (3) the
“cognitive interview,” which, as described by other researchers, relies
on mnemonics and other cognitive interventions to enhance the
accuracy of recall and testimony. These methods would presumably
be used prior to trial, and in preparation for it. Further discussion of
the methods for evaluating children in abuse cases is found in
15.06(b).
Expert testimony on credibility, on the other hand, addresses the
likelihood that statements made by a person who has been found
competent to testify are truthful. As a conceptual matter, the
distinction between a competency evaluation and a credibility
assessment seems reasonably clear. As a practical matter, however,
the line between the two evaluations is likely to be blurred.
It is a basic premise of the Anglo-American legal system that the jury
(or judge, in bench trials) is responsible for assessing the credibility
of witnesses. In an effort to avoid “usurping” this function of the jury,
ethical rules forbid both the judge and the lawyers from expressing an
opinion in front of the jury about the truthfulness of a witness. For
some time, the law also significantly restricted the ability of a party
to present testimony about a witness’s credibility. Only statements
about the witness’s “reputation” for truthfulness in the community
were permitted; the person describing the witness’s reputation was
prohibited from expressing his or her own opinion as to credibility,
and furthermore was not permitted to describe specific acts of
untruthfulness or truthfulness unless queried about them during crossexamination. As Lilly noted, these limitations were designed “to
minimize188 the burdens of delay and distraction caused by the
introduction of secondary issues.” Furthermore, information about
reputation was seen as more reliable than a personal opinion about
truthfulness and more relevant and less prejudicial than descriptions
of specific acts of fabrication.
Given the “reputation evidence” restriction on credibility testimony
in this traditional regime, mental health professionals should have
had no role to play in assessing witness credibility (as distinct from
witness competency). Nonetheless, some courts did allow them to
testify on the issue. One of the first such cases involved the
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prosecution of Alger Hiss on espionage charges in the early 1950s—a
case worth investigating in some detail, because it illustrates many of
the pitfalls of expert credibility testimony.
[T]he general rule was that a witness’s character for truthtelling could
only be impeached with testimony about the witness’s reputation as
an untruthful person. In 1975, however, almost 25 years after the Hiss
trial, the federal courts adopted Rule 608, which liberalized the
approach to credibility testimony. … Rule 608 allows opinion
testimony as well as reputation testimony.
Whatever the correct reading of Rule 608, psychiatric testimony on
credibility has been admitted with increasing frequency since its
promulgation. … At the same time, such testimony is not routinely
admitted. Indeed, many courts still insist that experts should normally
not be allowed to testify about credibility. There appear to be two
reasons for this stance. First, of course, a court might feel that such
testimony is not based on specialized knowledge, which is required
of all expert testimony. … Second, even if the mental health
professional’s credibility testimony is thought to pass this initial test,
the court may believe that its potential for confusing the jury or
usurping the jury’s traditional role as an assessor of credibility
outweighs its probative value. In many cases, this possibility might
be curable with an instruction of the type given by the trial judge in
Hiss, combined with effective cross-examination (along the lines of
the cross-examination in Hiss). In other cases, however, the courts
have concluded that these procedural devices do not sufficiently
protect against misleading the jury.
Nonetheless, expert testimony on witness credibility has been
permitted in enough cases to discern at least four areas in which
courts in some jurisdictions may permit it. The first is when the
witness is allegedly suffering from significant mental disorder, such
as hallucinations. … Second, courts have traditionally been willing to
allow credibility testimony focused on the complainant in rape
cases—the situation raised in Case Study 7.3. This stance follows the
view of many commentators, who have argued that accusations of
rape are particularly likely to be fabricated. … Because this reasoning
appears to be based on outdated attitudes amounting to sexism,
testimony about the credibility of alleged rape victims is becoming
less common.
Similar comments can be made about a third common area for expert
credibility testimony, having to do with the truthfulness of child
witnesses in child abuse cases. Some courts have allowed the
prosecution to rebut attacks on a child witness’s credibility with
expert testimony to the effect that children never or seldom lie about
abuse. Like testimony attacking the credibility of rape complaints,
testimony unequivocally supporting the credibility of child abuse
complainants is based on outmoded assumptions—in this case, the
assumption that today’s children are not able to fabricate stories
about sexual abuse. Courts may be more reticent about permitting
such testimony as they come to recognize that children do lie, or at
least, as suggested in 7.07(b)(2), can be prompted to “remember”
events that did not occur. This topic is discussed further in
15.04(c)(4).
A final common type of credibility testimony has to do with the
reliability of eyewitnesses. … It is sufficient for present purposes to
note that the research suggests a number of conclusions about
eyewitness testimony that, if not counterintuitive, at least may be
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helpful to a jury considering the credibility of an eyewitness. These
include the findings that (1) people tend to be less accurate observers
in stressful situations; (2) people have difficulty making cross-racial
identifications; (3) people focus on weapons rather than faces; (4) the
memory of a perception begins decaying immediately; (5) gaps in
memory are easily and often unconsciously replaced by
preconceptions about what must have happened, or by suggestions
implanted by subsequent accounts, the police, or other external
forces; and as a result of all this, (6) there is no necessary correlation
between the level of certainty evinced by the eyewitness and
accuracy.
Despite the helpfulness of such observations, several courts have
clung to the view that juries are competent to evaluate eyewitness
testimony without expert assistance, or, somewhat contradictorily,
that the jury will be overly influenced by expert testimony on the
topic. Many other courts have permitted such testimony, although
some have reasonably prohibited the expert from stating his or her
own opinion on the “ultimate issue” of the eyewitness’s accuracy.
Whether mental health professionals have any ability to evaluate
credibility per se is a matter of some controversy. … As just
discussed, in some areas (e.g. eyewitness testimony), behavioral
science may be able to assist the courts in detecting “unconscious”
false testimony. Again, however, detection of intentional deception is
not the aim of the experts who testify on this issue. We believe that
when the only reason an expert is on the stand is to attack a witness’s
motivations or honesty, there will typically be very little “science”
involved. In short, as a general matter, this type of credibility
testimony about a witness is highly suspect.
In sum, courts should consider motions to compel an evaluation for
purposes of assessing credibility with caution. Indeed, the weak
scientific basis for most such assessments, combined with the insult
to privacy interests, might lead to the conclusion that such
evaluations should never be permitted, even when the witness to be
evaluated is a party to the litigation.

262

Should (x2,
borderline
instruction)

